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I. INTRODUCTION 
The use of property as a regulatory mechanism in the telecommunica­
tions sector is hardly novel. Since the early twentieth century, policy mak­
ers and regulators in the United States have experimented with different 
mechanisms for al locating private rights in the radio spectrum. 1 In 1959, 
Ronald Coase proposed that the FCC auction rights in the broadcast spec-
I. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Right w Radio Spectrum U<;ers: 
Whv Did FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years:;, 41 J.L. & EcoN. 529. 532-33 ( 1 998) 
(hereinafter Hazlett. Assigning Property Rights] (noting how the idea began in 19 1 2  and 
identifying four approaches that were adopted). See also Thomas W. Hazlett, The Ra­
tionality of U.S. Regu/01ion o( Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECO'i. 133 ( 1990); Law­
rence J. White, "Proper�v;:ing .. the Electromagnecic SpecLmm: J-Vh_1· il ·s fmponan1. and 
How to Begin, in COMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION AND FCC' Rt.;r-oRM 111 {Jeffrey A. 
Eisenach & Randolph .f. May eds., 200 I). 
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trum and convert broadcast l icenses into tradable commodities.2 However, 
it was not until very recently that the FCC implemented Coase's idea. At 
least pa11 of the reason for the long delay in implementing this seemingly 
efficient mechanism lay in the public nature of broadcasting and the per­
ceived trade-offs between the "public interest" and private control.3 
Since its creation, the FCC has regulated the grant of broadcast li­
censes using the rubric of "publ ic  interest."4 All  the same. the FCC's ideal 
of"public interest'' and its conception of what a property right is have var­
ied over time.5 Historically, the well-documented taxonomical categories 
o f  ownership have included the privilege-based model, the "social com­
pact" or "public tTusteeship" model, and, more recently, the expansive 
market-oriented model.6 
Spectrum allocation. however, is far from being the only area where 
property rights have been deployed to regulate broadcasting. Content pro­
ducers have long enjoyed copyright protection over individual content that 
is broadcast over the spectrum.
7 Additionally, many countries around the 
world recognize that broadcasters hold a property right in their content­
carrying broadcast signals, independent of the copyright in the underlying 
content.
8 ReferTed to as ·'broadcasters' rights'·, the purp01ted justification 
for their existence derives from the need to equip broadcasters with 
mechanisms to prevent others from free-riding on their investment of time, 
skill, and effort in working the infrastructure of the television industry.9 
2. R.H. Coase, The Federal Communicmions Commi.�sivn. 2 J.L. & Eco ·. I 
( 1 959). 
3. See William H. Melody. Radio Speurum Allocation: Role o.fthe Markel. 70 Atvl. 
Eco 1. REv. 393. 394 ( 1980) (characterizing the broadcast specrrum as a fom1 of "social 
property''). umcrous other competing explanations exist for this anomaly and are con­
sidered in detail by Thomas Hazlett in his study. See Hazlett. Ass1gning Property Riglus. 
supra note I. lntcrestmgly, Coase. the original proponent of the idea, would later charac­
terize the public interest argument as ·'syrupy talk.'' Ronald H. Coase. El•tduution ld'Pub­
lic Polic�1· Rela!tng 1o Rudio and Tele1•isivn Broadcasting: Social wul J::cvnomic Issues. 
4 I LAND ECON. 16 1 . 16  7 ( 1965 ). 
4. 47 U.-.C. � 309(:1) (2000) (USIIlg the phrase "public interest. conveni(:nCe. and 
necessity''). See dtscusston infra Section JV.C. 
5. Hazlett. .·1.\·.\i�ntng Pro perry Rig/us. supra note I, :.�t -3 �-3 7. 
6. !d. 
7. 17 U.S. C.� I 02(a)(6) (2000). 
g_ This i ·a consequence of the Rome Convention. otherwise known as the Interna­
tional Convention for the Protection of Performers. Producer:. or Phonograms and Broad­
casting Orgamzations. brought into force in 1961. 
9. CLAltDL M.\�OlYE. \.VORLD lNTJ:LLH.'TUAL PROP. OR<, fWIPO), GtTJDL TO THI· 
R0!\11 COr-i\'f.:NTIO� . .\ND TO THE Pl iO •OGRAMS CON\'I:xTICJ (William Wallace trans .. 
19� I l. 
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Structured analogously to traditional copyri.ght. these rights (together with 
certain others) are often characterized as ··neighboring" or '·related" 
. h I 0 ng ts. 
The idea of broadcasters' rights, however, never found much favor in 
the United States. As early as 1930, decades before the idea of broadcast­
ers' rights assumed international impot1ance, Louis Caldwell, General 
Counsel of the Federal Radio Commission (the predecessor to the FCC), 
argued that the idea of granting broadcasters prope11y rights in their pro­
gram-carrying signals was likely to pose innumerable conceptual, doc­
trinal, and practical problems." Specifically, he argued that "the 'juridical 
concept of broadcaster's proprietorship' might seem overly radical in the 
American context, where audiences had become accustomed to receiving 
broadcasts for ·free. "'12 For over seven decades since, the United States 
has stayed clear of adopting a system of open-ended broadcasters' rights.
13 
Since 1 998, however, the United States has been pushing for the adop­
tion of a new treaty at the WIPO that would grant broadcasters and cable­
casters independent property rights in their transmission signals.14 Titled 
the "WIPO Broadcasting Treaty", this new instrument would update the 
existing international regime governing broadcasters' rights and extend it 
to the digital world. 
The creation of new property interests in intangible and informational 
goods (i.e., intellectual property rights) has been the subject matter of in­
tense debate for quite some time now.15 In a similar vein, many have ques-
I 0. See, e.g.. George H .C. Bodenhausen, Protection of "Neighboring Rights", 1 9  
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 5 6  (1 954). 
1 1 .  Louis G. Caldwell. Piracy of Broadcast Programs, 30 COLUM . L. REv. 1087, 
1 101, 1 1 10- 12  ( 1 930). For an overview of Caldwell's attempted reform of the broadcast­
ing industry as a whole. see Robert W. McChesney, Free Speech and Democracy! Louis 
G. Caldwell, the American Bar AssociaEion and the Debate Over the Free Speech lmpli­
cations ofBroadcasr Regulation, 1928-1938,35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 351 ( 1 99 1 ) .  
12. Caldwell, supra note I I , at 1 1  I 2-14.  
13.  The United States did not ratify the Rome Convention, despite pariicipating ac­
tively during the actual negotiations. The reasons for this remain somewhat unclear. 
14. Discussions on the treaty commenced in 1998 at the WIPO and the United 
States delegation submitted a detailed proposal in 2002. WIPO, Protection of the Rights 
of Broadcasting Organi::.ations, WIPO Doc. No. SCCR/817 (Oct. 2 I ,  2002). avaiLable at 
http://www. wipo. int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_8/ sccr_8_7 .pdf. 
1 5 .  For a sample of this literature, see PETER DRAHOS & JOl-IN BRAITHWAITE, IN­
FORMATION fEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2002); EXPANDING 
THE BOUNDARIES Or INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWL­
EDGE SOCIETY (Rochelle Dreyfuss et aL eds., 200 l ): James Boyle. A Politics of lntellec­
tual Property: E111•ironmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L . .J. 87 ( 1 997); Richard A. Pos-
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tioned the wisdom of the \VI PO Broadcasting Treaty and it potential im­
pact on television broadcasting. 16 These debate tend to ignore the reality 
that while the United States never recognized open-ended broadcasters' 
rights as several other countries did, it nevertheles did grant the indu try's 
main player (broadcasters, cable companies, and content producers) at­
tenuated exclusion01�y protection, or limited property rights, believing that 
this grant would optimize competition to create a balanced. workable sys­
tem. Television broadca t and cable revenues have continued to ri e stead­
ily under this system and there remains little reason to believe that broad­
casting as a whole has suffered in any way.17 
What, then, prompted the shift in the United States' position on broad­
casters' rights, and what benefit, if any, is the new property regime likely 
to confer on national television broadcasting? More importantly, will the 
introduction of a new fmm of property remain compatible with the exist­
ing structural and functional attribute of the indu try. which for decades 
has committed itself to the "public interest" and operated on a ystem of 
limited exclu ionary protection? 
This Article examines the implication of granting broadcasters and 
cablecasters open-ended property rights (a opposed to limi1ed exclusion­
ary privileges) in their tran mi ion ignal (as contemplated under the 
new WIPO Broadca t Treaty regime), specifically in the context of the 
United States television industry. It argue that while the gains as ociated 
with the e rights are not readily identifiable, the regime i nevertheless 
likely to have significant costs. 
Part 1 1  of the Article provides an overview of the ideu of broadcasters' 
rights in their signaL. Jt examines the genesis of the idea at the Rome 
Convention, then outlines the basic idea behind the WIPO Broadcast 
Treaty and concludes with a conceptual discussion of the po sible justifi­
cations that might exi t for these rights. Part IlJ examines the exi ting 
structure of the U.S. broadcast indu try and the myriad property rights re-
ner, Intellectual Property: The Lu11 and EconomiC\ Approach. 19 .I.L. & ECON. PER P. 57 
(2005). 
16. SC'e. e.g . . Jam�s Boyle. More Rig/us are II rong .for ll'ehcosten. FT.COi\1. Sep. 
26. 200�, hnp: W\\\ .ft.com.cm:.�441306be-2eb6-llda-9a�J-00000c2511c'.hrml: 
Adam R. Tarosky. The Constiwnonaliry of II'! PO·., Broadcll\flll.!!. 7 nmty. 7he Originallt:'· 
and Lumted Times Rt!qttireme1lls r�f £he CoJl.rriglll Clause. 2006 DL H L. & TECH. RE\. 
0016. 
17. For an oven tew or re\ cnue:. in the televi:.ion bro::tdca:,ttng sector. �ee 12 FI:D. 
(OMM( "N:-. CoMrvt' /\1\N. A -,-;F.SSM[NT OF TilE. lt\TUS Or Cor-.1PI 11110\i IN THI: MARH T 
I-OR rHt- Or! I\ l:RY 01- VIDt-0 PRO<iR;\MI\liN(j 4 (2006), m·ai/ah/e of http://tjallfos:.. 
Jcc.govtcdoc� pub! ic'attach match' FCC -06-1 1 A I .pdf [hcre111a fkr FCC A sscs�M 1: T] 
(nottng that the market ha� continued to grow). 
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gimes that govern interactions between the di fferent players therein. Part 
LV examines the possible effects that the new property regime is I ikely to 
have on the new user dynamic that has begun to emerge on the intemet, on 
the ideal of greater authorial control over dissemination, and lastly on the 
public interest ideal that has remained central to communications regula­
tion. 
Pa1i V argues that if broadcasters' arguments for property rights do 
have any merit, they derive from the principle of "unjust enrichment." It 
then goes on to suggest a staggered two-phase approach to implementing 
broadcasters' exclusionary privileges against commercial webcasters with 
the intention of recreating a level playing field and at the same time ena­
bling the intemet to develop as an independent distribution channel . 
II. OPEN-ENDED PROPERTY PROTECTION FOR 
BROADCAST SIGNALS: THE CURRENT AND PROPOSED 
INTE RNATIONAL REGIMES 
The concept of broadcasters' rights has been in existence for at least 
four decades now. 
18 In spite of this, however, as an idea it remains rela­
tively unknown in the United States. What does it mean to recognize 
property rights in broadcast signals, independent of the copyright in the 
underlying content? 
Consider the fol lowing hypothetical: Walter. a film producer, produces 
a documentary on earthquakes entitled Quakes. Under the terms of both 
domestic and international copyright law, he obtains copyright in the 
documentaty. 19 Walter then licenses the use o f  the documentary to XBC 
Inc., a private broadcasting corporation that agrees to broadcast the docu­
mentary. Under the traditional model, XBC merely acquires the right of 
public performance20 over Quakes that Walter originally had (either exclu­
sively or non-exclusively). Under a broadcasters' rights model, however. 
XBC would also acquire, in addition to the right it licenses from Walter, 
an independent set o f  rights over its own broadcast signals canying 
Quakes. The regtme thus effectively converts XBC's contractually ac-
1 8 .  See International Convention for the Protection of Performers. Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1 96 I ,  496 U.  .T.S. 43, art. I 
[hereinafter Rome Convention). 
19.  See 1 7  U.S.C. § I 02(a)(6) (2000); Beme Convention for the Protection of liter­
ary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1 886, as last revised at Paris, July 24, 1 9 7 1 .  828 
U. .T.S. 22 1 .  art. 2( I) [hereinafter Beme Convention] 
20. 1 7  U.S.C. � 1 06(4) (2000); Beme Convention, supra note 1 9, at art. I I  his. 
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qui red right into a full-blown set of right that ari e independent of XBC' 
licen e with Walter. 
Now, if DBC Inc .. another broadca ter, were to intercept XBC's trans­
mission of Quakes and re-broadcast it a it own, what rights would Wal­
ter and XBC have against DBC? What if Bori . a viewer, made a re­
cording of Quakes from the broadcast at home and later sold copies of his 
recording to the public? A broadcaster ' rights regime purports to deal 
with prcci ely these types of situations. 
A. Or igins of the Idea: The Rome Convention 
At the Brussels Revision Conference of the Berne Convention, mem­
ber states ·ettled on the idea of extending copyright to performers, phono­
gram producers, and broadcasters. 21 Following the conference, actual 
work on a new instrument came to be delegated to three intemational or­
ganization -the BTRPl (predecessor to the WJPO), the ILO, and 
UNE CO.::!::! After going through several draft . the three organizations 
together finally convened a Diplomatic Conference at Rome in 196 1 .  re­
sulting in the Rome Convention.23 
Intcre tingly, each of the rights protected under the Convention is de­
rivative of traditional literary and ar1istic work . the ·ubject matter of 
copyright.1..1 Performers pe1j"orm musical or dramatic work ; phonogram 
producer are responsible for the .fi.raJion of mu ical performances; and 
broadcasters facilitate the public distribution of audiovi ual works. The 
activities covered by the Convention are thu "related to" creative works 
covered by copyright, but are rarely ever directly creative themselves. 
They do little more than facilitate the process by which creative works are 
21. St�l.! DOC U\•ICNTS DE LA CO 1FI':RENCI- Rf:t..; IJF A 8RUXI�l Ll: · DU 5 AU 26 JUI!'X 
194!\. -.t25-29 ( 1951 ); MASOUYE, supra note 9. at R; AM RICKI·"I SON & JANf- C. Gl'JS. 
BLRC •. I run�AliO\lAL COP'l RIGHT A. ·o , Et<.HI:H1URJN<; RIGHTS: THI· BI:.RNI: Co' \T:'\· 
TIO' A D BI·YO 0 (2d ed. 2006). 
22. 2 RICKE1<-;0N & GINSBL'RG. supra m11e 21. at 1211-12. WIPO stands for the 
\.\'orld Intellectual Propeny Organization. ILO for the lntcmational Labor Organization. 
and Ul'r TO for the Umted 'arion Educauonal ctcnttlic and Cultur<�l Organtzatton. 
23. It! 
2-L .\e( ul. at 1206-7. Hence the name ""netghboring'" or ··related·· nght . It 1:- of 
course op�n to debate as to why these nghts haYe not formed the !>Ub.Ject matter <..'i" tradt­
tional cor� nght. especiall� gi,·en that copyright co' ers a wtde . pcctrum of propcny-like 
nghts O\ cr c\presst,·e acu,·iue:;. One answer t' that hi ·torically. tn mo-;t European coun­
tries v<ith a civil law tradition. copyright or droir cl"outeur is re:-.tncted to authorial nghts 
anJ rcqutrc-.. the tdcntification of a creative author for the grnnt or property proteL·tion. 
Conscqul'mly. the necJ emerged to move ;:t\\<.l) fi·om !he tradiuonnl conccption or copy­
right. Sel' Rudolf i\'loma. The Concepr v(Cop1nght !'ersus the /)mil d" . ..Juteur. :r� S. CAL. 
I.RI\ 177tllJSlJ). 
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produced and disseminated publicly, with the obvious consequence that 
the traditional justifications for copyright do not automatically carry over. 
The Convention clarifies that the protection accorded under it does not 
detract from traditional copyright protection afforded to the underlying 
work independently.25 In relation to broadcasters' rights, it defines broad­
casting as the "transmission by wireless means for public reception" of the 
audiovisual work, 26 and thus excludes from its scope transmission over 
wires-i.e.,  cable transmissions.27 This is explained by the fact that cable 
television emerged as a commercially significant player only after the ac­
tual adoption of the treaty. 
The Convention grants broadcasters the "right to authorize or prohibit" 
a series of activities in relation to their broadcasts.28 lt does not use the 
phrase "exclusive right" commonly used in relation to copyright holders' 
rights over their works.29 While the element of exclusivity may be inherent 
in the acts o f  authorizing or prohibiting, the absence of any express refer­
ence to it does enable the creation of overlapping rights over the same sub­
ject matter vested in multiple parties. This is probably a recognition of the 
fact that broadcasts are derivative resources and that copyright holders can 
already exercise some of these rights under traditional copyright law. 
The Convention rights include: ( i )  rebroadcasting the broadcasts in 
question; ( i i )  fixation of the broadcasts; ( i i i )  reproducing the fixations so 
made; and (iv) communicating the broadcasts to the public, when made in 
a publicly accessible place.30 Much like copyright, the duration of these 
rights is limited, but to twenty years from the year o f  the first broadcast.-1 1 
25. Rome Convention, supra note 18,  at art. I .  
26. !d. at art. 3( f). 
27. See 2 RICKETSOt & GI SBURG, supra note 2 1 ,  at 1 216. Ricketson & Ginsburg 
also argue that it is likely that the protection does not extend to encrypted wireless broad­
casts, given that such broadcasts are not meant for public reception i n  the traditional 
sense, but rather for reception by a defined subscriber base. 
28. Rome Convention. supra note 18,  at art. 1 3 .  
29. See, e.g., Beme Convention, supra note 19, at arts. 8. 9, I I, I I  bis, 1 2 .  
30. Rome Convention, supra note 1 8, at art. 1 3(a)-(d). Rebroadcasting is defined in 
art. 3(g) to include only the simultaneous retransmission of one broadcasting organiza­
tion's broadcasts by another and is therefore distinct from the right to communicate to the 
public. Tbe right to communicate the broadcast to the public is also known as the "televi­
sion exhibition right" and was the subject of some debate during the Diplomatic Confer­
ence. See Abraham L. Kaminstein, Report of the Rapporteur-General, in RECORDS or­
THE DIPLOMA TIC CONf-ERENCE ON THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTIO 1 OF PERFORMERS, 
PRODUCERS OF PHONOGRAMS AND BROADCAST! G 0RGAt IZATIONS, ROME, I 0 TO 26 
OCTOBER 1961, at 33, 49-5 1 ( 1968). 
31. Rome Convention. supra note 1 8, at art. 14( c) .  
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These rights extend not just to the ephemeral transmission, but to sub-
�2 sequent fixations as wetl.-> The broadcaster thus gets to control uses of the 
broadcast beyond the actual broadca t it elf. Thus, in relation to our earlier 
hypothetical, XBC is now equipped with claims against both DBC for 
communicating its broadcasts to the public and against Boris for .fixing the 
broadcast and reproducing the fixation. The rights thus operate to give 
broadcasters a cause of action against competitors (i.e.,  XBC against 
DBC) as well as a mechanism to control revenue generation from uses of  
their broadcasts after its transmission ( i .e . ,  XBC against Boris). This dis­
tinction is critical when examining the justification for these rights. 
Perhaps most interestingly, though, the Convention avoids defining 
with any degree of precision what exactly a "broadcast" is. During the 
Diplomatic Conference, it appears that countries interpreted the tenn to 
cover transmissions by "hertzian waves or other wireless means."33 No­
where during the conference did countries consider problematic the fact 
that broadcasts (or transmissions) derive their physical existence and 
commercial significance exclusively from the underlying content that re­
main the subject matter of copyright. Conceivably, they may have be­
l ieved that the independence safeguard in Article 1 was sufficient to take 
care o f  this.34 
At the Rome Conference, the U.S.  delegation was by far one of the 
largest.35 The bead of the delegation. Abraham Kaminstein, then bead of 
the Copyright Office, also served as Rappo11eur-General to the Confer­
ence.36 The United States participated rather actively through the drafting 
process and at the actual conference. Specifically, in relation to the broad­
casters' rights provisions, it proposed alternative definitions of ''broad­
cast'' and ·'broadcasting organizations'
, 
and even proposed extending the 
32. !d. at art. 1 3(b).  
33.  Kaminstein, supra note 30, at 40. This emerged consequent to an Austrian pro­
po:;al that broadcasting be defined to cover transmissions over wire as \veil. v.-hich the 
Conference ultimately rejected . •  )·e"' CDJ?!4Y Austria, in RECORDS Of· THI:. DI PL<Xvl \TIC 
CONrF.IO:NCF. ON THI� lNTERNL\TIONAI PROTL:.CTION OF PERFORMERS. PRODl,CLR:-. or 
PHONOGRAM<) -\l\ID BROAD( ASTING 0R<1ANIZATIONS, ROME. I 0 TO 26 0CTOBFR 196 I .  at 
209 ( 1 9Mq. 
34. 5iee Rome Convenr1on, supra note I '. at art. I (''Protection granted under 1h1s 
Convention shall leave intact and shall in no way affect the protect ion of copyright i n  
l i terary and arti!'tic works. Consequently. n o  provi ion of this Convention may h�:.· inter­
preted as pr�judicing such protection ... ). 
35. Consisting of twenty members. 
3(J . . 'lei.' R!-:< ORO$ OF THF D t PLOiviA rt<." CONrERJ-NCE 0 .  T I I F  INl t=RN.l.T!OI\: \1. PRO­
I ECl iOi\ I ll Pt RJ-ORi\H:RS. PtWDUU:.R� 01· P I ION()(d(.-\ ".1S /\NI) BtW:\D( !\STII'\( I OR< t -\NI-
7AT[lJN-.. . Ror--1 1 . 10 · r o  2<, Ocr oHI::R 1 96 1 .  ut �R. 32 ( 19oR). 
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period of  protection to fifty years.·37 Yet when it came to actually signing 
the convention, the head of the U.S.  delegation placed on record the fact 
that he had yet to receive authority to sign the Convention from his gov­
eJnment and had come merely with instructions to "return with the Final 
act."38 To this day, the exact reasons for the United States not signing the 
Rome Convention (either in 1 96 1  or since), despite its active role in the 
drafting process, remain a mystery. 
Following the adoption of the Rome Convention, many common law 
countries (other than the United States) amended their copyright laws to 
include broadcasts within the category of protected subject matter and 
thereby granted broadcasters rights analogous to those given to content 
39 producers. 
The Rome Convention thus laid the foundation for the idea of copy­
right-like protection for broadcast signals. By failing to ( i )  specify the na­
ture of the resource over which the right is to be exercised; or ( i i )  delineate 
the exact manner in which the new rights would interact with traditional 
copyright, the Convention avoided having to get into the broader regula­
tory implications o f  the new regime.40 More importantly, though, the re­
gime also avoided specifying the parties against whom these rights would 
operate. As technology developed and new means of distribution emerged, 
the Convention came to be viewed as largely outdated, although its gen­
eral idea o f  property rights in broadcasts fmmed the basis for a newer, 
more expansive proposal. 
B. Open-ended Property Protection: The WIPO Broadcast Treaty 
Beginning in the 1 990s, the WIPO embarked on the project of updat­
ing the existing international copyright and related rights regimes to adapt 
them to the digital age. The WTPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) updated tradi­
tional (authorial) copyright mechanisms, while the WlPO Performances & 
Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) involved an analogous updating o f  perform-
37. See id. at 67, 209, 225-26 ( 1968).  
38.  !d. at 134. Interestingly, though, the records seem to indicate that the United 
States did indeed sign the Final Act, but not the actual Convention. See id. at 20. 
39. See, e.g., Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, §§ 6, 9, 14, 1 6, 19 ,  
20, 35 (U.K.); Copyright Act, 1968, c. 1 33, § §  87,  91, 95, 99 (Austl.). For an overview of 
the Australian regime and an interpretation of the provisions involved, see ctwork Ten 
Pty. Ltd. v. TCN Channel Nine Pty. Lrd. (2004) 2 1 8  C.L.R. 273 (Austl.). 
40. See generally Gillian Davies, The Rome Convention 1961 -A BriefSummwy of 
its Development and Prospects, 2 EUR. 1NTELL. PROP. REv. 1 54 ( 1 979}: Andre Kerever, 
Should the Rome Convention He Revised and. !{So. Is This 1he Right Mome111?. 25 COPY­
RIGHT BULL. 4 ( 1 99 1  ) .  
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ers· and phonogram producers· rights.4 1  Given that the Rome Convention 
dealt with pcrf01mers, phonogram producers. and broadca. ter . .  when dis­
cussion on the WPPT began. many countries felt that the in trument 
needed to include provisions protecting the rights o f  broadca ter as 
well.42 However, most countries ultimately concluded that further analysis 
wa neces ary before treaty language could be propo ed. and a. a re ult, 
discus ion on broadcasters' rights were put off until the WPPT was 
adopted.43 With the adoption of the WPPT in 1 995, the W I  PO began dis­
cus ion on a new instrument on broadcasters' rights in 1 99 in its expert 
body on copyright, called the Standing Committee on Copyright and Re­
lated Rights ( SCCR) .44 Initially several countries proposed including these 
rights a an additional protocol to the WPPT, but eventually this idea was 
dropped and work began on drafting an altogether independent instru­
ment.4'i 
After about fifteen CCR sessions over seven year , the W T PO Gen­
eral A· cmbly called for two fw1her special SCCR . e ions. to be fol­
lowed by a Diplomatic Conference in 2007.'H' At the fir t spec ial e sion. 
mo. t countrie agreed that .. signal protection'· remained the objecti\e. Yet 
4 1 .  for a general overvie'' of Ihe WCT. the WPPT. and the r:.H.Iu.:.ll chang�s they 
introduced, sec MIHALY FIC "OR. THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT Al\D THI: I' 11-R,ET: THr 1 996 
WI PO TRF.Al l l . .  THEIK. INTI::RPRF.TATION AND IMPLI:ME '1 A I lOt\ (2002): .IORG 
Rtl BUIIIF & SILK[ VOj Ll·WI'\SKI. THF WIPO TREATIE 1 996: Til l  \\' I PO COPYRIG H r  
TRFATY Aj D THI. WI  PO P I:RFOR 11\NCES & PHO OGRAt-.IS TREA 1 'l :  (OI\1\IL '1 -\RY -\ D 
LFG-\L A ALYSIS (2002). For analyses of their impact on U .. . domestll.: law see Julie E. 
Cohen. WI PO CopyriP,ht Trealy lmplemenwlion in !he Uni1ed Swte,·: II 'til F111r Use Sur­
,.;,•e?. 2 1  l:.UR. IN rEt.L. PROP. REv. 236 ( 1999): Pamela . amuclson. The U.S. Oigital 
.·lgenda al WI PO. 37 VA. J . INT'L L. 269 ( 1 997). 
42. Wl PO. £.\iSiing lnrernmronal. Regional and Na!Wiwl l.egi,fauon Coll('l.!/'lling 
rhi! Pmlt!Ction of the Rights of Broadcasring Organi:::auon.,, an. I .  WI PO Doc. o. 
SCCR, 1 '3 ( cpt. 7, 1998), cwailah/e at http:l/www.w ipo.mt/edocst�ndnc:- copynglll'cn/ 
ccr_l /sccr 1_3. pdf. 
43 ld 
44. WI PO. Report of the Thtrd Si!<;sion <?/the Standing Commlllt!e on ( 'op1nghr ami 
Relared Rigltts. at 1 7 - 1 . WIP0 Doc. SCCR 3 I I  ( 0cc. l . l999}. 
45. See ul. 
46. 5)ee \\' I PO. Prote('/ivn vi Broadca'iting Or!c!,alll:::ations. \\ IPO Doc. 'o. 
\\ IPO GA 33 -1 ( <.!pl. 22. 2006). amilahle at http: •\\ w\\ .\\ 1p0.1111 cdol.:� mdoc:, 
go\bOd) en wo_ga 331wo_ga_ �3_-Ldoc fseuing the date' for the D•plomauc Confer­
ence): tanding Commil!ee on Copy1ig.ht ami Related Rig.hb. Re,·i.\l!cl /)ra{r Bo.\ic · Pm­
powl fhr rhe WI PO Trear_Y on rhe Prot en ion of Broadcasung 01p,wu:::arwn'i. �CCR 1 5 2 
tJuly 3 1 .  2006). ai'Ctilahle til Imp· " "'" .wipo.inUcdoc:. mdocs,sccr•en ... ccr 1 5  seer_ 1 5_ 
1.pdf rhercinaf"ter Re1Fed /)raj; Ba.,ic Proposal]. Si!e al.\o 'v\illl1am l C\\ . 1 1 '/PO Broud­
( tl\'ling rrellfy .ld1'(/I/CC'S Post DI.\£/?,IW'/11('11h', IN1 FLL. PRCIP. W \ I ( H. :-.ep. 1-+. 2006. 
hnp:!/ip-watch.or� wcblog wp-1rackbacl-.. .php?p""'l95. 
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considerable ambiguity seemed to persist over exactly hml' a signal­
protection-based instrument ought to be structured.-l7 By the second spe­
cial  session, it became clear that countries could not quite agree on the 
real objectives and scope of the treaty. Consequently, parties concluded 
thar more time was needed before a Diplomatic Conference could be con­
vened.-!-' Yet the treaty is to remain on the WIPO's agenda and is unlikely 
. I h . h f -19 to dt appear a toget er m t e near uture. 
The product of these discussions, called the draft WlPO Broadcast 
Treaty ( WBT),50 builds on the basic framework of the Rome Convention 
but expands on the nature of protection afforded to broadcasters. 51 One of 
the major changes in the Rome Convention framework that the WBT in­
troduce · is in extending protection to cablecasters as well .  I t  retains the 
classic definition of broadcasting as encompassing a wireless transmis­
sion, 52 but at the same time introduces the concept of "cablecasting," 
which refers specifically to wire transmissions. 53 This is an obvious rec­
ognition o f  the emergence o f  cable TV as a major player in the television 
industry and the perceived need for analogous protection in this segment. 
-+7. See lnt'l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Governments Remain Divided on 
W!PO Broadcast Treary, BRIDGES: WEEKLY, Jan. 24, 2007, a£ 4. available at 
http:! www.ic£sd.org/weekly/07-0 1 -24/BRIDGESWeekly l l -02.pdf; William New, Ques­
tions Looll/ (or W!PO Broadcasting Negotimion, I NTELL. PROP. WATCH. Jan. 23. 2007, 
http://www. ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=S i l & res= I 024_ ff&print=O. 
48. See W lPO, CONCLUSIONS OF THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSI01 OF THE SCCR ON 
THE PROTECTION OF BROADCASTING 0RGA 'IZATIO S (2007). 
49. !d. at 2. 
50. ft is worth mentioning that during discussions, more than one draft proposal was 
considered. The final official version that incorporated them all was the one of Feb. 8,  
2006. See Revised Draft Basic Proposal, supra note 46. During the special sessions of the 
SCCR. however, £he Chairman was entrusted wi£h the responsibility of modifying this 
version infonnally, in an attemp£ to generate consensus among countries. The version that 
re ulted from this came to be described as the '·non-paper" version of the treaty. Given i£s 
unofticial status, the Revised Draft Basic Proposal continued to form the baseline for the 
negotiations. See WI PO, supra note 48. Where the non-paper veTsion introduced signifi­
cant changes ro the treaty's ideas that were noteworthy, special mention is made in this 
Article of it 
5 1 .  For an overview of the scheme in very general detail, see MEGUMI OGAWA, 
PROTECTIO ' OF BROADCASTERS' RIGHTS 73- 1 1 3  (2006). 
52. Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, Revised Draft Basic 
Proposalfor rhe WIPO Treaty on the Proteclion of Broadcas1ing Organizations, art.  5(a), 
SCCR/ 1 5  2 (July 3 1 ,  2006) (hereinafter WI PO Broadcast Treaty], available at hnp:// 
www. INipo. int/edocs/mdocs/sccr/enlsccr_ l 5/sccr_ I 5 _2.pdf. 
53.  WIPO Broadcast Treaty, supra note 52, at art. 5(b). I t  is interesting to no£e £ha£ 
the definitions of both broadcasting and cablecasting exclude the concep£ of wcbcast­
ing- the transmission of signals over computer networks such as the internet- from £heir 
coverag�. 
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Protection under the treaty is restricted to broadcasting and cablecasting 
organizations-defined as entities that take the initiative and have the re­
sponsibility for the transmission, assembly, and scheduling of content.54 
Thus, individuals engaged in the same activities are not entitled to the 
benefits of the treaty. 
U nl ike the Rome Convention, the WBT explicitly defines its protect­
able subject matter. I t  provides in no unce1tain terms that protection '·ex­
tends only to signals" used for transmission and not to the underlying con­
tent that they caTTy.55 The WBT goes beyond the Rome Convention in that 
i t  grants broadcasters and cablecasters a set of seven expansive "exclusive 
rights" in relation to their transmission signals. 56 These are the right to 
authorize: 
I )  retransmission, by any means, of their broadcasts;57 
2) communication to the public of  their broadcasts; 58  
3) fixations of their signals;
5Y 
4 )  reproduction (direct or indirect) of  the fixations;60 
5 )  distribution o f  the original and copies of the fixations�61 
6) transmission to the public of  the broadcasts following fixation:62 
and 
7 )  making available to the public of the fixations through broad-
63 casts. 
54. !d. ar arts. 5(c) & 5(d) .  See also Re1·ised Draji Basic Proposal. supra note 46. at 
26-27. 
55. WI PO Broadcas1 Ji-eary, supru narc 52, at an. 6( I ). 
56. The non-paper of April 20, 2007 sought to move away from enumerating these 
rights individually, providing instead that broadcasters were to have the exclusive right to 
authorize the '"retTansmission of their broadcasts .. and "deferred transm1ssion .. of fixed 
broadcasts. I t  omitted the fixation right� of the original proposal. However, given that 
f·ixation was protected under the Rome Convention. see supra note 30. this omission 
proved to be unacceptable. with many countrie, viev.,ing it as doctrinally retrograde . .  )·ee 
WIPO. Non-puper on 1he WfPO Treary on the Pr01ection ofBroadcasling Organi:£1/ions. 
art. 7. W I PO Doc. No. SCCR/ S l /WWW[75352) ( Apr. 20. 2007), avai/uh/1:' a1 Imp:// 
www.wipo. intfedocs/mdocs/sccr/en/sccr_s 1 tsccr_s I_ "':ww _75352.doc. 
57.  WJPO Bmadcas1 Treary. supra no1e 52. a1  art. 9 .  
58.  /d. at an. I 0 .  
59.  /d. at art. I I . 
60. /d. at an. 12 .  
6 1 .  /d. at  an. 13.  
62. /d. at art. 1 4. 
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Together, these seven rights would give broadcasters and cablecasters 
near-complete control over the use and fixation of their transmission sig­
nals. ln addition, the WBT mandates that countries recognize technologi­
cal protection measures and grant rights-holders adequate legal remedies 
to enforce them.6-l It requires countries to create a cause o f  action against 
any person who circumvents a technological protection measure that pre­
vents the access to and copying of broadcasters' signals.65 From the struc­
ture of the treaty and the inclusion of the technological protection meas­
ures mandate, it is abundantly clear that the rights are meant to operate 
both against competitors and consumers. 
While the treaty does not explicitly say so, the default assumption ap­
pears to be that these rights are to operate in rem, along the lines of tradi­
tional property rights.66 Also, the theme of "anti-piracy" is a recunent one 
throughout the treaty.67 Furthermore, the rights would persist for a period 
of fifty years after the broadcast.68 
Going back then to our earlier hypothetical, XBC Inc., under this new 
regime, would have a larger bundle of rights to exercise against DBC and 
Boris. In addition to being able ro preclude Boris from fixing its signals, 
XBC now obtains absolute control over the uses of the recording o f  
Quakes from its broadcast. J f  X B C  were t o  encrypt its transmission using 
digital technology, and Boris were to decrypt the transmission to view 
Quakes without XBC's authorization, XBC could then initiate a circum­
vention action against Boris. Further, if Boris were to distribute his re­
cording o f  Quakes over the internet, this too would give X B C  a cause o f  
63. fd. at art. 1 5 .  
64. !d. at art. I 9. 
65. For an overview of the WCT and WPPT's technical protection measures, see 
Dean S. Marks & Bruce H. Tumbull, Technical Protection Measures: The Intersection of 
Technology, Law and Commercial Licenses. WIPO Doc. No. WCT-W PPT/IMP/3 ( Dec. 
3, 1999). For a general overview of their implementation under U.S. and E.U. law, see 
Terese Foged, U.S v. E. U. Anti-Circu11n·enlion Legislation: Preserving the Public ·s 
Pri1·ileges in the Digital Age?, 24 EUR. INH:LL. PROP. REV. 525 (2002). 
66. The Revised Draft Proposal provision on limitations and exceptions to the rights 
granted contains four altematives, each with varying degrees of specificiw Three out of 
the four proposals contain an express exception for "private use"-thereby making it 
clear that individual users making unauthorized use of the broadcast signals would ordi­
narily be liable under the treaty. See Re1·ised Draft Basic Proposal, supra note 46, at 65-
70. For more discussion of in rem rights. see also infra Par1 Ill. 
67. See W!PO Broadcast Trearv. supra note 52, Preamble (noting the ·'anti-piracy'' 
function of the treaty) .  See also DARRFLL PA ETHIER£, THE PERS ISTENCE OF PIRt\CY: 
CONSEQUENCES FOR CREATIVITY, FOR C't:LTURE, AND FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
I 7 -I 8 ( 2005 ), http:i/unesdoc.unesco.org/i mages/00 1 3/00 1 396/ 1 3 965 1 e.pd f. 
68. 'YV!PO Broadcasf Treaty, supra note 52. at art. 1 8. 
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action again t him. Thus XBC is g1ven near-ab olutc control over its 
tran. mission or  Quakes. 
O\v a ume CC, a cablecaster. enters the picture and provides its own 
content to it subscribers. In addition. CC records XBC' broadcast and 
retran mit i t  to its own subscriber at a later date. Under the new regime, 
CC i given property rights over it tran mission analogous to XBC's 
right over its tran mission of Quakes. XBC now al o has a claim against 
CC' recording and retransmission of its broadcast. This latter claim as­
sumes special relevance in the U.S.  broadca ting context, as wil l  be seen 
later. 
The WI3T thus seeks to create a full-blown property rights regime in 
broadcast and cable transmission ignals. Coupled with its anti­
circumvention mandate, it enable broadca. ters and cable operator to ex­
ercl c a igni ficant amount of control OYer the usc of their ignals. 
C. Broadcasters' Rights: From Contract to Property? 
Property rights can and often do minimize tran action co t .6q The a l ­
location o f an in rem exclusionary entitlement ex  ante reduce the need to 
contractually acquire it .  Contractual acqui ition entail significant search. 
information, and negotiation costs and im·olvc uncenaintie a sociated 
with holdout and cognitive biases.711 By en. uring an optimal al location up 
front and thus obviating the need for individual contracrual tran fers. 
property rights can enhance overal l  efficiency. 1 t  might therefore be ar­
gued that broadcasters' rights-a property rights-achie c preci ely this 
result. 
In this understanding, broadcasters' right. do l i tt le more than convert 
right that a broadcaster might have contractua lly obtained from the origi­
nal copyright holder into a prope11y right. By vesting them in the broad-
(ll}, See \VJLLIA\1 M. LA'\DES & RllHARD A. PO 'NLR. THI:. ECONOt-.-11<. • TRL <:TURF 
01 I'\ n I I I l fUAL PROP I.:RTY LA \V 1 2 - 1 3  ( 2003) ("Reducing transaction cosb 1:- the ve1y 
ra1�on d'\:,trc or propcn� nghts.''). For some or the seminal l11crature seeking to establish 
thi correlation see YoR,\�1 13-\RZXL. E< 0'\0\lll A'\ \LY IS or PROPLRT'l RI<JHT� (2d ed. 
1 9<:17): Annen /\. Alchwn. Some l:.'cmwmiC"s o.f Pmperry Rtgl/1.\. 30 IL  POI ITI< O R l 6  
( 196:'):  llarold Dcm�etz. Tmnml u Tlu!m:1 of J>ropem· Right.\ . 57 A\ILR. 1.:.<.0'\. Rl \ .  3-P 
( 196 7 ): Harold Dcmsct7. 7he Exclwnge and Et!/i>rcemetll c?/ Properly Rtghl\. 7 .I. L. & 
[COl\. I I ( 1 964 ): En·i!.. G. Furnbotn & n�tOza PejO\ 1ch. J>ropem R1glw am/ Economic 
Tht�ol'l I .\.//IT(�\' C?/ Reu'lll l.lleruture. 1 0  J. t( 0!\. LJ r. 1 1 37 ( 1 972): 1 homa" \\ 0 I\ terrill 
& J-knr�· 1- . . llHlh. Optimal 5)tanclarcli::alion in 1he l.llll' of J>roperr.l·: The umeru::; 
Clnu:-.u::-. fJrmuple. I I 0 Y -\1.1· L.J.  I (2000). 
70. .\ee generul�r Lloyd Cohen. 1/olclmtl\ am/ Free Riders. �() .1 .  U · < ,  \L 'll o. 3 5 1  
( 1 99 1  ): R 1 chard A .  fpslcin. Holdmtl\. 1:.'.\femtdinl!s. and '"" Sing/<' Omu1r: One• More 
Sa lui<' In l?onulcl Cou.w '6 . 1 . 1 . .  & h ON. )53 ( 1 993 ). 
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caster ex ante, thi regime obviates the need for the broadcaster to con­
vince the content producer to either ( i )  uc for an infringement when the 
bmadcaster lacks standing: or ( i i )  transfer to it the entire copyright in the 
work. 71 It thus gives XBC, a non-exclusive licensee o f  the ''right to broad­
cast" Quakes from Walter, independent ·tanding to sue both DBC and Bo­
ris. This seemingly represents an obvious efficiency gain. On deeper 
analysis, however, this view o erlooks evcral significant elements. 
While copyright law recognizes the divisibi I ity of rights during a trans­
fer, it continues to draw a clear distinction between exclusive and non­
exclusive licenses. 71 Exclusive licenses are treated as transfers of the 
copyright, while non-exclusive licenses are not.73 Therefore. only an ex­
clusive license would give a I icensee an independent right to sue for in­
fringement. Yet, even in relation to exclusive licenses, the l icensee · s  
standing i s  limited b y  the scope of the license 74 Thus, in our hypothetical, 
if XBC were to obtain a non-exclusive license from Walter to ·'broadcast 
Quakes nationally over the air." it would lack independent standing to sue 
for copyright i n fringement. 75 Now i f  the license were e\clusive, XBC 
would have standing to sue. Even with an exclusive license. though, it 
would have an action only against DBC, a broadcaster, and not against 
Boris, a copier and distributor, unless Walter transferred to XBC the ex­
clusive rights to copy and distribute Quakes. This distinction remains cru­
cial .  
7 1 .  This analysis assumes. of course. that a broadcaster attempts to sue on either a 
contract or property theory. A third alternative that may be invoked involves tort law and 
in pa1ticular the claim ot' ·'tortious interference with a contract." The tort has both con­
tract and property overtones, but enrai Is a strong intentionlreckles ness requirement that 
might be hard to establish in simple instances of infringement. See Richard A. Epstein, 
Inducement of Breach of Contract as a Problem of Ostensible OH·ners!Jip. 1 6  J. LEGAL 
STUD. I ( 1 987); Benjamin L. Fine. An Analysis of t he Forma lion of Proper/1' Rights Un­
derlying Tor1ious fnle!ference ll'ilh Contracrs and 01her Economic Refttlions. 50 U. CHI. 
L.  RF.V. 1 1 1 6 ( 1 983 ); Mark P Gergen, Tortious lnte1jerence: How if is Engulfing Calli­
mercia I Law, Why This is Not Entirely Bad, and a Pmdentia/ Response, 38 ARIZ. L. RE\'. 
1 1 75 ( 1996). 
72. For an overview of the doctrine of indivisibility, contained in the Copyright Act 
of 1909, see 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, N IMM ER 0 COPYRIGHT: A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LITERARY. MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY. ·\ND THE PRO­
TECTION OF IDEAS � 10 .0 1  ( 2006); Robert A. Gom1an, An Overview ofthe Copyright Act 
uf 1976, 1 26 U. PA. L. REV. 856. 860 ( 1978); Leon Kaplan, Artistic and l.iterary Proper{}' 
(Including Copyright) as Secunl\': Problems Facing the Lender, 1 9  L:\ w & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 254, 265 n.S I ( 1954). 
73. See 1 7  U.S.C. * 20 I ( d ) ( 2 )  (2000); 3 NIMMER, supra note 72, at * I 0.02[A). 
74. 3 t1MMER, supra note 72, at 9 10.02[8] [ 1 ]  (noting how thi.s amounts to a lim­
ited relention ofthe indivisibility rule). 
75. !d & n. l 6. 
2008] THE SOCIAL COSTS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 1319 
Additionally, the law forbids a transfer of the mere right to sue, inde­
pendent of a transfer of the w1derlying right.76 The Copyright Act allows 
for a tran fer only of the exclusive rights it confers on the owner, and the 
right to commence an action for infringement is treated a an "entitle­
ment'' rather than an exclusive right.77 Since a non-exclusive license is not 
treated as a transfer, anything short of an exclu ive licen e to copy and 
distribute the work would render unenforceable an independent transfer of 
the right to sue for these actions.78 In other word , baiTing a complete 
transfer of the rights to broadcast, copy. and distribute, XBC would have 
no action again t DBC or Boris under copyright law. 
A regime of broadcasters' full-blown property rights would now grant 
the broadcaster independent causes of action against other broadcasters 
and individuals fixing its broadcasts and using them post-fixation. ln spite 
of the broadca ·tcr's need for a license from the copyright holder (to avoid 
copyright infringemene9), the nature or existence of this license and its 
scope would now have no bearing whatsoever on the broadcaster's ability 
to commence an action for use of the broadcast and its underlying con-
t l xo en . 
To be sure, each of the doctrinal subtleties outlined ha a rational ba­
si . To grant non-exclusi e licensees the right to sue independently would 
create multiple infringement actions. Fmther, the very idea of a non-
76. Sl!e Sil,cr v. ony Pictures Entm't. Inc .. 402 F.Jd 8 8 1  (9th Cir. 2005) (examin­
ing the statutory language, legislative history. ancl analogies to patent law and concluding 
that the mere right to sue for copyright infringement cannot be as igned); Eden Toys, Inc. 
v. Florekc Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27 (2d C1r. 1 982). I ndeed, this principle seems to 
be fairly \\'ell established in the law of patent!>. having been aninned by the upreme 
Coun on more than one occasion. s·ee Jndep. Wireless Tel. Co. , .. Radio Corp. of Am., 
269 ll . . . 459 ( 1 926): Crown Die & Tool Co. v. yc Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U . . 24. 
35-36 ( 1 923 ). 
77. See 1 7  U.S.C. � 50\ (b)  (2000). For a comprehensive overview of the rules of 
standmg in intellectual property. see Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter. The Elusive 
l.ogic oj'Stand111g Do<'frine in lntelle<'fliU! Pmpert,\· /.all'. 74 fUL. L.  Rev. 1 323 ( 2000). 
78. Sc-e 3 lf\1\-IER. supra note 72. at � 1 2.02 ("An exclu 1ve liccn�ee may not ue 
for infringement of nghts a� to "hich he is not licensed. e'en 1 r the ubJCCt mauer of the 
infnngement is the " ork as to '" hich he 1s a licensee."). 
79. See 17 U .. . C. * 106(4) ( 2000 & upp. I\'  2004). 
go. It might of cour e be argued that i\rticlc I (2 )  of the V. BT. which spec1fically 
pro,·Jdes that the trenty is m no way meant to preJudice copynght 111 the underlymg con­
t�nt. " ould require :;uch a cotTe!>pOndence between the e:-.ercisc or right..; ancl the undcrl)­
mg llcen-.e. While such a correspondence mtght be necessary for the actual exercise of 
rhe exclu�l\ C right ( t .c .. to acttwlly di  tribut(' reproduction� of the fixation) to avoid tn­
fi·ingtng, the underlying cop) nght. it cl.!l1ainly \\ ould not he neccs:.ary for the exercise of 
the right to innwtc an <lCtlnn, �tn<.:e rhat would 111 no way interfere with the comcnt 
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exclusive license incorporates the basic understanding thar the value o f  the 
license lies in its enabling the use of the work in and of itself, not the ex­
clusive or even limited use of the work ( the copyright holder being free to 
create infinite non-exclusive licenses), but by the use alone. 
The efficiency argument ignores altogether the reality that broadcast­
ers' rights go well beyond just granting broadca ters the right to sue for 
infringement o f  any right they might have contractually obtained. As  
noted earlier, broadcasters' rights extend beyond the right to  broadcast to 
post-fixation actions.::s 1  Ln other words, they replicate several of the copy­
right holder's exclusive privileges, but through the broadca ·t. Given the 
inseparabi lity of the signal from its underlying content, these in turn trans­
late into rights over the content. Thus, the broadcaster's exclusive right to 
authorize the ' reproduction of fixations"�.<� means little more than the right 
to authorize the reproduction of the content of the broadcast, a right that is 
also vested in the content producer.83 A user reproducing content obtained 
via a broadcast is now subject to two potential lawsuits -one from the 
copyright holder, and another from the broadcaster. Whereas avoiding 
multiple lawsuits remains central to the rules surrounding copyright l i ­
censing, the broadcasters' rights regime is directed at  creating an addi­
tional right to sue. 
Broadcasters' rights thus do much more than jusL move the entitlement 
from the content producer to the broadcaster, they replicate it. A mere du­
plication of the gate-keeping function might in some iluations work to 
c reate what economists call  a "polyarchical" or decentralized project 
structure.84 Central to realizing the efficiency gains from such a structure 
is the need for the decision-making process to be substantively decentral­
ized as a whole.85 In other words, if an authorization from the broadcaster 
were to alleviate the need for a similar or equivalent authorization from 
8 I .  See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text. 
82. WI PO Broadcast Treat;v·, supra note 52, at art. 1 3. 
83. See 1 7  U.S.C. s l 06( I )  (2000). 
84. See Patrick Bolton & Joseph farrell, Decentralization. Ouplication. and Delay, 
98 J .  POL. ECON. 803 ( 1 990); Raaj Kumar Sah & Joseph E. Stiglitz. Tlw Arclziteuure of 
Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies, 76 AM. ECON. Rr:\·. 7 1 6  ( 1986).  For 
further l iterature focusing on this distinction, see Ruth Ben-Yashar & Shmuel itzan, The 
Robustness of Optimal Organi::ational Architectures: A Note on I lierarchies and Po(var­
chies, L 8  SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 1 55 (2004); Thomas Gehrig, Pien·c Regibeau & Kate 
Rockett, Project Evaluation and Organizational Form. 5 REV. ECON. DF.SIG� 1 77 (2004): 
and Raaj Kumar Sah & Joseph E. Stiglitz, CommitTees, Hierarchies. und Polyarchies. 98 
ECON. J. 4 5 1  ( 1 988). 
85. See Tim Wu, Intellectual Proper�r. Innovation and Oecenrrali:::ed Decisions, 92 
VA. L. REV. 1 23 ,  1 29 (2006) ('"[A]ny single actor's approval of a project i$ sufficient''). 
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the content producer and vice versa, such that consent from either \vould 
immunize a user from liability (under both regime ), the decision-making 
structure then becomes truly polyarchical (i.e., with multiple gate-keepers. 
any of whom are sufficient for entry/authorization). Broadcasters' rights 
consciou ly reject such a model (of decentralized authorization), however, 
in the legitimate belief that so doing would undermine the content produc­
ers' contribution, which is central to the entire creative process. 86 Thu 
broadca tcrs' rights contemplate a structure that is distinctly hierarchical, 
detracting from the po sibility of any structural efficiency gains. 
The efficiency argument thus fails on three fronts . First, broadca ters' 
rights go far beyond the ideal of minimizing broadcasters' costs of con­
tracting for similar rights, simply because broadcasters could not have 
contracted for such rights to begin with (except by acquiring the copyright 
in its entirety) . .  ccond, they do not effect a mere reallocation of the enti­
tlement to uc for infringement. Instead, they replicate the entitlement and 
con ciou ly contemplate a multiplicity of lawsuit for a single act of in­
fringement. Third. the efficiency argument ignore the fact that transaction 
costs exi t on both ides of the producer-consumer equation. 7 Even if the 
regime minimi7cd broadcasters· transaction costs, it multiplic u �er ' costs 
by now requiring them to navigate through an additional layer of liability. 
D. I nvc tment Protection & Piracy Prevention as a Rationale 
Attempts to develop coherent theoretical justification for copyright 
abound in the literature. Sfl They range from the utilitarian or law-and­
economics-ba cd explanations to the more dcontological ones based on 
86. See Rom� Convenuon. supra note 1 8, at an. I :  H ·1 PO Broadcasl Trewr. supru 
note 52, at an I .  SeC' also supra text accompanying note 34. 
87. In many respects this tracks the problem of an arHICOmmons. 1dcntilied by Mi­
chael Jleller. Here. the creation of additional layers of propert) nghts mcreascs the trans­
action cost:-. of usmg the underlying resources. thereb) detemng actual use and resultmg 
in an altogether tllffercm inefficiency. See Michael A. Jleller. The Traget�,. of 1he Ami­
common.\: J>ropen_,. in 1he Trunsi1ion .fi'om A1ar  w .1/orke/.\. I l l  1 1 ·\RV. L. REV. 62 1 
( 199 ): Jamc \11 . Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon. Symm<!lnc Tra�eclie.\: Commons and Ami­
common\. 43 J.L. & Eco�. I (2000). The argument has been further C\tcnded to the 
world of uHangiblcs. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca . . [i ·cnberg. Can Pa1en1s De1er 
hmomriun :' 111e A n1icummons in Biomedical ResC'arch. 2XO ( ll NCF 698 ( 1998 ). 
88. SC'I!, e.p, . . Edw111 C. Heninger. Juslifi·mg lntelleclllal J>roperf., .. I 8 PHIL. & PUR . 
. A.I F. 3 1  ( J 9H9): 'tC\\al1 E. Sterk. Rhetoric and Rea/ill· in Copyrig/11 Lt/1\". 94 MICH. L.  
RJ.:\'. 1 1 97 ( 1 996): amuel E.  TroSO'-\ . The 1/h/\·in! Search .for Jusltjiccaon Theories: 
Copyright. ComJIWtlt/icanon and Cupiwl. 1 6  C\N:�DIAt-- J L. & .ILIRISPRUDI.::-JCF.. 2 1 7  
(2003). 
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personality.39 While none has proven to be unproblematic altogether, the 
util itarian framework appears to be dominant in the traditional conception 
of copyright.90 In this understanding, property rights are granted to authors 
of l iterary and artistic works as an ex ante incentive for their creativity.9 1 
Broadcasters' rights and other related or ''neighboring" rights represent 
an altogether d i fferent story because broadcasters and cablecasters never 
directly engage in any creative activity, in the traditional sense of the 
term.92 They nevertheless do contribute to the dissemination of  creative 
works through their distribution networks. Hence, their rights remain con­
ceptually related to traditional copyright. Broadcasters' rights, however, 
seemingly derive from a di fferent type of utilitarian rationale--one related 
to their investment of time, energy, and resources.93 As the W I PO Secre­
tariat notes: 
Broadcasting organizations have been granted protect ion for the 
result of their invest ment, their en trepreneuria l efforts and their 
contribution to the diffusion of culture and their publ ic informa­
tion service. Broadcasting organizations are entities that take the 
89. For the utilitarian approaches to the topic, see Deborah Chalsty. The Economic 
Logic of Cop.vright, in THE POLITICAL EC01 OMY OF LEGAL l1 FORMATION: THE EW 
LANDSCAPE 145 (Samuel E. Trosow ed., 1999); Robert M. Hurt & Robert M .  
Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 5 6  AM ER. Eco '. REV. 42 1 ( 1966); 
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis a./Copyright Law, 18 J .  
LEGAL STUD. 325 ( 1 989). For the more deontological philosophical justifications, see 
Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale o./ Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Re1•olutionmy France 
and America, 64 TUL/\ E L. REV. 991  ( 1990); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in 
Se(F-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural La"v of lnre!lectual Property, 
102  YALE L.J. 1 533 ( 1993 ) ;  Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of fme!!ectual Property, 77 
GEO. L.J .  287 ( 1988);  Jeremy A. Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: fndividual Rights 
and Social Values in Intellectual Property, 68 C!-11.-KENT L. REV. 84 1 ( 1 968). 
90. Part of this justification, at least in the context of the United States, derives from 
the fact that copyright derives from the Constitution, which in Article I .  Section 8, pro­
vides: '·To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and rnventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Dis­
coveries.·' This clearly is a utilitarian approach to the subject. 
9 1 . See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual 
Property, 7 1  U. CH I . L. REV. 129 (2004). 
92. 2 RICKETSO & G1 rssuRG, supra note 2 1 ,  at 1 2 1 2 .  
93. See Werner Rumphorst, Neighbouring Rights Protection of Broadcasting Or­
ganizations, 1 4  EUR. lNTELL. PROP. REV. 339, 340 ( 1992); Werner Rumphorst, The 
Broadcasters ' Neighbouring Right: Impossible to Understand?, COPYRIGHT BULL., July­
Sept. 2006, at I ,  3 ,  http ://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/00 1 4/00 1 477/ 1 47736e.pdf ("The 
broadcasters' neighbouring right is there to protect the broadcasters· entrepreneurial ef­
fons and investments in the form in which they materialize as an end product from their 
activity, viz. the broadcasts."). 
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financial and editori a l responsibility for the selection and ar­
rangement of, and investment in, the transmitted content ."� 
1323 
The rationale thus appears to be that since broadcasters invest a sig­
nificant amount of time and resources that indirectly contribute to the 
creative process, they ought to be granted property rights that enable them 
to control their investment. I n  a sense, this rationale is Lockean yet sig­
n i ficantly more consequent ialist.95 
But  why might such control be necessmy at al l? Surely not a l l  invest­
ments require control as a quid pro quo. This takes us to the other side of 
the investment protection rationale: the piracy argument-that the unau­
thorized use of broadcasters' signals results in a diminution of their reve­
nue. The UNESCO, in its discussion of the treaty, seems to al lude to the 
legitimacy of this justification and its connection to the investment ration­
ale, in observing that protection is intended to "prevent third parties from 
using these [signals] without . . . authorization" which could result in 
"economic losses" and that the rights involved are a recognition of the 
"investments [broadcasters] make . . .  that benefit the eventual consum­
ers. "96 
The piracy argument is one that has been made ever since discussions 
on a new instrument began at the WIP0.97 Broadcasters argue that wi th 
94. WIPO, Prorecrion <�/"Broadcasting Organizations: Terms and Concepts, WlPO 
Doc. No. SCCR/8/I F/1 (Aug. 1 6, 2002). available at http://v."vw.wipo. int/edocs/ 
mdocs/copyright /en/sccr_8/sccr_8_inf_ l .pdf. 
95. The Lockean argument is. of course, one from labor-desert. that an individual's 
expenditure of labor and cffon entitles him or her to an exclusionary right over the prod­
uct of those labors. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNME 'T: A CRITICAL EDITION 
WITH AN I TRODUCTIO AND APPARATUS CRITICUS BY PETER LASLETT, �§ 25-5 1 ,  at 302-
5 1  (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1967) ( 1 690). The Lockean the01y 
has been applied rather extensively in  the context of intel \ecwal propeny. especially 
copyright. See, e.g., PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPH'. OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 4 1 -72 
( 1996): Richard A. Epstein. Libert.r Versus Properry? Crack., in rhe Fvundarions of" 
CoP.vriglu Lu11, 42 SAN DII:GO L. REV. I .  2 J (2005): Wendy J. Gordon, Render Cop_l·­
righ! un/o Ca�sar. On Taking Jnce111i1·es Seriously. 7 1  U. CHI. L.  R�:.v. 75 (2004); Adam 
D. Moore. A Lockean Theory 4 1nrellectual Property. 2 1  HAMLJNI: 1 .. RE\'. 65 ( 1 997}. 
for an interesting revisionist account of the Lockean theory. applied in the context of 
copyright Ia\\. see Liar Zcmer. The Making of a Ne11· Copyrigh1 Lvckean, 29 HARV. J.L.  
& PUB. PoL·Y 891  (2006). 
96. Prmection of the Rights oj BroadcastinJ< Orguni:::ations. para. 6. U 1E CO Doc. 
No. 1 7 1  F:.Xt 59 (Apr. 8. 2005 ). avuilahle at hnp://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/00 1 3/ 
00 1 390 1 39057e.pdf. 
97. Set! W I  PO. Agenda lti!m 4: Proreclion (�( rhe Rig/us o( Brol/(lcusting Orguni:::o­
rions. Suhmissions Recei11ed ti·om Nnn-Covernmentul Organi:::arions h_,. March 31.  1�99. 
at 8. 'V. IPO Doc. ·o. 'CCRt2 ·6 (Apr. 7. 1 999), al'llilahle ar http: W\\\V.wipo.in!iedocs/ 
mdocs/copyrightlen1sccr_2'sccr_2_6.pdf ("Comprehensively updated imcrnational pro-
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the advent of new technologies of digital copying, unauthorized intercep­
tion, fixation, and retransmission of broadcasts has become rampant. 9� 
Studies undertaken by broadcasters· col lectives to support this argument 
show that there was a 1 50% increase in television piracy in 2004; that 7% 
of a l l  broadcast piracy occurred in the United States; and that revenue 
losses from signal theft globally amounted to approximately $2 billion 99. 
The emergence of the internet as a distribution medium and its transna­
tional nature, broadcaster claim, further diminishes their revenues. 100 
Broadcasters often use the iCrave TV controversy that erupted in 2000 to 
i l lustrate the threat posed by the internet to their revenues. 
The iCrave TV episode involved a Canadian entrepreneur capturing 
over-the-air broadcast signals from the United States and Canada and 
streaming them digitally over the internet, enabling others to view televi­
sion broadcasts on their computers, for a subsc1iption fee . 1 01  After much 
convincing, U.S. broadcasters managed to get copyright owners to initiate 
an action against him for copyright infringement, on the premise that since 
users in the United States could access the service, he was infringing their 
rights in the United States. They eventually succeeded in getting an in-
tection of the broadcasters' neighboring right is  the only way to ensure the possibility of 
wi  ft and effective action against piracy of broadcasts "): WI PO, Protection of Broad­
casling Organi::.ations. at 1 5, WlPO Doc. No. SCCR./7/8 (Apr. 4, 2002). available a1 
http://www.wipo. int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_7/sccr_7 _8.pdf. See also Viviana 
Munoz Tellez & Andrew Chege Waitara, A Development Analysis a_( the Proposed WIPO 
Treaty on the Proteclion of Broadcasting and Cablecasting Organisation 26-31 {South 
Ctr. Research Paper o. 9, Jan. 2007). C/\•ai/able at http://www.southcentre.org/ 
publications/researchpapers/ResearchPapers9.pdf (providing an overview of the piracy 
rationale). 
98. See sources cited supra note 97. 
99. These tigures are from a briefing note by internet monitoring company Envi­
sional in 2005, entitled TV Piracy. Broadcast unions such as the European Broadcasting 
Union (EBU) relied upon the figures extensively to establish an increase in piracy rates 
worldwide. See Will Sturgeon, 24 Reasons Why TV Piracy is Soaring, WEBWATCH, Feb. 
1 7, 2005. http:l/networks.si l icon.com/webwatch/0,39024667 ,3912791 9,00.htm; Daisy 
Whitney, SiJiraling Piracy Threatens TV, TVWEEK, Feb. 2 1 ,  2005, http://www.tvweek. 
com/article.cms'?articleld=2730 I .  
I 00. EUROPF.AN BROADCAST UN ION, SOME RECENT EXAMPLES OF B ROADCAST PI­
RACY (2005). available at www.ebu.ch/CMSimages/en/leg_p_pressreports_piracy_ 
120905_tcm6-42762.pdf (last visited Nov. 1 3, 2006). 
I 0 I .  See John Borland, Broadcasrers Win Batile Agains1 iCraveTV.com, C iET 
NEWS.COM, Jan. 28. 2000. http://news.com.com/21  00-1 033-236255.html; John Townley. 
t'vfovie. Broodmsting Companies Sue iCra11eTV, INTERNET EWS.COM, Jan. 2 1 ,  2000, 
http://www.imemt!tnews.com/bus-news/article.php/29 I 1 3 1 .  
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junction against him. 
102 However, the case is often used to i l lustrate the 
ease with which broadcast signals can be converted into digital format and 
retransmitted over g.lobal networks, and broadcasters, dependence on con­
tent owners to commence an action to stop the retransmitter-the al leged 
pirate. 
The anti-piracy argument, however raises an important conceptual is­
sue that has signjficant practical implications. This relates to the distinc­
tion that is rarely ever made between revenue losses (strictly speaking) 
and lost revenue streams. A revenue loss from piracy may be said to occur 
when individuals or organizations deny broadcasters a source of revenue 
that they would have had, in the nom1a 1 scheme of things. A failed reve­
nue stream, on the other hand, represents the broadcaster being denied a 
source of revenue that it would nor have ordinarily had, except in a hypo­
thetical or theoretical sense. Take the iCrave TV episode described above. 
Broadcasters at the time were not yet making their content available 
online. Although a broadcaster might indeed argue that online broadcast­
ing was the next natural step, this argument is at best hypothetical. The 
distinction is thus one o f  appropriate baselines to asceriain the status quo 
(and thereby losses). Broadcasters argue that a world with the entitlement 
is the status quo and anything short of it is a loss, which ignores the nu­
ance that the very existence of the entitlement is at issue. 103 
Computations of piracy-related losses do not seem to make this di -
tinction. 104 They operate on the assumption that a diminution of any form 
o f  actual and potential revenue resulting from the use of broadcasters' ig­
nals represents a piracy-related loss. This distinction is relevant when i t  
comes to  tbe piracy-related just i fication for property rights in broadcast 
signals, for it is not clear that the losses jdentified merit classification as 
piracy-related when broadcasters' entitlement to them is unclear a priori. 
Broadcasters' open-ended definition of piracy as including all revenue 
diminutions assumes that broadcasters are entitled to internalize all the 
positive extemalities associated with their investment, at least insofar as 
these externa lities are reducible to sources of revenue. 105 Their conception 
I 02. Na1·1 Football Let1gue v .  TV Radio ow Corp .. 53 U.S. P.Q.2d ( 8  1A l 1 83 1  
( W .O. P<L 2000). 
I 03. ror more on the usc of baselines to detcnnine harm and losses in imellecrual 
properly contexts, sc� Wendy J. Gordon. q( Harms and Bene(i1s: Torrs. Reslitlllion. and 
fmefll!cttw! l'mpeny, 2 1  J.  LFGAL STUD. 449 ( 1 992). 
I O..J. .)'ee ,.UfJrLI note 99 and accompanying rext. 
I 05. For a theoretical c:xposition or this argument and its application in rhc property­
tmelkctual property Jebatc. see Mark A.  Lemley. Proper1_1 . lllleflecw(l/ PropertY. and 
f7ree Nicling X:1 Ti.:X. L. RF\·. 1 0] 1  (2005) . . 1)ee also Mark A. Lemley, The r:nmomics o( 
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o f  the property right is tied intrinsically to their understanding of piracy . 1 06 
Thus, i f  piracy were understood as being l imited to revenue losses. claims 
should be limited to unfair competition, restricting competitors from free­
r·iding on the first-mover's efforts when such free-riding lead to a direct 
loss ( for example, XBC against DRC). On the other hand. if piracy en­
compasses failed revenue streams as well, an open-ended property right 
becomes necessary. Al l  o f  this or course depends on who broadcaster 
c haracterize as "pirates," and given the general tendency to include in this 
category any person making an unauthorized use of the broadcast signal, 
the usage tends to be in the direction of the widest possible interpretation. 
Piracy losses ought to be under tood as revenue losses resulting from 
free-riding on the efforts o f  an earlier entrant into the market and as ex­
cluding losses resulting from another party's identification of a new reve­
nue stream, even if the new stream remains in some way indirectly con­
nected to the established one. Discussions of signal piracy do not, at pre­
sent, reflect this distinction. lndeed, a few years before discussions com­
menced at the WIPO, a prominent member o f  the European Broadcasting 
Union ( EB U )  observed that private copying of broadcasts by individuals 
"constitute[ d) unjust enrichment on the part of the private individuals car­
rying out such recording [since] there i a conesponding actual loss or loss 
of opportunity to . . .  license its protected material . . . . " 1 07 The tendency 
to equate revenue losses with lost revenue streams thus dominates the de­
bate. 
This analysis logically leads to a case that has become infamous in the 
information property context: International News Service v. Associated 
Press. 108 For quite some time now, commentators have faulted the Comt's 
analysis of propetty in new there. 109 Where the International News Ser-
lmpr01•ement in Intellectual Proper(\' Ll/11', 75 TEX. L.  REV. 989 ( 1 997); Mark A. Lemley 
& Brett M. Frischmann, Spillovers, I 07 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007). 
I 06. See generally Peter K. Yu, Four Common Misconceptions About Copyriglu Pi­
racy, 26 LOY. LA. I T'L & COMP. L. RE\·. 1 27 (2003). 
107 .  Moira Burnett, Thirty-Four Years On: High Time for Filling the Gaps in Broad­
casters · ProtecTion, 6 E T. L.  REV. 39, 40 ( 1995). 
1 08.  248 U.S.  2 1 5  ( 1 9 1 8) .  
109. See. e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy 
of fntemational News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI.  L. REV. 4 1  1 ( 1983 ); Rich­
ard A. Epstein, International News Sen·ice v. Associated Press: Custom and Law as 
Sources of Properry Rights in News. 78 VA. L. REV. 85 ( 1992); Dennis S. Karja1a, Mis­
appropriation as a Third Intellectual Propert_v Paradigm, 94 COLUM. L.  REV. 2594 
( 1 994); Bmce P. Keller, Condemned to Repeal the Past: The Reemergence c�( Misappro­
priation and other Common La11· Tltf!orie�· (l Protection for fntellectual Property, I I 
HARV. J .L.  & TECH. 401 ( l99S): Richard A. Posner, Misappropriatiun: A /)irge. 40 
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vice holding might yet be u eful to the pre ent analysi is in the Court 's 
attempt to understand excludability as being limited in cope to losses 
arising out of direct free-riding. In his majority opinion. Ju tice Pitney 
gramed the plaintiffs a limited prope11y interest in their new tori c. -one 
that would operate only against competitors, wa time-specific. and would 
come into existence only when there was actual ex post free-riding. 1 10 At 
the root of the Court' reasoning appears to have been a concern that one 
party wa. profiting off of the investments of another, a form of unfair 
competition. The Court thus recognized that an ordinary revenue lo was 
unfair, whereas losing a new revenue stream was not. I f  an individual had 
come along and found a way to distribute news stories freely using a novel 
mechanism-on kite , for example-the Cou11 would probably have di al­
lowed the plaintifr claim, even though in an ideal world the plaintiff 
might have een a new revenue tream in the distribution and preferred to 
control it. 1 1 1  
Perhap al l  of thi piracy talk, which derives from the rhetorical force 
of identifying a "pirate," is one-sided. In other word . a pirate i- but an 
individual who make unauthorized use of another' property rights. and 
con equently we ought to first identify the owner of the property right be­
fore we embark on a di cu ion about piracy and related lo e · .  \Vhile thi� 
would ce11ainly be the ca e for real and per onal propeny, it i not . o for 
imangibles. 1 12  Real and personal property are at all material times en­
dowed with the characteri tic of ownabi lity, by vi1tuc of their being tangi­
ble (or a re ). Conver ely, an intangible is converted into an ownable re. 
only through a legal fiction. and its independent legal exi tcnce as a res i. 
consequent upon the identification of rights individuals have in relation to 
it. 1 u Thus, information becomes property only when the legal sy tem ac­
cords indi' idual exclusionary entitlement over it. 1 1 -l The , a me is true for 
Hou · . L. R1 ' . 6 2 1  (2003 ): Leo .1. Raskind. The J\,fisapproprimion Docmne a_, a Cnmp<'lt­
ltl'<' Norm oflntl!l!l!clllal f>ruperf}·. 75 U. Ml'l . L .  RE\'. 875 ( 1991  ). 
I I  0. In!'/ \'e"·' S11n . 248 U.S. at 2-+ 1 -42. 
I I I .  See ul a1 239 ( "The right of 1hc purchaser of a smgk ne'' ... paper 10 -.pread 
\..nn\\'kdge of lb contcnb gratunousl�. for any legiumate purpose not unrca:-.onahly Jn!CI­
I�ring wuh c�lmpli.llnant's ngh1 to make merchandise of i1. ma� be admnted.'') 
1 1 2. See I .·\ \\'RI 'lll - L ESSIG. FREF CL I TLRE: THF 1 -\I LRI .'\'lD (li l t  HI 01- CRL\· 
1 1\ IT't 53-l\-t (2005) (prO\ 1ding an exhau 11\e O\ CJ'\ JC\\ of the gent:·,� of Ihl' tt:'m1 Ill the 
C.:IHllC'\1 or 111tCJ(ectuaJ propeny diSCOUrSeS). 
1 1 3 . . Set' . ' tephen L. Caner. 011·ning ll"ha1 Dot>sn '1 £.n,l. 1 .1 I I  \R\ .I.L. & Pt B. POL., 
1>9 I 1990 ). 
1 1 -t. Httl .,ee rrunk l·a:-.terbrook. llllellenua/ Proper1_1 f., S'n/1 ?mpen_, .. 1 :  1 1 -\R\ . .I.L. 
& Pt B. Pn1 .,  I og ( I  990): Richard A. Epstcm. !JI!ellt!c nwl Propem Ole/ !Jo111ularies 
Clllcf .\('\1 rm/111('/'\ . 76 1'--D. 1 .. .1. �03 (200�).  Another \\(IY llr ()11'/1/11� lnlonnatinn. :-.o 10 
:-orh.:a\..  I� t h rnugh 11ll'C'hili11Sil1:-. o r  secnx:: and here SCl'I'I?L'Y l'Oil\"CI'b the ekmenl o r  de 
1328 BERKELEY TECH OLOGY LAW J O U RNAL fVol.  22:1303 
broadcast signals that are equally intangible. Consequently, it becomes 
critical to identify the reasons upon which the justification for a propet1y 
regime depends before bestowing proprietary status upon broadcast sig­
nals. Since the primary justification for the property regime is the exis­
tence of revenue lo ses from piracy, we need to begin from the piracy ar­
gument. 
Undoubtedly, the main factor driving the broadcasters' push for ex­
tended prope11y rights in  their signals is the emergence of digital copying 
and with il the internet as a global medium of communication. 1 1 5  In the 
internet, they see a huge market from which to eventual ly generate signifi­
cant revenue. At the same time, they see it as a major source of potential 
competition for their analog revenues-especially when it involves their 
own signals.
1 1 6 Creating a property regime over their signal and its .fixa­
tion enables them to control all uses of the signal-in both the analog and 
digital worlds. This in nun ensures that until they decide to enter the world 
or intemet broadcasts (or webcasts) themselves, they get to extend their 
dominance in the analog world to the digital one. 1 1 7 
Equipping broadcasters with broad exclusionary control over their 
broadcast signals, which in turn derive their existence from other sources, 
is bound to upset the equilibrium that currently exists between different 
players in the television broadcasting industry. [t remains to be seen what 
the nature and consequences o f  this are l ikely to be. 
ln sum, the WBT would, if implemented, give broadcasters a set of in­
dependent exclusionary rights over their broadcast signals, many of which 
replicate copyright owners' control over the underlying content. Rather 
than move the entitlement from the content producer (i.e.,  copyright 
owner) to the broadcaster, the WBT replicates it, creating a system o f  duaJ 
liability. The WBT's sole justification seemingly derives from an open­
ended view o f  piracy-one that treats any inability to internalize benefits 
jure exclusivity into a de facto one. Secrecy arguments are made most commonly in the 
context of indigenous cultural property. See Michael F. Brown, Can Culture Be Copy­
righted?. 39 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 193, 1 99 ( 1998).  
I 1 5 .  This is most apparent in the preamble to the WBT, which explicitly recognizes 
the threat posed by new technologies that ha vc given rise to new opp01tunities for unau­
thorized use of broadcasts. See W!PO Broadcast Treaty, supra note 52, Preamble. 
I 1 6 .  See supra text accompanying notes 96- l 0 I .  
I 1 7. For a review of similar rationales in the context of Australia and Japan, see 
OGAWA, supra note 5 1 ,  at 1 67-76. [t is interesting to note that Australia introduced 
broadcasters' rights into its copyright legislation pursuant to a Free Trade Agreement 
( FT A )  entered into with the United States in 2000, in order to provide protection for U.S.  
broadcasters. ld at 122 n. 1 5. 
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associated with the broadcast as a loss that detracts from broadcasters' le­
gitimate entitlement. 
I I I .  ATT ENUATED EXCLUSIONARY RIGHTS I N  THE 
TELEVISION INDUSTRY 
Part J l  examined the basic structure o f  the property rights regime for 
which broadcasters have been lobbying and which countries including the 
United States seem ready to adopt at the W I PO. This Part examines the 
cunent regime in place i n  the United States television broadcast industry 
and the nature of interactions that exist between it. di fferent players. The 
basis of the regulatory regime here is a balanced system of what 1 call at­
tenuated exclusionary rights, vested in each of the primary actors. These 
rights together form a regime that creates a level playing field between 
di fferent interests in the i ndustry, and at the same time aims to preserve 
the ideal of  the public interest. 
A word first about the idea of '·attenuated rights.·· Traditionally one of 
the characteristic differences between property and contractual rights is  
that property encompasses rights that operate in  rem against the world at 
large, whereas contractual rights only ever operate inter se between con­
tracting parties. 1 1 8 The in rem/in personam distinction is often taken as the 
basis for characterizing certain rights as property rights or othenvise. 1 19 
The regimes that exist in the current television industry are not in rem in 
the absolute or traditional sense, but are restricted to the existing industry 
players and are thus significantly more nuanced than the traditional ideal 
of exclusionary properiy, which tends to ignore the identity o f  a potential 
transgressor or the right. 120 In this sense, the existing property bundle re­
mains /imi!ed. However, the concept of ''limited rights'' is today associated 
almost entirely with the intel1cctual prorerty discour c and its emphasis on 
temporal�,. limited rights. 1 2 1  The word "attenuated'. is therefore employed 
to highlight the fact that the limits here are operaTional rather than tempo­
ral. Yet the rights remain in rem-in that they come into existence inde­
pendent of a contract or other ex ante interaction between the parties and 
1 I 8. See genflra/(1· Thomas W. Men·ill & 1 -knr) E. Smith. The Propi!rl.\. Con/rae! 
lnt�Jface. I 0 I COLl'l\1 .  L. R F \ .  773 ( 200 I ). See ulso Steven N .. . Cheung.. The .).mtcll/re 
u{ u Co111rac1 und 1he Them:r (�(a Non-exclusil'e Rl!source. 1 3  .I.L. & Eco . 49 ( 1 970): 
Wesley ewcomb Hohfeld. Fundoml!ll!al /.ega/ Conceptions as Applied in .Judicial Rc>u­
soning. 26 Y ·\U: L.J. 7 I 0 ( 1 9  I 7 ). 
1 1 9. Se:-1! Men-ill & Smith. supru note I 1 8. 
I 20. Si!e .I.E. PF'INI- R. TH 1: l 1>U1 m PROPERTY li\ LA\\. I 28 ( I  997 ). 
I 2 I .  In the: comext of rhc U . S  .. at least. th1s dcri' e::, from rhe phra::,c ··Jimited tim�s .. 
a� used 1n the Copyright Clrrust: ol"the Constiwrinn. l .S. Cc>NST. art. I , � X. cl.  X. 
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are to that extent independent o f  the parties' identities. Hence the phra e 
··attenuated exclusionary rights.·' 
A. A Structural Overview of the U.S. Television Industry 
I. The Basic Structure 
Apart from audiences (who in some sense remain passive) and adver­
tisers, the U.S. televi ion industry is today characterized by the existence 
of four primary players-program producers, networks, television stations, 
and cable companies. 1:!1 Cable television emerged as a commercial phe­
nomenon only in the early 1 960s, and to a large extent required the intro­
duction o f  new rules that found a place for it within the overall system. 123 
A l l  legal rights of concern here originate with the producers of an 
audiovisual work such as a movie or a "television show." These program 
producers are either i ndependent producers or produce programs based on 
the requirements of networks. 124 Independent producers sell. their pro­
grams to television networks and are in turn paid a royalty rate that is of­
ten computed on the basis o f  factors such as the number of affiliate sta­
tions likely to broadcast the program and the amount of advertising reve­
nue the network is likely to be able to keep for itself. 125 
Television network are brokers whose sole purpose is the assembly of 
television programs by purchasing content from producers and selling the 
a sembled programming to television stations. 1 2  At the same time, how­
ever, they act as intermediaries between advertisers and television stations. 
In assembling the programming, networks offer advertisers internal spots, 
short time slots ·within each program, and receive compensation for each 
122. See BRUCE tv!. OWEN ET AL., TELEVISION ECONOMICS 6 ( 1 974) (profiling the 
different players in the television broadcasting industry at the time). Note that this book 
was published before the cable television boom and consequently does not devote signifi­
cant attention to th1s segment. 
123 .  See 3 ERIK BAR1 OUW. A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UN!TED STATES: 
THE IMAGE EMPIRE 24 7 ( 1 970); VINCENT MOSCO, BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED 
TATES: INNOVATIVE CHALLE .GE AND ORGANIZATIONAL CO TROL 85 ( 1 979). 
1 24. See Susan C. Greene, The Cable Television Provisions of the Revised Copyright 
Act, 27 Ct.\THOL!C U.L. REV. 263, 265-66 ( 1 978). 
125.  Stanley M. Besen el a!., Copyright Liability for Cable Television: Compulsot)' 
Licensing and the Coase Theorem, 2 1 J.L. & ECON. 67, 77 ( 1978). In a comprehensive 
review of the television program production segment of the industry, Owen et a!. demon­
strate that the indust1y is characterized by ve1y high levels of competition. yet at the same 
time monopolistic competition-in the sense that numerous producers produce differenti­
ated products that are easily substitutable and no producer earns profits in excess of a 
normal rate of return. See OWtN ET 1\L., supra note 122, at 1 7 .  
126. OWEN ET AL. supra not\! 122, a t  7.  
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or the e slots, priced commensurate with the size and demographic of  the 
program' audience. 127 The networks are arguably the most important 
players in the television broadcasting industry. 
Television stations, in turn, are of two kinds-affiliate and independ­
ents. Affil iate are television station that are affiliated with an individual 
network. 128 A ffiliates receive almost a l l  their programming from the net­
works. and affiliates in the same time zone typically receive identical pro­
gramming paekages. 129 H owever. an affiliate is u ually granted a cer1ain 
degree of exclusivity in carrying the program within each geographic mar­
ket. Interestingly, though, the nen.vork com pen ate afii I iates for canying 
programming, which implies the transfer of a certain portion o f  a net­
work's advertising revenue to its affiliates. 1 30 I t  is important to remember, 
though, that the only advertising slots that networks can sell and derive 
revenue from are in-program slots. In addition to these internal lot . how­
ever, are time slots between individual programs, refcrTed to either a "an­
nouncement time" or "adjacencies."13 1 These are controlled exclu ·ively by 
the television stations. Television stations similarly el l  these adjacencies 
to adverli er for revenue, detennined again by variables uch a viewer­
ship. nature and duration of the time lot. etc. The sharing of thi. adver1is­
ing revenue is unidirectional. Unlike networks who mu t ·hare their reve­
nue with rations, stations do not have to hare their revenue from adver­
tising sales with the networks. 1 32 
lndependents are local television stations that arc not affiliated with 
any network. 1 33 This being the case, their primary source of  programming 
comes from producers in the syndication market. 1 3-t This market is gener-
1 27. tanley M. Besen & Ronald Sol igo. The Economics <�( the Nellmrk-Af/iliate 
Relationship in the Telel'ision Broadcasting lndu.wy. 63 1\MCR. EcON. RL:\ . 259, 259 
( 1973): Franklin M. Fisher et a!., The Audience-Revenue RelatiOnship /in· Locul Televi­
sion Stations, I I  BELL J. Ecor-.. 694. 695 ( 1980). 
1 28. Regulations define a "full network station .
. 
as: ''A commercial tele\ i 1011 broad­
cast �tatton that generally carries in weekly pnme time hour� 85 percent of the hours of 
programming offered by one of the three major national telc\ tston networks \\ nh which it 
ha a primary affiliauon ( t .e  .. right of fir�t refusal or first call)." 47 C.l .R. * 76.5(j) 
(2004 ). 
1 29.  Bcscn et al.. supra note 1 25, at 77. 
1 30. Qwr £1 AL.. supra note 122. at 97- 1 00. 
I 3 1 .  Fi her et al.. supra note 117. at 695: 8esen & oltgo. supra note 127. at 259. 
1 32. Besen & oligo. supra note 1 27, at 259. 
133.  Regulattons characterize an "independent station" a� one whtch generally ca1Tie� 
no more than ten hours or programmmg per \\'eel< of'fered by the three ma.tor national 
television networks during prime time. 47 C.F.R. * 76.5(1)  (2004). 
I 14. Greene, supm note 1 24, at 77. Regulations define a syndicated program a� .. any 
program solo. l iccn�cd. distributed or of'f'ered to television station l icensees in more than 
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ally regarded as the secondary market for television programs. I t  is very 
rare for new programming to enter the syndicated market directly: conse­
quently, the market here consists of programs that have completed their 
run on the primary networks. Obviously, the revenue that these programs 
generate is significantly lower than on the primary market. Occasionally, 
network affi l iates (affil iate stations) also purchase programming on the 
syndicated market in order to fill non-network time. 1 3 5  
Television stations-both affil iates and independents-then broadcast 
the content to viewer audiences j()r .fi-e e. 0 f course, viewers do not repre­
sent a direct source of revenue for content producers, broadcast networks, 
or television stations. 1 16 
The picture presented above is  a rather simplistic model of the televi­
sion broadcasting market. Two important exceptions, however, exist to the 
general model. The first is that the network-affiliate relationship merely 
gives affi l iate stations a first claim over a network's programming, as op­
posed to an actual obligation to carry whatever the network gives them. 1 37 
This exception is important, and it ensures that television stations a !so re­
tain some amount of control over the content of what they broadcast. The 
second is that networks retain al l  the advettising revenue associated with a 
pre-determined amount o f  broadcast program time carTied by the sta-
1 ,8 tion. _, 
2. The Emergence of" Cable Television. 
Arguably, the most important development in the television industry 
prior to the digital revolution was the emergence o f  cable television as a 
commercial phenomenon. Cable television presented regulators and pol-
one market within the United States other than as network programming." 47 C.F.R. 
§ 76.5(ii) (2004). 
135 .  Owen et al. analyze the syndication market and conclude that, unsurprisingly, 
this market remains Jess competitive anti at the same time Jess monopolistic. They attrib­
ute at least part of this effect to the t'<tct that here content producers can interact with tele­
vision stations directly, thereby taking advantage of the public good nature of their prod­
ucts, which producers cannot in the primary market. While the market is concentrated, 
the speed with which the demand needs to be met ensures its continuing viability. See 
OwEN ET AL., supra note 122, at 3 1 -35. 
136. Recent years have of course seen the emergence of new subscription-based 
broadcast technologies such as Direct Broadcast Service (DBS) and the Home Satellite 
Dish (HSD).  While these continue to grow in popularity, their penetration rates continue 
to remain rather low compared to both cable and broadcast television. See FCC ASSESS­
YIENT. supra note 1 7, at 36-46. 
1 37.  See 47 C.F.R.  § 76.5(j)  (200-+l (''right of first refusal"). 
1 38.  Besen & Soligo, .wpm nott' 1 27. at  259. 
2008j THE SOCIAL COSTS OF PROPERTY RIGl lTS 1333 
icy-maker with a ho t of different issues, all or which had major implica­
tions for the overall stmcture of the broadcasting indu try. 
ln it mo t ba. ic form, cable television i a hvbrid between television 
and telephone technologies. 1 39 Cable system u. e 
.
antenna to receive tele­
vision signal (broadcast by broadcast stations) and wires to then carry 
them to individual subscribers. 140 While the emergence of broadcast tech­
nology marked the move from wired communication to over-the-air com­
munication, cable television reversed this trend and thus to many seemed 
technologically regressive at the time. 
Cable television in the U nited States began in the late 1 940s as com­
munity antenna television (CATV)-a way of bringing broadcast signals 
to remote areas ·where they would not reach directly. 1 4 1 ln the typical 
setup, special antennas were installed at certain locations, uch as hilltops. 
The e antenna received television signals, ampli1ied them, and then de­
l ivered them via coaxial cables strung from utility poles to individual 
home . "Cable tele i ion" has ince evolved into a generic phrase for three 
different thing : J-C! ( i )  the community antenna system ju t de cribed, where 
four to six channel were captured and delivered via coaxial cable : ( i i )  the 
CATV . ervice vvhich involves capturing broadca t signal from other cit­
ies or location and transmitting it to local audience ( thereby augmenting 
local transmi sions) :  and ( i i i )  an independent ervice where content gener­
ated specifically for this service is delivered to a subscriber base. 
In it initial stages, cable television worked as a upplement to broad­
cast television and actually enhanced broadca tcr revenues by increasing 
overall viewersh ip. Cable television fir t started to run into problems when 
operators began carrying signals from distant locations to local communi­
ties, and later ,.vhen they began to provide audience with programming of 
their ovln. When thi happened, broadcasters. both local and out-of- tate. 
began to worry that cable television was eating into their revenues. Ini-
1 39. Tr \ L \i R. Rl\ Kl'\. A E\\" GuJDr TO FEOfR \I ( i\13LI TF.LL \ ISJO:-- RFCiLLA· 
TIO\;!:. ( 1978 ). 
140. Se!e g,e11crol�1· MAR'\ ALIU.: \IL\Yl-R PHILLIP\. C.\ f\': A II I�TORY 01 (Ot\lt\I L ­
"!IT'\ .A. '!Tr "- \ 1 1  l F\"1':>10'\ ( 1972): CHARLES C .  WOOD-\RD . .IR .. CAUL I. TFI L \'ISIO': 
A( Ql l I flO'\ \'\D OI'LR-\1101'\ or CATV SYSTF.t\1� ( l tJ7�). 
1 4 1 .  Oav1d I . 1mon. Local Televiswn I 'ersus Cahll!: .-1 ( opynght Them:1 of Prmec­
tion. 3 1  FLO. C0\1\1. L.J. 5 1  ( 1979). For an elaborate O\ l:l\ ie\\ of CATV·� early year" 
and the regulatory 1ssues i t  pre ented sec Note, ll' ire ,\fTrl!: The FCC a11d CA TI". 79 
H:\ R \ . L. R 1 \ . 366 ( 1965 ): John C. Palmer Jr. et at. .  C.-I Tl · .)·un·�r o( a Regulutm:1· Proh­
lem, 52 Gl-0. L.J. I '6- 1 37 ( 1 963 ) .  
142.  Do R. Li Dl •( . C.\BLF TI L.E\·r:-,tON AND 1 11 1  FCC: 1\ CRI�IS It'- :VILOI!\ Col\.. 
1 ROl 6 ( 1 973 ). 
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tially, the FCC refused to exercise jurisdiction over cable operators. 14�  It 
was not unti l cable began to gain significant popularity and broadcasters' 
complaints i ncreased tbat the FCC eventually promulgated guidelines for 
cable transmission. 144 Current estimates of the National Cable & Tele­
communications Association ( NCTA) indicate that the countrywide cable 
penetration levels as of September 2006 are around 5 8 .9% of all house­
holds with a television set. 1 45 
The most important characteristic of cable television, for the purposes 
of this Article, is that i t  acquires its content from two sources. First, cable 
operators retransmit basic broadcast signals. Second, in a more recent 
phenomenon, they also acquire rights to content meant .for cable systems. 
Cable television networks have emerged much along the lines of broadcast 
networks. I.Jn These networks act as similar intermediaries between indi­
vidual cable operators, broadcast networks, content producers, and adver­
tisers. They acquire content from producers and broadcast networks, sell 
advertising space to advertisers, and then put together cable programming 
that is relayed to individual cable operators via satellite. 
Cable networks, however, diverge from broadcast networks in one 
critical respect. They sell their programming to individual (affiliated and 
independent) cable operators with the royalties they receive dependent on 
the operator's subscription base, and at the same time they sell advertising 
slots to advertisers. Thus, unlike broadcast networks, cable networks have 
two independent sources of revenue. 1 47 
1 43.  See Joseph R. Fogarty & Marcia Spielholz, FCC Cable Jurisdiction: From Zero 
ro Pli!IUIIY in Twenty-Five Years, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 1 1 3 ,  1 1 4 ( 1 985) (noting the FCC's 
initial ··unwill ingness to impose any regulatory constraints on the cable industry"). 
144. For an overview of the FCC's attempts to regulate cable television, see generally 
ROBERT W. (RA DALL & HAROLD FURCIITGOTT-ROTH, (ABLE TV: REGU LATI01 OR 
(OMPI:TITION? ( 1996); LELAND l. JOHNSON. TOWARD COMPETITION IN CABLE TELEVI­
SION ( 1 994): William S. Comanor & Bridger M. Mitchell, The Costs of Planning: The 
FCC (lnt/ Cable Television, 1 5  J.L. & ECON. 1 77 ( 1 972);  Richard A.  Posner. The Appro­
priate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Telel'ision fndusLry, 3 BELL J. Eco . & MGMT. 
Cl. 98 ( 1 972): Daniel J. Smith, Note. Stay the Course: A HistOty ofFCC 's Response to 
Change 111 1he Cable IndustJy, 1 3  J .L. & POL. 7 1 5, 7 1 7-7 1 8  ( 1997). 
145. Nat ' I Cable & Telecomms. Assoc., Statistics, http://www.ncta.com/Contem 
View.aspx'�contentid=54 (last visited Nov. 14. 2006). 
1 46. 47 C.F.R. � 78.5(i) (2004) ("A cable network-entity is an organization which 
produces programs available for simultaneous transmission by cable systems serving a 
combined total of at least 5,000.000 subscribers and having distribution facil ities or cir­
cuits m ailable to such affiliated stations or cable systems."). 
147. Museum of Broadcast Communications, Cable Networks, http://www.muscum. 
r,· nn.:hives/etv/C/htmiC/cablenetwork/cablencrwork.htm ( last visited Nov. 1 6, 2006). 
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In cable television's early days, mo t network tended to transmit pro­
grams previou ly aired over broadcast network , continuations of pro­
grams that were not picked up by broadca t network , or a few made-for­
television movies. By the 1 990s, however, cable networks began produc­
ing original programming. 148 Today several basic cable networks provide 
their own programming (e.g., ESPN or C-SPA ) or contract with inde­
pendent producers to make movies or shows for them. In addition, many 
of them contract with movie producers to air movies after theatrical re­
lease. Another alternative is for cable networks to include shows that 
broadcast networks decide are not worth giving air time. 149 
Cable television has become a major force in the U.S. television indus­
try, and today generates more revenue than traditional broadcasting. 150 
B. Exclusionary Rights Regimes in the Television industry 
I raving examined the structure of the television industry in tenns of 
both organization and revenue flows, thi Section proceeds to examine the 
various property and quasi-property regimes that curTently exist between 
the different industry players. The currenr claims of broadcasters and ca­
blecaster for property rights ( i .e., "broadcasters· right ") are hardly novel 
in light of the history of broadcast television regulation in the United 
States. In varying degrees, the FCC and Congres already rejected or ac­
cepted the e claim to create the cwTent sy tern. To better understand the 
implications of the proposed regime, it thu becomes critical to analyze the 
current exclusionary regime that exist and the process by which they 
came into existence. 
The idea of property rights is general ly associated with two related but 
somewhat independent concepts-tradability and excludabi lity. 1 5 1  Trad­
ability is the notion that a property right creates a market for something 
and allow. the force of demand and supply to operate in ensuring its effi-
148. !d. 
149. ld 
1 50. See n· lncluslrl Re!l"elllU!.\. in GLOB.·\ I E'\TFR I AIN'vl['\ T A. D MFDI \ 0Ul LOOJ.-: 
2006-20 I 0. mwlahle ut http: /w\\ '' .n nev .. sday.com/ fast_ t�lcts t ,._revenue�. 
1 5 1 .  lndcetl, th1� 1 a debate that ha- existed among propeny thcon ·ts for a while 
no\v. For an C'\celknt O\'e" 1ew of the ideas involved. see Thom<ls W. Memll & Henry E. 
mlth. ll"hut 11app�.:ned 10 Pmpt:rl_r in LaH· und Ecvnomtc:.. I l l  Y ALf L..l. 357 (200 I ). 
for conception� of proper1y ernphas1zmg the excludability element. sec J.F:.. Pt:.\JNER. THE 
IDLA 01 PROPI R l 'l I� LA\\ ( 1 997): and Thomas W. Merrill. Property and !he Righi to 
1:\c/udl!. 77 L H. I . R 1 \ .  7]() ( 1998). Bw see Carol �. Rose. Co non., of  Pro per y Talk. 
or. /Jiacblolw ·., . 111.\iel_r. I 0� Y-\LF L.J. 60 I .  6] I ( 1 99 ' ) (;�rg.umg that the exclusivity 
mc1nphor IS ··at mnsl a cnrtoon or l mpe·· and ought 10 be used " ith cau11011) .  
1336 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: 1303 
cient a l location. 152 ln a sense, tractabil i ty represents a macro-conception of 
prope11y rights. Excludability, however, relates to the actual functioning of 
the property right and to the idea that a property right fundamentally gives 
its holder (usually the owner) a right ( in rem) to exclude the rest of the 
world from the object over which the right operates. 1 53 It thus represents a 
micro-conception of property. To a large extent, the macro- and micro­
conceptions represent two sides of the same coin, in that excludability (or 
exclusivity) is critical to any idea of tractability. Thus, it makes little sense 
for A to sel l  B his car unless the car is A ' s  to begin with, which would only 
be true if A can exclude everyone else ( including B) from it.  But when we 
move to the world of intangibles, the presumptive inseparability of the two 
concepts becomes somewhat complicated. 1 )4 Part of this complexity re­
lates to the very definition of property rights over an intangible entity, but 
another part derives from the fact that property tights over intangibles are 
ultimately instrumental, in that their existence does not necessarily derive 
from the rivalrous nature of the resource in question. 155  
I n  the context of most property regimes, tractability and excludability 
go hand in hand. However, one of them remains dominant. rn the context 
of the television industry, and broadcast signals in particular, if tractability 
were the primary motive of the regime, it would hardly require the intro­
duction of new rights. Copyright holders would transfer their rights (ex­
clusively or non-exclusively) to networks, which would in turn transfer 
their rights to stations, and, through a chain of contracts, traditional copy­
right would continue to be a tradable asset. No new rights would be 
needed. Excludability thus remains the primary motive, a conclusion bol­
stered by broadcasters' reliance on piracy-related arguments to justify the 
152.  See David Berry, The Market for Tradable RenelVable EneJ�'?Y Credits, 42 Eco­
LOGICAL ECON. 369 (2002) (applying the concept to renewable energy credits); Robert 
W. Hahn, Market Power and Tran.�ferable Property Rights, 99 Q. J .  ECON. 753 ( 1984) 
(providing a conceptual overview of this idea). Cf Martin Feldstein, Tradeable Gasoline 
Rights, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2006, http://online. wsj.com/article/SB 1 1 494658844877108 
O.html (extending the idea to tradable gasoline rights for households). 
153 .  For more on this, sec Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demyst({ying the Right to Ex­
clude: Of Property, Inviolability. and Automatic Injunctions, 3 1  HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 
(forthcoming 2008) (describing the actual functioning of excludabi I ity in property law). 
154. See supra note 1 1 3 and accompanying text. Cf Christopher Kalanje, Leveraging 
Intellectual Property: Beyond !he Right to Exclude, http://www. wipo.int/sme/enl 
documents/Jeveraging_ip.html (last visited ov. 1 5, 2006) (arguing that the two go hand 
in hand and that the power of one ought to be leveraged into the other to render intellec­
tual property meaningful) .  
155 .  See, e.g., Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B . U .  L.  Rev. 1 047 (2005) 
(arguing that virtual property. unlike informational property, is rivalrous). 
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new regime .. 156 The idea of a property regime for broadcast signals is thus 
predicated on excluding others' use of signals. These rights may indeed be 
traded or transferred, but excludability remains central. 
Exclusionary rights have existed in the U.S.  television broadcast in­
dustry for quite some time now. Given that excludability has been their 
primary focus, it becomes critical to delineate the parties against whom the 
rights operate at each stage. The television industry reveals an i nteresting 
dynamic of attenuated exclusionary rights between content producers. 
broadcasters, and cable operators that operate inter se and occasionally in 
rem. What follows i s  an outline of each of the regimes, organized sttuctur­
ally rather than chronologically, to i l lustrate the dynamic. 1
57 
1.  Content Producers ' Rights: Extending Copyright Law 
Of the different players in the television broadcast industry, the legiti­
macy of  content producers' rights has remained unquestioned because of 
the belief that, as authors, content producers directly contribute to the 
creative process and therefore are entitled to authorial property rights in 
the work they directly create. 158 Since the emergence of television broad­
casting, federal law has recognized the existence of copyright in audiovis­
ual programs. 1 59 The real challenge for content producers has remained. 
however, in adapting these rights to new and emerging technologies. 
Among the several rights granted to content producers as copyright 
holders under the Copyright Act of 1 909 was the "exclusive right" to per­
fonn the work publicly. 160 Unti l  the I 976 revision of the Copyright Act, 
the precise definition of "public performance" remained unclear, although 
it was undisputed that an unauthorized broadcast of a work (over the air) 
amounted to a public performance that was actionable. 1 6 1  Content produc-
1 56. See supra Section J l .D. 1 £  is also interesting to note thai the WBT uses the phase 
"exclusive right"' throughout the treaty. but nowhere deals in any great detail with 
mechanisms through which these rights may indeed be transferred or sold. 
1 5  7. For a chronological overview of the current structure. see LE DL:C. supra note 
142, at 8 1 - 106. See also Stanley M. Besen & Roben W. CrandalL The Deregularion of 
Cable Telel'ision. 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBe:;. 77 ( 1 98 1  ); Ashutosh Bhagwat, q{ Mar­
kets and Mediu: The Firsr Amendmenl. rhe Ne,,· Mass tvlediu and the Pvliricul Compo­
nents of Culfllre. 74 l.C. L. REV. 1 4 1 ,  150 ( 1 99 5 ) :  Ttm Wu, Copyright ·s Commrmica­
tions Poli(l', I 03 MICH. L RE\·. 27X. 3 1  I -24 (2004 ). 
1 58 .  Thts is the traJitional authorial conception of copyright as an incentive or re­
ward system. ,)'ee. e.g. MARSHALL LEAFFER. UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGII'l LAW 58 (3d 
ed. I 999}. 
I 59. Today. this tinds recognition in I 7 U . .  C. * I 02(a)(6). JiscusseJ supra. 
160. See Copyright Act � I .  I 7 U.S.C. * I ( 1 974). 
1 6 1 .  Jd. � I ( d )  ("to make or procure the making o f  any transcription or record thereof 
by or from " hich. in -..,·hole or in pan. it may tn any manner or by any method be exhib-
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ers were thu entitled to exclusionary protection against broadcasters, 
which they often invoked. As a consequence, broadcast networks began 
l icensing copyrighted works from producers prior to broadcasts, which 
remained a relatively uncontroversial system. 
With the emergence of cable television, things began to change. Cable 
television soon began to eat into the revenues of television broadcasting, 
and init ial ly, as discussed, cable programming mainly involved the re­
transmission of content ca1Tied by broadcasters. 1 62 Broadcasters and con­
tent producers felt  that cable operators were free-riding off of their 
rights-rights that the broadcasters had paid for. In two separate cases, 
copyright holders attempted to assert their exclusionary rights under the 
copyright regime against cable operators. While it remains contestable 
whether they were motivated to do so on their own 163 or whether they 
were acting as proxies for broadcasters, the claims were doctrinally struc­
tured as assertions of copyright holders' rights. 
The ftrst case was Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television. 
Inc. 1 64 The plaintiff was a production company that held the copyright in 
various motion pictures it had l icensed to television broadcasters. The de­
fendant operated a CATV service that captured the signals of five broad­
casters (to whom the plaintiff had licensed its copyright) and retransmitted 
the unedited content to its own subscribers through wire. 165 The plaintiff 
argued that the defendant's retransmission amounted to a "performance" 
under copyright law that infringed its exclusive rights in the work. 166 
Drawing a distinction between the role of a broadcaster and that of a 
viewer (who uses "equipment to convert electronic signals into audible 
sound and visible i mages" 167) ,  the Court concluded that CATV fell on the 
"viewer's side of the l ine" and went on to conclude that cable operators 
(CATV operators) did not perform the work in auestion when they re­
transmitted it. 1 68 In his  forceful ly  worded dissent, 1 6 Justice Fortas admon-
ited, delivered. presented. produced, or reproduced; and to play or perfonn i t  in public for 
profit, and to exhibit, represent, produce, or reproduce it in any manner or by any method 
whatsoever"). The Act goes on w draw a distinction between intentional and uninten­
tional infringement by "broadcasters;' thus making it clear thal broadcasting was indeed 
covered by its express tem1s. 
162. See supra Section l l l .A.2. 
163.  Wu, supra note 157.  at 3 1 7  (noting that this was indeed a broadcasters' attack). 
1 64. 392 U.S .  390 ( 1968). 
1 65. !d. at 392. 
1 66. !d. 
1 67. !d. at 398. 
16S.  !d. at 399-40 I .  
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i hed the majority for "attempt[ing] to fo ter the development" of cable 
and abandoning precedent on the meaning of "performance."170 Arguing 
that the majority characterization was overly impli tic1 71 , he concluded 




. c: . I 71 t ere ore constitute an mtrmgement. -
While Ju tice Fortas' suggestion that the majority was driven by the 
need to develop cable may seem extreme, it is piau ible that it was at least 
influenced by the adveJiising model that broadcast television operated on 
and was therefore skeptical of any harm actually ensuing. 1 73 The Fort­
nightly majority opinion adopted a bipartite classification that does indeed 
seem overly simplistic and ignores the technical details of how cable tele-
. . 
1 1  fu . 174 v1s1on actua y nctwns. 
The second case on the same subject matter, decided six years later, 
was Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System. lnc. 175 Here 
the plaintiffs owned copyright in several television programs and com­
menced an action against the defendant. a cable operator that was retrans­
mitting its program from distant area to it own ubscriber . While the 
District Court had found for the defendant (relying on Fortnightly). 176 the 
Second Circuit divided the defendant's activities into two categories- one 
involving the wire retransmission of broadca t ignal to ubscriber 
within the range of the actual broadca t signal and the other involving the 
retran mi sion of signals to areas where the signaL were not directed­
and found the defendant's activities to amount to a ··performance" in the 
latter, though not in the former. 1 77 The Supreme Court rejected this rea­
soning. concluding that merely "by importing signals that could not nor­
mally be received with current technology in the community it erves, a 
CATV ystem does not, for copyright purposes, alter the function it per-
169. /d. at 402 ("This case calls not for the judgment or olomon but for the dexterity 
of Houdim:' ). 
170. !d. at 404-05. 
171. /d. at 405. 
172. !d. at 408. 
173. /d. at 400 { usmg the phrase ··addirirmal ,.,ewer ·") (em ph a. is added). 
174. The.: Court relied on the Forrnighrz,· reasoning in another case 1n' olving the re­
transmiSSIOn of a radio broadcast over a speaker system. Twentieth CcntuJ) \1usic Corp. 
v. Aiken. 422 LJ. �.  1 51 ( 1975). See Greene. supra note 124. at  271 {characterizing liS u. e 
as precedent a� a "disrupti'e consequence''). 
175. Teleprompter Corp. ' . Columbia Broad. Sys .. Inc., 4 1 5  U . .  394 ( 1974 ). 
176. Col umbra Broad . .  ys .. Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp .. 355 F. :upp. 6 1 8  (S.D.J\.Y. 
1972), n?l' .rl in pan. 476 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1 973). 
177. Sec ( olumbia Bro<1d . .  ·y . .. Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp .. 476 J - .2d 3"8. 350 (2d 
Ctr. 1 973 ). rc•1 'din par!. Tekprompter Corp. v. Collrmbia Broad .
. 
y:-.. Inc . .  4 1 5  U . .'. 3li4 
( I  974 ). 
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forms for it subscribers." 1
7h The Court accordingly found for the defen-
d 
. L' . h I 1 79 ant, as m 1 ortrug t y. 
Most interest ingly, though, the Court seems to have been directly in­
fluenced by the revenue model that broadcast television operated on, in 
particular the fact that copyright holders and broadcasters were compen­
sated by advertising revenue and never directly by subscribers. ft went on 
to not"e: 
Unlike propagators of other copyrighted material . . .  holders of 
copyrights for television programs or their l icensees are not paid 
d i rectly by those who ultimately enjoy the publication of the ma­
terial-that is. the television viewers-but by advertisers who 
usc the drawing power of the copyrighted material to promote 
their goods and services. 
By extending the range of viewabi l ity of a broadcast program, 
CATV systems thus do not interfere in any traditional sense with 
the copyright holders' means of extracting recompense for their 
creativity or labor. 180 
The Cou11 thus appears to have been implying that broadcasters should 
find mechanisms to internalize the benefits of this enhancement in viewer­
hip rather than stifle technological development. 1 8 1 
As a direct consequence o f  these decisions, Congress amended the 
copyright law to extend content producers' exclusionary rights to cable 
television. 1
x2 The Copyright Act o f  1 976, which replaced the 1 909 Act, 
defined a "pub! ic performance» as including any transmission or commu­
nication and, to clarify, defined "transmit" as including transmission by 
"any device or process." 183 Cable transmissions by wire are thus expressly 
covered. 1 x4 A direct consequence o f  this amendment was that cable opera-
1 78. Teleprompter Corp., 4 1 5  U.S. at 408. 
1 79.  ld 
1 80. /d. at 41 l - 1 2. 
1 8 1 .  For analyses of the decision see Gil lis L. Heller, Regulatory Versus Property 
Rig/us Solutions /or the Cable Television Problem, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 527 ( 1981  ); Note. 
CA TV and Copyright Liability: Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 
Inc. and the Consensus Agreement, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1 507 ( 1 974). See also Note, Cable 
Television and Copyright Royalties, 83 YALE L.J. 553 ( I  974) (analyzing the Second Cir­
cuit's dec is ton). 
t 82 .  Copyright Law Revision Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § I 0 I ,  90 Stat. 2541 ( 1976). 
183.  17  u.s.c. * 1 0 1  (2000). 
1 84. Sec: I I.R. Rt::P. No. 94-1476, at 63 { 1976) ("'[A] cable television system is per­
forming when it retransmits the broadcast to its subscribers.''). 
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tors who cho c to carry copyrighted content directly, as opposed to re­
b·ansmitting broadcast signa]s, were now subject to content producers' ex­
clusionary rights. 
I n  relation to retransmissions, however, the Act introduced a some­
what complex mechanism. For cable retransmissions, referred to as "sec­
ondary transmissions," the Act introduced a statutory licensing regime. 
Under this new licensing regime, cable systems are permitted to retransmit 
copyright content can·ied by broadcasters, upon the payment of a statuto­
rily determined license fee. 185 The royalty received under this statutory 
license is then distributed to copyright holders through a mechanism in­
volving the Copyright Royalty Tribunal. 1 86 The Act thus introduced an 
exclusionary entitlement vested in content producers but subjected it to a 
liability (as opposed to property) rule. 1 87 Scholars have called into ques­
tion the efficiency of this mechanism, arguing that it stifles the free nego­
tiation o f  royalties. 188 With the emergence of new services such as Direct 
Broadcasting ( DB S)  and satellite broadcasting, the same statutory license 
mechani m came to be extended there as well. 189 
Even in relation to cable retransmissions, however, cable operators 
that are mere ''passive carriers" of broadcast signals (i.e., those who exer­
cise no editorial control over the selection and carriage of content) are ex­
empted from any liability, including the payment of a licensing fee. 
190 
Thus, cable operators that merely pick up a broadcaster's signals and carry 
them to sub. cribers are not subject to the regime. 1 9 1 However, the law 
makes a cable operator liable for infringement if it alters either �rogram­
ming content or commercial adve11ising in the broadcast signal. ' 2 In such 
1 85. 1 7  U.S.C. � I l l  ( c )  ( 2000). 
1 86.  17  U.S.C. � l l l (d)(4) (2000). For an elaborate overview of this mechanism and 
its functioning. see 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DA\' ID ·llviMER, IMMF.R ON COPYRIGHT: 
A TRE.\11�f:. ON THC. LAW OF LITERARY, MUSIC,\L AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY. AND TifF. 
PROTECTION 01-- I DC.:\S. � 8 . 1 8  (2006 ) .  
1 87.  In the Calabresi-Mclamed formulation. See Guido Calabresi & A Douglas 
Melamed. Pmpcrr_,. Rules. Liahiliry Rules. and lnalienabili�l".- One Vie11· of The Cathedral. 
85 I-J AR\". L. Rr- v. I 0�9 ( 1972). 
1 88. S11e e.g. , Bescn et al.. supra nore 1 25. at 68. 94-95 (concluding that the long run 
impact of rhe mecha111sm will  be de1rimemal 10 1hc overall supply of programs and that a 
ful l  copyngh1 hability regime \vould present <.1 much better solution to the free-rider prob­
lem): Greene. "upra note 1 24, at 264-65 (noting that the Act is likely to generate exten­
sive lit 1gation owing to its complex procedures). 
1 89 . . )'ee 1 7  U.S.C. *� 1 1 9. 1 22 (2000 ) . .  )"ef! af.,o H.R. REP. 0. 1 08-660, at I (2004). 
190. See 1 7  U.S.C. � l l l ( a ) (3)  (2000). 
1 9 1 .  Se<' Huhban.l Broad .. Inc. ' .  S. SatcllitL" Sy� .. Inc .. 593 F. Supp. 808. 8 1 7- 1 8  (D.  
Mum. 1 9, 4) .  
1 92. 17  U.S.C. � l l l ( c l( J )  (2000). 
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a scenario, the operator is clearly no longer a ''passive" conduit. This ntle 
is thus designed primarily to safeguard broadcasters' main source o f  reve­
nue-advertising. Much like the Supreme Court, Congress structured the 
liability regime around the centrality o f  the advertising model to the sys-
t 193 em. 
Content producers are today protected by a l i mited set of property 
rights against broadcasters, cable companies, and third parties, such as 
other producers who might reproduce their content. Through a mix of 
property and liabi lity rules, their rights operate against a l l  the other major 
incumbents in the television industry. 
2. Broadcasters ' Exclusionary Rights: Beneficial Ownership and 
Retransmission Consent 
Unlike content producers, broadcasters in the United States were 
originally without rights. 194 Under the rules applicable to radio broadcasts 
under the Communications Act o f  1 934, prohibitions existed on the re­
broadcasting of one station's programming by another without the original 
broadcast station ' s  authorization. 195 This regime thus operated between 
broadcasters inter se and prohibited one broadcaster from free-riding on 
another's programs. With the introduction of television broadcasting, 
courts applied the open-ended language of the rule to television broadcasts 
as well. 196 
193. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476. at 93-94 ( 1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5708-09. It notes: 
Ln the Committee's view, any wil lful deletion, substitution, or insertion 
of commercial adve11isements of any nature by a cable system or 
changes in the program content of the primary transmission, signifi­
cantly alters the basic nature of the cable retransmission service, and 
makes its function similar to that of a broadcaster. Further, the place­
ment of substitute adve11ising in a program by a cable system on a "lo­
cal" signal ha1ms the advertiser and, in tum, the copyright owner, 
whose compensation for the work is directly related to the size of the 
audience that the advertiser's message is calculated to reach. 
194. The phrase broadcasters' rights as used here is  not to be confused with the con­
cept of "broadcasters' rights" as used in connection with the rights proposed under the 
new regime. Here, they refer merely to the limited exclusionary rights granted to them as 
part of the overall regulatory structme. 
195.  4 7 U.S.C. § 325(a) (2000) ("[N]or shall any broadcasting station rebroadcast the 
program or any part thereof of another broadcasting station without the express authority 
of the originating station."). See Frontier Broad. Co. v. FCC, 4 1 2  F.2d 1 62 (D.C. Cir. 
1969). 
196. See United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1 1 73, 1 1 76 (D.C. Cir. 1 989) (noting 
that the section forbids a broadcast station from rebroadcasting another broadcast sta­
tion's signal without pem1ission in rhe context of video tTansmission::; as w�ll ). 
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With the emergence of cable television, however, broadcasters began 
to see their signals being retTansmitted into both local and distant markets. 
More importantly, though, they noticed that cable operators were making 
significant profits from their subscribers, using broadcasters' program­
carrying signals. They begaJ1 to make the argument that this constituted a 
form of  unfair competition. since they were required to pay the content 
producers for content, while cable operators were not. 197 But since 
§ 325(a) was restricted in its operation to a "broadcasting station . .'' they 
were seemingly without a statutory cause of action. As a consequence, 
they initially raised different common law claims as substitutes. 
In Intermountain Broadcasting & Television Corp. v. Idaho Micro­
wave Inc., 198 a group of television stations (network affiliates) initiated an 
action against Idaho-based cable operators who carried their signals to 
subscribers located in the same geographic area over which they held ex­
clusive contracts from their networks to carry the programming. 199 The 
plaintiffs here claimed that the defendants had engaged in a form of "un­
fai r  competition" and "unjust enrichment" and ought to be restrained 
through injunctive relief along the lines of the Supreme Court's decision 
. J . I liT s . ?UU tn nternatzona JVews ervtce.-
ln refusing to extend the doctrine of "unfair competition" to cable re­
transmissions, the court proceeded to deny the plaintiffs any relief.20 1  In 
addition, it seemingly restricted the operative scope of § 325(a) by holding 
that the provision did not grant broadcasters a property right of any kind 
against a re-broadcaster: 
[T]he statutory requirement (Sec. 325(a)), of consent before re­
broadcast is not based upon. or intended to recognize any prop­
erty right of the originating tation in its broadcast signal a uch. 
I t  was designed only as a means for safeguarding the interests o r  
such person as might have propet1y rights i n  program conret1t 
which would be protectible under established law, a . .  for cxmn­
ple, statutory or common law copyright or exclusive license ar­
rangements protectiblc under the doctrine of unfair competition. 
1 97. At one point. the National Association of Broadcasters ( N A B )  ns:::erted thm the 
broadcasting industry as a whole rnnd a bow 25% or its gross revenues ror copynghted 
material. See Greene. supru note 1 24. at 26 7 n. 1 6. 
1 9X.  1 96 F  . . upp. 5 1 5  ( .D.  Idaho 1 96 1 ). 
1 99. /d. at 3 1 7-20. 
200. ld at 32 1 .  
20 I .  /d. at �26. 
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The Commi ·sion points out that. since Sec. 325(a) doc, not pur­
po11 to alter or define the property rights in program material. in 
some cases the consent given u nder the section may be of l i tt le 
value as authori ty for the rebroadcast of a program because of 
the ·ration · · lack of authority to give consent to a third pany for 
'(I' 
the Lt-e of someone el e's prope11y.- -
It is, of course, open to dispute whether the court's inteqJretation of 
� 325(a) is correct, given the express statutory language in question and 
other ca es applying that language to television broadcasts. What is impor­
tant to note, however, is the court 's  Hat refusal to restrain defendants' 
transmission of content-carrying signals, even if transmission amounted to 
free-riding and even i f  the defendants were making a ignificant profit 
f 1 
. 
. 1Q3 rom sue 1 acttvtty.-
Tn Cable Vision, lnc. v. KUTV, inc. ,204 brought the very next year, a 
group o f  cable operators brought an antitrust action against a local televi­
sion station. In its counterclaim, the station a l leged both to1iious interfer­
ence with its exclusive contractual rights and unfair competition.105 The 
district court init ial ly found for the defendant and enjoined the plain­
ti ffs.206 The Ninth Circuit reversed, concludi.ng that since the television 
station had failed to establish the existence of a "protectible interest" by 
virtue of copyright law or other Congressional enactment, the court was 
forbidden from laying down a rule that would restrict access to the public 
domain without legislative authorization.207 
A direct consequence of these decisions was that broadcasters could 
not exclude cable operators from retransmitting their signals. Immediately 
after Cablevision, the Supreme Court decided Fortnightly and Telepromp­
ter, which together eliminated even the possibility o f  broadcasters initiat­
ing copyright i n fringement claims through content producers. Interest­
ingly, studies show that broadcasters failed to maintain a cohesive position 
202. !d. at 327. 
203. !d. at 328 ("The Court does not helieve that the mere profit-purpose o�· defen­
dants' rendition of an identical service to the owners would transform the operation into 
unfair competition with plaintiffs."). 
204. 2 1 1  F. Supp. 47 (S.D. Idaho 1 962). 
205. fd. at 50. 
206. fd. at 60-6 1 .  
207. Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc .. 335 F.2d 348. 354 (9th Cir. 1 964) ("In con­
clusion. we hold that unless appellees are ahle to demonstrate a protectible interest by 
virtue of the copyright laws or bring themselves within the contemplation of some other 
recognized exception to the policy promoting free access to all matter in the public do­
main. they cannot prevail."). 
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in the wake of these decisions.208 Some were more intere ted in obtaining 
cable franchise , while others genuinely wanted to eliminate competition 
from cable television.209 This again brings to the forefront the reasons for 
which the property idea is deployed. 
When Congre amended the copyright laws subsequent to Telepromp­
ter, it did more than just give copyright holders rights against cable opera­
tors. In giving a "legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right, the right 
to initiate an action for infringement, Congre went on to provide that 
broadcast stations (as licensees or assignees) were entitled to initiate ac­
tions for infringement against cable systems that retransmitted their sig­
nals, but only when such retransmission occuLTed within their local service 
area.2 10 Thus, local broadcasters could restrict cable operators from re­
transmitting their signals into the same area they service. Broadcasters 
were given absolutely no control over cable operator that pick up their 
signals and retransmit them to other areas. This seems logical. If the real 
reason broadcasters seek to curb cable retransmis ions is because cable 
operators compete with their source of revenue. then they should not ob­
ject to operators who make profits by tran mitting their programming to 
other areas becau e new area represent new, rather than existing, revenue 
streams, given that broadcasters' revenues derive entirely from local ad-
. .  ll l verttsmg. 
Broadca ter were also given the right to commence an action against 
cable operators that alter the content of their signals to modify the pro­
gramming or ubstitute the advertisements between such programming.2 1 :!  
Once again, this right was i n  recognition o f  the centrality of the advertis­
ing model to broadcasters. 
Even after the 1 976 Act, broadcasters were not given a property right 
in their signal . I n  1 984, CongTe s deregulated cable rate across the coUJ1-
try in an effort to timulate competition? 1 3 In the years t'ollowing the 1 984 
deregulation, cable subscription prices in the United States rose by an av-
20 . See Lr Dt'C. supra note 1-+2. at 134 (noung that 1 3% or all cable )Stems 111 
1965 were o�ned b) broadcasters and that the members of NAB often exh1bited more 
b1t1erness to each other than to cable tcle' ision rival ). 
209. /d. 
2 1 0. 1 7 U .. . C. � 5 0 1 ( c ) ( 2000). 
2 1 1  See David r. Simon. Local TeleviSIOII flen/1.\ Cahle· A Cop,·rig./11 Tlu:m:\· 0/ 
Prmecuon. 3 1 Fl D. CO!v\11.1. L.J. 5 1 .  5 7  ( 1 978) (noting 1ha1 the protection of local hroad­
ca�ting wa� central to the pro' isions introduced in 1976). 
2 1 2. 17 U . . . C. � 50 I (d)(i) (2000). 
2 1 3 . Cabk Communications Policy Act. Pub. L. t o. <.JH-549. � 60 I .  9� Stat. 2779. 
27XO (codi lied at -17 U . . . C � 52 1 ( 1 9H4 )). 
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erage of 56%, alarming pol icy makers and regulators.� �� Ln response, Con­
gre�s passed the Cable Act of 1 992.-us Among its provisions were regula­
tions granting broadca, ters further property-I ike protection over their sig­
nal . 
Referred to as the ''retransmission consent" provisions, these new rules 
now required cable operators that sought to retransmit broadcasters' pro­
gramming to obtain the express con ent o f  the broadcast station originat­
ing the signals.2 1 6  In effect, these rules gave broadcasters control over the 
distant transmission of their signals via wire by cable operators, even 
when the recipients were not in their local service area. The rationale was 
no longer that the retransmission affected their advertising revenue, but 
rather that as originators o f  the ignals they were entitled to control the 
revenue that cable operators were making off of their signals. Once again 
we see the explicit resurgence o f  propetty talk. 
At the hearings before the Senate sub-committee prior to the passage 
o f  the Act, broadcasters were vocal about their reasons for the protec­
tion.2 1 7  Edward Fritts, then president of the NAB, noted that broadcasters 
were merely seeking the right to control '\1ses" of their signal and speci"fi­
cally requested the committee to include retransmissjon consent in the 
original bil 1 .2 18  On another occasion before the House of Representatives, 
Fritts specifical ly noted that there existed an "interest in the signal which 
belongs to the broadcaster" making the ownership claim explicit.
2 19  Dur­
ing the FCC ' s  mlemaking proceedings fol lowing the Act's passage, the 
2 14. See Gregory S. Crawford, The fmpact of the I 992 Cable Act on Household De­
mand and Welfare. 3 1  RAt D J .  ECON. 422, 422 (2000). See also GEN . ACCOUNTING OF­
FICE, 1991 SURVEY OF CABLE TELEVISIOt RATES AND SERVICES ( 1 99 1 ); THOMAS W. 
HAZLETT & M.L. SPITZER, PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD CABLE TELEVISION: THE ECONOMICS 
OF RATE CONTROLS ( 1 997). 
2 1 5 .  Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act, Pub. L. No. I 02-
385, l 06 Stat. 1460 ( 1992). For an exhaustive study of the legislative history surrounding 
the Act, see Nicholas W. Allard. The 1992 Cable Act: Just the Beginning, I S  HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 305 ( 1 993). 
2 1 6. 47 U.S.C. � 325(b) ( 2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 
2 1 7 . For an elaborate overview of the legislative history surrounding the retransmis­
sion consent provisions of the Act, see Charles Lubinsky, Reconsidering Retransmission 
Consent: An Examination o(lhe Retransmission Consent Provision (47 U.S.C. § 325(b)) 
ofthe 1992 Cable Act,49 FED. COMM. L.J. 99 ( 1 996). 
2 1 8. Cable TV Consumer Protection Acl of /99 1:  Hearings on S. 12 Before the Sub­
comnz. on Communications (�/ tlze S. Comm. on Commerce. Science and Transportation, 
l 02d Cong. 199. 254 ( l 99 1 ). 
2 1 9. Cable Tele1•ision Regulation: Hearings 011 H.R. I 303 and 2546 Before the Sub­
comm. on Telecommunicwions and Finance of the H. Comm. 011 Energy and Commerce, 
l 02d Cong. 774 ( 199 1  ). 
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FCC specifically noted that "Congress created a n '"' communications 
right in the broadcaster's signal, completely eparatc from the program­
ming!'220 This rhetoric suggests that retransmi sian con cnt 'vas intended 
as an independent property 1ight that broadcaster had in their transmis­
sion signal . 
The retransmission consent provisions were tructured in such a way 
that broadcaster were given the option of negotiating a royalty with cable 
operators or choosing to have them carry all their programming in return 
for the permission to cany some, called the must-carry altemative?2 1 Ne­
gotiations were meant to happen every three year .::!22 In the first round of 
negotiations since the provisions' introduction in 1 992, most stations 
chose retransmission consent with a royalty in tead of the mu t-carry op­
tion.223 
The retransmission consent provisions also make it clear that they do 
not affect the compulsory copyright licensing mechanism introduced in 
1 976.224 Neverthele s, some remain skeptical about the ability of broad­
ca ters to u e the mechanism to extract revenue from cable operator 
without also affecting the copyright licen ing mechanisms. 225 Further­
more, although the Telecommunication Act of 1 996 ought to futiher de­
regulate telecommunications, it left intact the retransmi ion consent pro-. . 226 VISIOn . 
As things stand today, then, broadcaster· arc equipped with l imited 
property rights against other broadca ters, local cable operator . and dis­
tant cable operators. 
220. In re Implementation of the Cable felcvision Con:-umcr Prot. & Compcrition 
Act of 1992, F.C.C. R. 2965 �I 1 73 ( 1993 ) .  
22 1 .  See 47 U . . C. � 325(b)(3) (2000). 
222. lei. § 325(b)(3)(8) (2000). 
223. /vlost Stutt0/1\ St!ek Payjor Must-Can}· . . F. CIIRO'-.. .lui) 1 6. 1 993. at C4. See 
also Lubin ky. supra note 2 1 7. at 146. 
224. 47 u . . C. * 325(b)(6) (2000). 
225. See. e.g . Patrick Murphy. Note. Retrvn�mts.,ton Conwnt. A ,\lixt!d Stgnvl for 
Cable Copynght. 1 7  COLU�1.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 237 ( 1 99 .. ). See a/\0 Loma craldi. 
Ne11·sco�ts as Propern Will Retransmi�sion Consent StimulaTe /)roduction of Afore l.o­
ca/ TeJe,•ision Ne11·s.l. 46 FED. COtvlt\1. L.J. 469, 489-90 ( 1 99-1 ): PrOJCCI, Ref:!ulatOIT Re­
form in the Cah/e lndustt}': The £. f ecr <�/ the 19Y1 Cahle A<'t ·., Mwr Can:,· and l?errans­
mts.,ion Con. l!111 l?ule., un the Jndusn:r and 1he Comumer. 47 Af)l\111\1. L. Rl·\ . 5l:<7. 604 
( 1995) (noting that the regime produced no ··new bountiful revenue ::.tn�Jms"). 
226. See Telc�.:ommunJcarions Act of 1996. Pub. L. 104-10-1. 1 I 0 .  tat. )(, ( 1 99(1). 
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3. Cahle Operators ' Rights: Service Thejt 
Of the three main players in the television industry, the law provides 
cable operators with the fewe t rights and the widest protection. The Cable 
Communications Policy Act of 1 984 introduced a provision aimed specifi­
cally at the theft of cable service.227 Specifically, it prohibits the "unau­
thorized interception or rcce[ption] . . .  [of] any communication service'' 
o ffered over a cable system. 
22!< The provision also allows a cable operator 
to bring a civil  claim for an injunction or compensation.229 
The cable operator is not granted an explicit property right in the Grdi­
nary sense of the term, but for al l  practical purposes, the regime operates 
analogously. The cable operators' "authorization" i, the equivalent of a 
tradable right in the prope11y sense, which is protected by a property rule. 
The provi ion is purportedly directed at individual users who might gain 
access to cable television without authorization, but would obviously op­
erate against other as well (e.g. ,  one operator seeking to access another's 
service to retransmit).230 
Thus, although cable operators are not explicitly granted property pro­
tection over the content of their transmissions or over their signals, their 
service remains protected through property-rule-type remedies. 
The pre ent system thus represents a complex balance between the in­
terests o f  content producers, broadcasters, and cable companies-interests 
manifested in the grant of limited exclusionary rights, or their analogs. 
Figure 1 summarizes the cun·ent regime and its equil ibrium, identifying 
the party in whom the exclusionary right is vested and against whom it can 
be exercised. It is clear that content producers have by far the most expan­
sive set of rights, under traditional copyright, while broadcasters have a 
more attenuated set o f  rights. Cable companies, on the other hand, are pro­
vided with mere propet1y-analogs. The boxes in gray represent areas 
where full-blown exclusionary protection is absent, and for good reason. 
227. Cable Communications Policy Act, Pub. L. o. 98-549, § 633, 98 Stat. 2779. 
2796-97 ( 1 984). 
228. 47 U.S.C. � 553(a)( 1 )  (2000). Assisting is also prohibited. 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) 
(2000). 
229. 47 U.S.C. � 553(c) (2000). 
230. See generally MARTI GREEN, THEFT Or CABLE SERVICE ( 1990): Kevin W. 
Grillo, Electronic PiraGy: Can the Cable Television Industry Prevent Unauthorized In­
terceptions, 1 3  ST. MARY'S L.J. 587 ( 1 982); Paul J .  Mass & Carl S .  von Mehren, Cable 
Theft: The Prvhlem. rhe Need .for Useful State Legislation. and a Proposed Solurion .for 
Georgia, 35 EMORY L.J. 643 ( 1 986). See also 74 AM. JuR. 2o Telecommunications � 190 
(2006). 
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Figure I :  Exclusionary Rights Regimes in the Television Industry 
Against Content Broadcasters Cable Third 
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4. The Ideal ofBalance: A Meta-Narrative ofProper(l' 
The system of limited property rights described is thus characterized 
by one uni fying characteristic-balance. The efficient functioning o f  the 
television broadcasting industry required l imiting individual players· ex­
clusionary rights and simul taneously ensuring that all the players in ques­
tion were granted some kind of protection, even i f  only quasi-property in 
nature. 
From one perspective. these l imitations may appear artificial and wirh­
our any rational basis. for example, consider the compulsory licensing 
mechanisms that Congress introduced for cable operator in 1 976. 23 1  
Scholars have criticized these provision as resulting in the creation of an 
unfair and inefficient system. 232 However, the rationale for the mecha-
2.1 I .  1 7  U.S.C. � I l l  (c) (2000). 
232. ."iee Bescn et al.. supm note 1 25 ( identifying the problems assoctated with the 
ltc�n ·ing :;ystcm): Heller. supru note I R I ( arguing for the imposition of ful l  Ct)pyright 
l iabi l i ty). 
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nisms was never pun:(v efficiency-driven, but rather involved the balanc­
ing of competing intcre ts. 
Thomas Streeter. in his interesting sociological analysis of the broad­
cast indu··try, characterized the property regimes that exist in the tele­
communications sector as a form of postmodem property, where the con­
cepts of ··property'' and ''markets" are simulated through bureaucratic 
mechanisms. 233 He additionally observes. in a related context, that 
"[ w ]hen faced with the absence or breakdown of traditional market rela­
tions, our bureaucratically structured bu iness world sometimes sets out to 
e ·tablish an administrative counterpart to property, a simulation of prop­
erty using the language and procedures o f  bmeaucracy."
234 [n thi  under-
tanding, much o f  what goes by the tit le of property in the broadcast world 
i. merely a metaphor for some kind of regulation aimed at a set of some 
broader aggregate goals. What is apparent from the previous discussion o f  
individual incumbents' tights i s  that one such goal is the notion o f  bal­
ance. 
Balance of course has a speci fie meaning within this context. I t  is the 
idea that: 
I )  The effective functioning of the industry requires providing ade­
quate financial and regulatory incentives to d ifferent participants. 
These incentives must relate to individual players' abil it ies to 111-
ternalize revenue streams associated with their activities. 
2) The incentives provided to one segment could prove to operate as a 
disincentive to another. 
3 )  These systems o f  incentives and disincentives tend to exhi.bit varia­
tions in efficiency as technology develops. 
The current exclusionary rights framework that exists between the dif­
ferent players represents this basic ideal: content producers need incen­
tives, but ones that do not stifle broadcast and cable distribution; broad­
casters need similar mechanisms, but ones that do not stifle cable or eat 
into content producers' incentives, and so on. 
233. THOMAS STREETER, SELLING THE f\ IK:  A CRITIQUE OF THE POLICY OF COMMER­
CIAL BRO/\DCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES 208 ( 1996). Part of Streeter's thesis involved 
the rejection of the functionalist approach to property rights in certain areas. a view that 
believes that prope11y rights are justified because they are needed to achieve the purpose 
they serve. 
234. Thomas Streeter, Broadcas1 Cop_l'rtghl and Bureaucralization l?[ Proper!_\". I 0 
C:.'\RD070 ARTS & E "T. L.J. 567. 589 ( 1 �92). 
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fn  addition to the basic rights framework laid out before, the FCC had 
for several years prescribed regulations governing the activities of cable 
and broadcast companies. A l l  of the e mechanisms supplemented the re­
gimes discussed above and were structured as exclusionary regimes, 
thereby tracking the general prope11y structure in place. Taken together, 
they provide an ideal i l lustration of Streeter's point on simulated property. 
What they also represent, however, is a set of regulations that operate in  
the interstices of the property regimes, directed at  introducing a sense of 
balance into the system. Their periodic modification (and eventual aboli­
tion) merely represents a series of attempts to remedy perceived imbal­
ances in the system. 
The FCC's first set of regulatory rules for cable television was prom­
ulgated in J 965.235 Since then, it ha developed four primary sets of rules 
to govern the balance between content producers, broadcasters, and cable 
operators.236 The first were the "'mandatory carriage rules," which required 
cable sy terns to can·y all of the local broadcast stations' content over wire 
in their service areas.237 The e rules highlighted the FCC's emphasis on 
local i m in broadcast ervices and the belief that local stations formed the 
backbone o f  the public televi ion y tem. 238 Second were the ·'network 
non-duplication rules."239 These rules forbade cable operators from im­
po11i ng broadcast signals from distant markets if the program were shown 
simultaneously (or near-simultaneously) on a local broadcast tation. and 
were intended to protect network exclusivity.240 Third were the infamous 
"distant-signal-carriage rules."2-l1 These rules placed limitations on the 
number of distant broadcast signa I cable y tcms could imp011. Lastly, 
the "syndicated-exclusivity" rule afforded syndicated program (carried 
by independent stations) the same protection that the non-duplication rules 
afforded network ones. 242 
A I I  of these regulations represented a balance between the interests of 
content producers. broadcasters. and cable operator . In  the I 9 Os. the 
235. ,)·ee hr-t Report and Order m Dockets 14895 and 1 5233. 3( f.C.C. 683. 7 1 6  
( 1 965). 
236. Sl!e Jules F. Jtnon. The Co/lap.\e (�/ Consensus: !:
.)Jec·fs of 1he Dl!regulalicm of 
Cuhle Tc!leli.\J0/1, 8 1  Cot l �I. L .  RL \ .  6 1 2. 6 1 6- 1 7  ( 1 98 1 )  ( idcnti fying five maJOr rules. 
but not1ng that one of them applie only to spons broadca t�). 
237. Set! .n C. I- .R. s* 76.5 I -.55 < 1 9�0). 
2.HL For an overvie'" of the FCC's localism arguments. sec tanky \11. Besen. The 
f.'mnmmc., ol ll1e Cahle Tele1·ision ··comenws ··. 1 7  J .L. & !-.<.. ON �9. 49-50 ( 1974 ). 
23l) . .' 'ie<! 47 C'.f.R. *." 76.92-.94 (2004). 
240. /d. 
2-1 1 .  Sl!t> 47 C.I· .R. � �  76.57-.65 ( 1 979) ( repealed 1 9RO). 
2-12. Se<' .n c.r. R. � �  76. 1 5  1 - .  1 6 1  ( 1 97l)) (repeal eo l lJXO ). 
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FCC el iminated altogether the distant-signal-carriage and syndicated­
exclusivity rules. 2-13 Over the years, the FCC has made modifications to 
the other rules as well to reflect Congressional changes in pol icy and ad­
vancements in technology.2..14 The system thus consisted of a complex in­
terplay between the FCC's regulatory rules and Congre sional grants o f  
rights, both of which remained integral to the exclusionary regimes. Ever 
since the Supreme Court a ffirmed the FCC' authority to partake in this 
balancing process when it refused to invalidate the FCC's first round o f  
cable regulations, the FCC has attempted t o  step in at various stages to 
supplement Congressional grants of rights and privileges.:Z-15 
Since the 1 990s, however, the FCC's regulatory incursions into the 
broadcast station-cable television conflict have been minimal relative to its 
initial foray into the area.246 The present system (and its equilibrium) is 
now largely a matter of statutory grants and denials of  rights. The question 
this poses for both the present regime and the proposed system of broad­
casters' and cablecasters' rights is whether the FCC wi l l  intervene to im­
plement or dilute these rights and the stage at which such intervention 
would likely occur ( i .e., before, concunent with, or after Congressional 
implementation). I f  the FCC's recent attempt are any indication 247 it wi l l  
probably play more than just a passive role in  this ongoing debate. 
IV. RECOGNIZING BROADCASTERS' (AND 
CABLECASTERS') OPEN-E N D E D  PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
11\II PLICATIONS & CONSEQUENCES 
Having seen how l imited exclusionary rights function in the television 
industry, this Part focuses on the likely consequences of introducing open­
ended property rights ( i .e., broadcasters' rights) as an alternative. The 
analysis here derives from some of the key attributes o f  the modern televi­
sion industry in an internet age, characterized by greater user autonomy 
and participants' ready access to new methods of distribution. 
Broadcasters, cable companies, and content producers are each inter­
ested in controll ing the revenue streams associated with their contribution 
243. In re Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663 
( 1980). This deregulation was challenged in Malrite T. V of N. Y. 1'. FCC, 652 F.2u 1 140 
(2d Cir. 1 98 1  ), where the Court upheld the FCC s jurisdiction to deregulate. 
244. For analyses of the FCC's more recent deregulatory initiatives, see Donald .1. 
Boudreaux & Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., Cable Reregu!Mion, 1 4  CATO J. 87 ( 1994). 
245. United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 1 57 ( 1 968). 
246. Boudreaux & Ekelund, supra note 244, at 87-88. 
247. Specifically in the context of the Broadcast Flag controversy, discussed later. 
See il�fi·a Section lV.A. 
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to the process. While content producers' contribution is by far the most 
ignificant (and therefore seemingly worthy of the most ex ten ive protec­
tion), broadcasters and cable companies also partake in the proces as dis­
tributor . The broadcast chain thus involves different participants at each 
stage. This necessitates tailoring the protection provided to the exact con­
tribution that each makes to the complex process. 
To qualify for protection under the WBT, entities need to satisfy t\;vo 
condition . The entity must take the initiative and respon ibil ity for ( i )  the 
tran� mission of content to the public and ( i i )  the assembly and scheduling 
of content.248 
ln the case of  broadcasting, it is reasonably clear that affiliates qualify 
for protection. Most broadcast programming is put together by the major 
networks and relayed to their affiliates. However, affiliates retain the right 
to refuse the network 's lineup, and therefore retain control over the con­
tent and its scheduling; they are also responsible for tran milling it to the 
public.249 ln  the cable industry, however, the matter is different. While ca­
ble operator remain responsible for providing individual hou ehold with 
wired connection , they have little to no control over the content of the 
programming. They may, of cour e, l imit  the channel carried. but not the 
content of the programming in each channel, which is the exclu ive pre­
rogative of cable networks. While cable networks retain control of the as­
sembly and scheduling of content. they are not respon ible for transm itting 
it to the public, . ince they remain dependent on cable operators for sub-
criber . The two elements of the definition of a cablcca ter are therefore 
split between two categories of  incumbents in the industry, and it is not 
clear which one of them will come to acquire the "cablccasters' right.' 
U ltirnately it remains more than I ikely that the ultimate beneficiaries wi l l  
remain cable networks. But i f  this is  the ca  e, the need for such protection 
become even more tenuous, given that network eldom have any direct 
interaction with the public. To the limjted extent that they might be con­
cerned about unauthorized interception of their communication over the 
2-HL Set' 11'/NJ Bruudca\1 Trea�r. 'illpru note 52. at art. S( c l  It pnl\ ides: 
"'[B]roadca ting organtlation· and ·cablecasting orgamzauon· menn th� legal enuty that 
takes the initiati'e and has the responsibility for the transmission to the public of sound� 
or of •mages or of tmagcs and :-.ounJs or of the rcprescntauon thereof. and the a'>'5embl) 
and �chetlul111g o f  the content or the transm•�s•on ... 
249. -l7 c.r.R. � 76.5(j) (2004). Indeed. an affi l iat� (or .. full 11Ct\\Ork ... tall<)ll .. ) IS de­
fined by it� broadca:-,t111g no Je�s than X5°/o, or its content from one or the llli'l ltlf tck�\'I<;J()Il 
network�. Thi., clearly indicates that u ·tat ion. even if an affilwtc. retains cnntrol O\ cr th� 
content selection and assembly prn�..·cs�. 
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air to c�ble )
�rerators for distribution. this activity is covered by an cxts­
tent regtme.-· 
Additionally, under the new regime, the extent o f  individual incum­
bent.' contribution i likely to be minimal, given that broadca ters' and 
cablecasters' rights are in a sense derivative. 251 This resonate with the 
·'tomato juice" hypothetical that Nozick famously used to identify a prob­
lem with the classic Lockean property rights argument. 252 The question 
becomes: why should broadcasters' and cablecasters' contribution to the 
distribution process entitle them to a proper1y right that covers content, 
given that they contribute very little to its production? 
In the current regime, the FCC and Congress have tailored individual 
claimants' rights to reflect both the extent of their contributions and the 
parties against which the rights are to be asserted, in order to enable each 
party to internalize particular positive gains. This narrow tailoring reflects 
the ideal of balance and suggests that extensive and unj ustified property 
protection could interfere with a host o f  other interests and value . 
One such value is that of freedom of expression, which is enshrined in 
the First Amendment.253 The First Amendment implications of television 
are some of the most well-documented issues in the I iterature.254 The prin-
250. This would be covered by the cable theft regime, which would Lake care of an 
unauthorized interception and reception of a cable service. 47 U.S.C. § 553 (2000). Ln­
deed, i r cable networks are worried about their over-the-air transmissions to individual 
operators, protcclion for over-the-wire cablecasting seems completely redundant. 
25 1 .  See supra Part (f.A. 
252. Locke ·s labor theory of property postulates d1at when an individual exerts his or 
her labor over something and as a consequence the labor gets irreversibly mixed with the 
thing, the thing ought to become the property of the individual. Nozick high! ights the 
fallacy of this argument-by asking whether the equivalent of Locke's argument meant 
that if  a person emptied his bottle of tomato juice into the ocean and the juice got irre­
versibly mixed with the waters there, the person could now claim ownership over the 
entire ocean. Nozick of course assumed that mixing one's property (i.e., tomato juice) 
with something was equivalent to Locke's idea of mixing one's labor with something. 
See ROBF.RT I .  OZICK, A ARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 1 74-76 ( 1 974). 
253. For an overview of the free speech implications of the new regime, specifically 
in the context of the European Convention Human Rights, see Patricia Akester, The Dra;; 
WI PO Broadcasting Treaty and Its Impact on Freedom of Expression, COPYRIGHT BULL., 
Apr.-June 2006, at 1 ,  http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/OO 14/00 1464/l46498E.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 1 6, 2006). 
254. See, e.g., H.C. DONAHUE, THE BATTLE TO CONTROL BROADCAST NEWS: WHO 
OWNS THF. FIRST AMENDMENT ( 1 989); RICHARD E. LABUNSKI, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
UNDER StEGE: THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION ( 1 98 1 ); CHARLES H. TILLING­
HAST. AMERICAN BROADCAST REGULATION AND THE fiRST AMENDMENT: ANOTHER 
LOOK (2000): Jack M. Balkin, Media Filters. the V-Chip. and the Foundations ofHrvad­
casl Regulation, 45 DUKE L.J. 1 1 3 1  ( 1996): Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Pre,·s--.4 
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cipal i sues relate to the basic understanding that the Fir l Amendment 
exists to promote a free "marketplace of ideas,"255 and consequently that 
both government regulation aimed at controlling media companies and 
private control vested in media companies are capable of impeding the 
realization of that ideal. The First Amendment issues a sociated with new 
broadcasters' rights are likely to be cognates of similar debates that have 
occurred elsewhere. While several of the issues discussed here do impli­
cate Fir t Amendment values, they also derive their basis quite independ­
ent of the same. 
A. Failing to Recognize the Emergence of a New User Dynamic 
The emergence of digital technologies and the internet in the later pari 
of the last century resulted in significant changes for communications me­
dia. The internet made the process of information dis cmination relatively 
eff011le s, cheap, and instantaneous, not only for producers. but also for 
consumer . Additionally, the emergence of digital copying clra tically re­
duced the marginal costs of copying, and at the same time made the proc­
e s of copying itself very simple-requiring little technological expertise 
or financial investment.256 
For incumbent in the television industry, though, digital technology 
had both positive and negative implications. On the one hand. the ease of 
dis emination meant that the costs of transmitting information to audi­
ences across the world reduced dramatically. At close to zero marginal 
cost, content providers could transmit infonnation and entertainment al­
most immediately to millions of individuals on the internet. However, the 
same technology that gave rise to this capability also enabled audiences to 
exercise greater control over what they were receiving-copying, moving. 
editing. altering, and sharing the content of the tran mi sions they re­
ce1ved. 
SeH· Firs/ Amendmelll Righi, 80 HARV. L. RE\·. 1 64 1  ( 1 967): Thomas \V. l lazlen, Physt­
cal Scarci1r. Rem Seeking. and 1he Firs/ Amendmenl, 97 COLl'i\-1. L .  Rn . 905 ( 1997}: 
Robert B. llorwitz. The Firs/ Amendme111 :vtee1s Some Nen· Tf!c·hnologies: fJroadcwaing. 
Common Carriers. and Free Speech in 1he 1990s, 20 TIIFOI{Y & 0<. · , .  2 1  ( 1991  ): L.A. 
Powc, Jr .. Mass Commzmicalions and Lhe Firs/ Amendml!nl' An On.on•w11·. 55 LA\\ & 
(mJTF\1P. PROBS. 53 { 1992). 
255. See. e.p,.. Red Lion Broad. Co. ' .  FCC. 395 .S. 367. J90 ( 1969) ( applying the 
tdca). Sl!e al<>o T. f::.MERSO . TOW-\RD -\ GF.NCRAL Ti l  CORY 01 TilL .1-IR� I Ar-.1 1  Dt-.IFt\. r 
( 1 966). 1Ju1 t:/." tanlcy Ingber, The Markerplace c?f ldl'w: . ..J l.egilimt=mg .\fnh. 1 9  4 
Ot iKI-. L.J. I (critic11ing the idea). 
256. Sec! generul�r LAWRLNCF LF�SI(i, Till- FUTURL 01 101  AS: TH I: I· \TL OF THL 
COMI\.�ONS IN i\ CONNECTED WORLD (200 1 l: Boyle . . �upru nolL' 1 S. 
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[ n the early part of the cenrury, radio and television broadcasting revo­
lutionized mass communication. By using the spectrum, broadcasters 
could communicate with mi l l ions of i.ndividuals who owned a television 
set. The traditional one-to-many model on which broadcasting operated, 
however. rested on the core principle of audience passivi(\·.257 Audiences 
had I ittle control over the content of what they received on their televi­
sions except for the ability to switch their television sets o ff. To be sure, 
audience control has steadily increased over the years. Audiences now 
have multiple channels from which to choose, and cable and pay television 
allow more control over the time and quantity of programn1ing. Nonethe­
less, the element of passivity has remained dominant. 
This passivity-driven model of broadcasting is often characterized as 
the "market for eyeballs."258 The main deficiency in this model is that it 
remains premised on the ideal of mass appeal and tends to ignore alto­
gether the diversity of actual interests and the individual needs of audience 
members. 259 Since broadcasters' compensation derives from viewership, 
their concern is limited to putting together programming that attracts the 
most viewership. The advent of the internet changed all  o f  this. It gave rise 
to a whole new category of players, users, who controlled the quantity, 
nature, and timing of information and, more importantly, o ften reworked 
the information to send to others. 
260 They thus sihtated themselves be­
tween producers and consumers by receiving, modifying, and transmitting 
information. As the iCrave TV episode i l lustrated, an individual could eas­
ily conve1i analog broadcast programming into digital format and transmit 
it over the internet to miJiions of users, who could in tum copy the stream 
and retransmit it to others. When this happened, incumbents began to 
clamor for greater control once they realized the threat that this posed to 
their modeL 
257. Indeed, even the Supreme Court operated on the assumption of audience passi v­
ity-using the phrase "captive audience" in relation to broadcast media quite often. For 
an overview of the doctrine and its use by the Supreme Court, see Charles L. Black, Jr., 
He Cannot Choose But f-iear: The /)light <�{the Captive Auditor, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 960 
( 1 953);  Marcy Strauss, Redefining 1he Captive Audience Doctrine, 1 9  HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 85 ( 1 99 1 ). 
258. E.g., Yochai Benkler. From Conswners to Users: Sh!/Ling the Deeper Structures 
of Regulmion Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 5 6 1 ,  
564 (2000). 
259. See C. Edwin Baker, Gil'ing 1he Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 3 1 1  
( 1 997). 
260. For a comprehensive comparison between the traditional broadcast model and 
the internet model, see Yochai Benkler, Communications !nfras!ructure Regulation and 
the Distribution of Control 01'er Conl�nr, 22 TELECOMM. PoL'Y 1 83 ( 1 998). 
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Audience passivity thus came to be replaced by greater interactivity. In 
the past, the e tablished i ncumbents rallied together in an attempt to elimi­
nate competition from new players bearing new technologies. Each time 
they sought to u e copyright or analogous property arguments to keep new 
players out, a they did with the advent of cable television.261 The re-
ponse to the perceived threat from users is no different, and we thus see 
cablecasters and broadcasters claiming exclu ionary rights over their ac-
. . . ?()? ttv Jttes.- -
In the pa t, threats to distributors' revenue streams normally came 
from commercial entities like broadcast retran mitters or cable companies, 
and the argument for exclusionary rights ordinarily derived its justification 
either from (i) perceived free-riding .for commercial gain.. or (ii) the need 
to restrict player ' activities to promote overall competition. The FCC in 
tum derived it rule-makjng jurisdiction fi·om one or the other of these ra-
. I ,61 tiona es.- · 
User pre ent an altogether different situation since they are not neces­
sarily commercially driven and do not compete \Vith broadcasters and ca­
blecasters in the traditional horizontal sense. To the current incumbents, 
they repre em both a source of additional rc\'enue. as audiences, and a 
threat to it, a. redistributors (albeit for non-commercial purposes). 
The idea of the user continues to present problems for the intangibJe 
property right discourse. For quite orne time now, i ntellectual property 
theorists in general and copyright scholar in particular have grappled with 
the role or the u er in relation to these rights.:!64 At one end of the spec­
trum remain the user-focused idealists who argue that copyright is in real­
ity about the ·'the use of the work," with owners being granted a special 
right for a I imited period and users a more general one that is not tempo-
26 1 .  Ranuy Ptc..·l-.cr de cribes this phenomenon a� the U!:>e of copyright as .. entry pol­
icy ... ob�cn ing that copyright law and prcsumabl) 11� 'ariant ha' e imponanr competi­
tion consequence-;. t:!:>pectatl) m relation to new entrants. Sc.>e Randal C. Picker. Copyright 
c" /:'JIIIT Polin . Tlte Ca.\C! o(JJigiwl DislrihuliOII. 47 A' Til RLST BULl. 423. 462 (2002) 
( .. Copyright Ia\\. bnth .JUdge-made and ·tatutory. ets kc) features or the kgal regtme for 
digital dtstnhuuon entrants ... ). 
262. Se!e g,enera/h· I f '! PO Broadca\1 Tre(J(y. supra note 52. 
263. See l ntted State�. ' ·  w. Cable Co .. 392 U . . 1 57 ( 1 968) ( upholdmg the FCC's 
.JUrisdtction 111 connectton wnh liS propc.:ny-hkc regulation� a. deriving from 11� ancillary 
tunsdicllon): L nucd "tlltes ' . :-.�tdwest \'ideo Corp .. 406 U . .  649 ( 1 972) ( upholding the 
FCC� jun�d1ction 111 connection wnh cenam must-carry regulation� tmposed on local 
cable compan1c.:s) Btu '<'t' FCC v. Mtdwest Vtdeo Corp . 4-W U . . 6c 9 ( J Y71)) ( finding 
that the I·CC lacked JUnsdiction tn relation to similar regulations). 
264 . .  )'<'<' !!.<'IH'ralh 8cnkkr. 'upro note 25�( 
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rally bounded.�o:' They thus argue for the rccogmt1 on o f  a set of "user's 
rights" within copyright (and indeed all of intellectual property)-rights 
that l imit  the nonnative claims of authors for greater control and simulta­
neously entitle the pub I ic to greater i n formational access. At the other end 
of the spectrum are the user-skeptics, vvho argue that users' right tend to 
focus on user consumption and ignore the role that copyright plays as an 
incentive mechanism in the creative process. Although the skeptics do 
agree that users are entitled to some pri1•ilege. , they tend to d isagree with 
the idealists in  believing that focusing on users dilutes the proprietary sig­
n i ficance o f  copyright.266 
I n  any event, the key point is that the users' rights discourse has ex­
isted within the realm of copyright and intellectual property for quite some 
time now. The intellectual property system that exists today represents a 
dynamic equilibrium between users' access rights and owners' exclusion­
ary privi leges. 
I n  contrast, the regulatory property discourse that recognizes exclu­
sionary rights in distribution channels has thus far never had to grapple 
with the idea of non-commercial users. Given that property rights, in the 
sense of attenuated exclusionary rights, existed exclusively between dis­
tributors in  an effort to preserve a competitive balance, the regulatory re­
gime recognized neither the legitimacy nor the need for such user regula­
tion. This state of affairs is well  i l lustrated by the recent disputes concern­
ing the "broadcast flag mandate. "267 
I n  late 2003, the FCC adopted the ''Broadcast Flag Regulations," a se­
ries of rules aimed at safeguarding broadcasters' and cablecasters' inter-
265. See L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: 
A LAW OF USERS' RIGHTS 1 9 1  ( 1 99 1 ); BenkJer, supra note 258; Julie E. Cohen, The 
Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347 (2005). See also Joseph P. 
Liu, Copyright La-...,• 's Theory of the Consumer. 44 B.C. L. REv. 397 (2003). 
266. See Kenneth W. Dam, Se((-Hefp in the Digital Jungle, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 393, 
394 ( 1999) (observing that users' rights advocates ··effectively emasculate" traditional 
copyright principles); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and intermediate Users ' Rights, 23 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS. 67 ( l999); Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copy­
right, 45 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y l ( 1 997). 
267. For an overview of some of the issues involved here. see Susan P. Crawford. 
The Biology of the Broadcast Flag, 25 HASTI 1GS COMi\1. & ENT. LJ. I (2002); Randal C. 
Picker, From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the 
Propertization of Copyright. 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 1 ,  29 1 (2003); Debra Kaplan, ote, 
Broadcast Flags and the War Against Digital Telel'ision Piracy: A Solution of Dilemma 
for the Digital Era?. 57 FED. COMM. L.J. 325 (2004). 
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ests during the transition to digital television.268 The rules mandated that 
television digital receivers incorporate the "broadcast flag," a digital code 
that would prevent the receivers from redistributing broadcast content 
once received.269 The FCC relied exclusively on its ancil lary jurisdiction 
for these regulations.270 However, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the FCC 
did not have authority to issue these rules since the broadcast flag only 
came into play after the transmission was complete.27 1  It concluded that 
the Communications Act only granted the FCC jurisdiction to regulate de­
vices associated with broadcasts, and therefore Congress did not delegate 
to the FCC jurisdiction over devices (and uses) not engaged in actual 
transmission. 272 Thus, actual post-reception use involving the broadcast 
tlag was something the FCC's exclusionary regime could not l.egitimately 
regu late. Of course, much of the concem with the broadcast flag arose be­
cause the FCC's proposal was seemingly biased against consumers and 
ought to replicate copyright's restrictions with few exceptions.:273 
What the broadcast flag case thus demonstrates is that the idea of us­
ers' rights is largely alien to broadcast regulation, not because users' privi­
leges are in any sense neglected, but rather more fundamentally because 
the regime does not legitimately extend to regulating their activities to be­
gin with.274 Users are not regulated because doing so is extraneous to the 
regime's basic purpose-creating a competitive balance and no more. 
268. See In rl! Digital Broad. Content Prot., I R F.C.C.R. 23.550 (2003 ). These rules 
were codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 73, 76 (2003). See also ln re Hoover & Hoover Capital 
Mg:mt.. Inc .. 1 7  F.C.C.R. 16 ,027 (2002) (inviting public comments on the idea). 
269. In re Digital Broad. Contenr Prot.. 1 8  F.C.C.R. 23.550 (2003). 
270. /d. at 23,563. The ancillaty jurisdiction ofthe FCC derives from 47 U . .  C. � 1 53 
(2000 & upp. JV 2004). which in different places authorizes the FCC to regulate ser­
vices incidental to broadcasting. Tbe Supreme Court has in the past interpreted the scope 
of the FCC"s powers under ancillary jurisdiction. See, e.g.. United States ' .  w. Cable 
Co .. 392 U.S. 1 57 ( 1 968) ( finding jurisdiction): FCC v. Midwest Video CoqJ .. -+40 U.S. 
6X9 ( 1 979) ( overruming regulation because of lack of jurisdiction). 
?.7 1 .  Amer. Lib. Assoc'n v. FCC. 406 F.3d 689. 705 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
272. /d. at 704-05. 
273. See BRIA T. YEl-L Co "Ci. RF.SF.ARCH SER\' .. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF DI GI­
T..-\L TF:LE\"ISION: TiiF  BROADCAST VJDF.O FLAC.o (2007). ul·ai/ah/l! ul http://opencrs.cdt. 
org::"tvtsiRL33797 _20070 I I l .pdr. 
274. Interestingly. some argue that the regime ought to step in not at the exclusionary 
nghts end. but rather at the users· access-privileges end of the debate. Thus. in situations 
whet\� the market results in access bc1ng diluted, quite independent of exclusionary rights 
(e.g .. self-help, technical protection measures) -regulators such as the FCC are thought 
tn ha\'C a role in restonng some balance. See Molly S. Van Hnuweling, Conii1111Jiicolions · 
Cop_rri.�l/1 Po lie�\. -l J. T I I. I-CO� II\ 1 .  & Ill <  oH TF.CII .  L. 97 ( 2005 ). 
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Property in the regulatory context and traditional intellectual property 
di ffer fundamentally. In  the former, property is not temporally l imited, but 
is nevertheless con trained by the actors against ""hom the exclusionary 
mechanism operates. In the latter, by contrast, it is temporal ly  limited, but 
in rem in terms of its applicability. Limitations on users are deemed ac­
ceptable in the intellectual property context because they ( i )  remain tem­
porally limited, and ( i i )  result in long-term efficiencies that accrue back to 
user through works entering the public domain.275 In the context o f  distri­
bution-related exclusionary rights, however, the matter is di fferent. Here, 
temporal limitations are absent because equivalent long-term efficiencies 
are unlikely. Thus, limiting cablecasters' ability to retransmit broadcast 
content only twenty (or fifty) years after the original broadcast is ineffi­
cient principally because any value associated with the content is largely 
immediate. Consequently, a temporal l imitation is likely to be of I ittle to 
no value. lt is precisely for this rea on that older programming ( i .e., rerun 
programming from past seasons) is almost exclusively a part o f  the syndi­
cated programming market carried by independent stations and not affili­
ates.276 Temporally l imited, as opposed to operationally attenuated, exclu­
sionary rights over the distribution process are of little utility, which ex­
plains why the regulatory discourse stayed by and large clear of time­
bound in rem rights. 
[t is obvious that the user remains the target o f  the new regime-· given 
that all other incumbents are already regulated. Interestingly, though, the 
new regime is structured in the nature o f  a temporally limited intellectual 
property right. The temporal tradeoff, however, is unlikely to be of signifi­
cant value to the public, given the value of immediacy that remains central 
to television broadcasting and viewership. 
Users are thus relegated to the peripheries o f  the new system in the be­
lief that their interests will  be served by the l imitations and exceptions of 
the regime's exclusionary rights, which are analogous to those contained 
275. For an elaboration on the efficiency trade-offs involved in limiting intel lectual 
property terms, see WILLIAM 0. NORDHAUS, INVENTiON, GROWTH, A D WELFARE: A 
TI IEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 79 ( 1 969); Edmund W. Kitch, 
The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 284 ( 1 977): Landes 
& Posner, supra note 89. 
276. See Museum for Broadcast Communications, Syndication, http://www. 
museum.rv/archives/etv/S/htmiS/syndication/syndication.htm ( last visited Dec. 5. 2006) 
( noting that the syndicated market does nor cover prime time network programmmg, live 
nev .. s. and live sports events): James E. Fletcher, The Syndication Marketplace. in MEDIA 
EC<>'\;OfvtiCS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 84 (Al ison Alexander et al. eds., 1 99} ). 
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in traditional copyright.277 This approach adopt an overly simplistic and 
outmoded conception of the user in the digital age-a a passive consumer 
of information upplied by content producer and distributors. who conse­
quently cares very little about the use-value inherent in the timeliness of 
the broadca ·t.27 It ignores the fact that u er in an interconnected envi­
ronment function as producers, consumers. and distributors, and typically 
do o for non-commercial purposes. By forcing u er into a regime prem­
ised on temporality, the new structure neglect at once ( i )  the reasons for 
which they were kept out of the regulatory property regime and ( i i )  the 
historical rationale for why the temporaJly limited intellectual property 
regime stayed clear of distribution rights in the United States. At least part 
of the rea on for this neglect stems from the Jack of a cohesive organiza­
tional framework for the category of users. ln addition, u ers' interests are 
diversified and at times seemingly incompatible. 
This u er dynamic is thus one that the cunent version of the proposed 
broadca. ter · rights regime completely glosses over. The regime remains 
premi ed on the belief that through exclu ionary rights, broadca ters can 
extract rent. from users and at the same time control their behavior. Situ­
ated mid\\ ay between authors and pa sive consumer . u ers get none of 
the protective right that authors and owner do. nor the protection ordi­
narily as ociated with consumers. 
B. Detracting from the Benefits of a New Distribution Structure 
One or the consequences of the internet and the emergence of digital 
tcchnoJogje · i that it decentralizes and democratizes the proce s of distri­
bution . 27
lf 
Broadcasters and cable companie are no longer viewed a in­
dispensable agents in the distribution proce . 
The most ob ious example of this is the emergence of companies such 
as YouTubc, an on line broadcasting ( or wcbcasting) facility that allows 
member. to share their video programming with other for free. 2xo l ts  
277. See II'/ PO Broadcast Trellf_1'. supra note 5:::! . a1 a11. 1-L The c\aCI nature o f  1hese 
limitations and except ton i . ho'' e'er. left to llH.li' 1dual nations to de1ennine ''bile en­
acling trcal� -unplemcntmg lcgJ:.lalion. 
278. See genem/1\ ERIC \ 01' HIPPEL. 01:\tOCRAl l/.1'\10 l'I'OvATIO:--. I C :W05) (docu­
mcming thl' diiTcrcnl tom1s of user innovation rhat occur and noting thai "ju ]ser-centercd 
innovation pmcec;:.c� offer great advantages O\ er the manufacturcr-centnc innovauon 
devclopmcnl sy-..tems that have been rhe mamstay or commerce for hunured� of years'·). 
27Y. For a detailed elaboration nf 1h1s argument and an analysi. of the p01cnunl benc­
fil� assncinted "' 1th 1his decentrallntion. sec Yoc I IAI  BrNKLLR. Till WJ r\LTH OF �I.:T· 
\\ OR K '>: I IO\\ StWI:\ L PROOl I( 1 101\ TR ·\ NSI-ORI\IS M \Rio-. FTS A '\11) fR F I. DO I\. I ( 2006 ). 
no It d(':-.crtb�:' it�elr <b follow-..: 
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company slogan-''Broadcast Yoursclf' - is aptly indicative of its goals. 
Producers and directors of original videos merely upload their videos onto 
the service, and users of the service view the videos there for free. Ser­
vices such as these are not targeted only at independent producers, who 
produce videos not necessari ly meant for mass audiences; YouTube is to­
day viewed as a major distribution base for commercial production as 
wel l .  \Vith more than 1 00 rn.illion viewers each day and 65,000 new vid­
eos added daily, YouTube presents advertisers and programmers depend­
ent on advertising with an additional source of viewership.281 Not surpris­
ingly, commercial sports leagues have begun forming strategic alliances 
with the service-previously relegated exclusively to broadcast stations.282 
Most importantly, though, broadcast networks have come to view 
online broadcasting as providing them with additional indirect benefits. I n  
October 2006, C B S  began supplying YouTube with programming. Within 
a month, CBS'  content on the website became the most viewed, and CBS 
soon acknowledged that online distribution actually increased the ratings 
for its traditional programming content.283 
Google's recent acquisition of YouTube reemphasized the growing 
importance of online broadcasting services.284 Some have argued that the 
growing importance of online broadcasting is likely to eat into television 
YouTube is a consumer media company for people to watch and share 
original videos vvorldwide through a Web experience. Everyone can 
watch videos on YouTube-both at YouTube.com and across the 
Internet. People can see first-hand accounts of current events, find vid­
eos about their hobbies and interests, and discover the quirky and un­
usual. As more people capture special moments on video, Y ouTube is 
empowering them to become the broadcasters of tomotTow. 
YouTube, YouTube Fact Sheet, http://www.youtube.com/t/fact_sheet (last visited Nov. 
24, 2006). 
28 1 .  YouTuhe Serves Up 100 Million Videos a Day Online, USATODAY.COM, July 
16,  2006, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-07- 1 6-youtube-views_x.htm. 
282. See YouTube in Web Video Deal with National Hockey League, REUTERS.COM, 
Nov. 1 5 ,  2006, http://www.reuters.com/article/sportsNewslidUSN 1 54869342006 1 1 1 6. 
283. See Vito Pilieci, YouTube Clips Boost CBS Ratings, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, 
Nov. 23, 2006, available at http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/business/story. 
htm l?id=2e7b9c59-aebe-4206-b3 1 5-3 1  cd5bec9c8 1 ;  Chris Tew, CBS Happy with You­
Tube, PVR WJRL Nov. 22, 2006, available at http://www.pvrwire.com/2006/1 1/22/cbs­
happy-with-youtube. 
284. See Michael Liedtke, Coogle Holds Back Stock in YouTube Deal, USA To­
DA Y.COM, Nov. 1 5 ,  2006, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/techinvestor/corporatenews/ 
2006- 1 1 - 1 5-google-youtubc-cushion_x.htm?POE=TECISV A. 
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broadcast advertising revenues, which is already affected by competition 
from cable advertising.285 
Content producers can enter into distribution contracts directly with 
these services, thereby bypassing broadcast and cable intermediaries alto­
gether, which is precisely what the sports leagues and CBS have at­
tempted. Additionally, advertisers can now contract with the e services for 
similar chunks of the viewership pie. While it may be premature to predict 
the likelihood of this occurring, the mere possibility drive home the point 
that online distribution services present a threat to broadcasters' and cable 
companies' revenues in more ways than one. 
Online broadcasting allows authors to play a more active role in con­
trolling the dis emination of their work. Historically, copyright 1aw has 
long recognized the exclusive right of public distribution to be one of the 
fundamental clements in the constituent bundle. 2x6 Online broadcasting 
offers authors the chance to resurrect direct distr.ibution and thereby di­
rectly internalize the benefits of their creations.287 
Scholarly debate on the value of direct distribution ha been both 
overly optimistic and overly pessimistic. Jane Ginsburg' po ·ition reflects 
the fom1er.288 She argues that the emergence of the digital world equips 
authors with the opportunity to disseminate their work · to the public and 
thereby internalize the incentive framework more directly. without having 
to submit to control by intermediary media companie · .  2)\9 According to 
Ginsburg, this is likely to have two implications. Fir t, it enhances the le­
gitimacy of copyright as an exclusionary framework by remaining prem­
ised on generating creativity, and second, it offers the public access to an 
285. See Bob Garfield. YouTube vs. Boob Tube. WIRED, Dec. 2006. at 226. available 
ar http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/ 1 4 . 1 2/youtubc.htrnl?pg 2. 
286. See generally LYMAN RAY PAITERSON. COPYRIGHT IN I l l  lORIC AL PERSPEC­
TIVE ( 1968). 
287. What exactly constttutes ·'direct distribution" might of' course be u mauer of 
orne contention. It certamly would encompass the case of the author producertmustcian 
di seminaung the work to the public directly. under ome kind of a revenue model. See 
MARK W. CURRA . SLL.I YOUR MUSIC!: l-10\\ TO PROFITAIJI \ · 1  L1 YOUR Ow RE­
(ORDI 1GS ONLI 'E (200 1 ). Increasingly. however. authors producer::. are also making use 
of free dtstribution channel . such as free webcastcr::. (e.g .. Googlc Video or YouTube ). 
II ere, authors retain complete control o,·er the production process and the content of thetr 
work. but ne' erthele s reach the general public via free dtstnbuuon channels that operate 
on business (i .e .. revenue) models mdependent of subscnption fees. TillS would qualify as 
dtrect distnbution in the traditional sense simply because the procl!s� mvolvcs the same 
clement of authorial control O\'er the process that rrue direct distnbutJon would ematl. 
288. Jane C. Ginsburg. Coprrighr wul Conrml On'r Ne11 TechnologieS (4'Disw!mino­
rion, 1 0 1  Cot UM. l. RE\'. 1 6 1 3 .  1 6 1 9  (2001 ). 
289. /d. at 1 6 1 7- 1 8. 
1.364 BERKELEY TECHNO LOGY LAW JOURNAL fVol. 22:1303 
increased eli vcr ity of works?m . However, others argue that although the 
authorial control argument i- laudable, it remains only an ideal given that 
the majority of creative works today are either mmed by media companies 
through the work-for-hire doctrine or procured by them through assign­
ments of copyright, and these intermediaries have a significant compara­
tive advantage by specializing in the distribution process.29 1 
The answer probably lie omewhere between the two extremes. Web­
casting has begun to assume a major role in the overall market for creative 
works only in the past year. 292 Online distribution is thus unlikely to 
elim inate the role o f  the intermediary distributor anytime soon, but authors 
are beginning to see a resurgence in their ability to communicate with the 
public directly. It is precisely this outlet with which the expansive set o f  
new broadcasters' rights is I ikely to interfere. 
The first thing to remember about the proposed bundle of broadcast­
ers' and cablecasters' rights is that it extends beyond just the act of broad­
casting. l n  other words, the rights are not restricted to concurrent retrans­
missions or inte1_lerences with an ongoing broadcast, but extend to fixa­
tions o f  the broadcast and uses o f  the fL-'<.ation a fter the actual broadcast 
ends?>3 l n  this latter respect, it obviously extends beyond just protecting 
the ephemeral ignal to controlling its manifestations in a fixed a fter-life. 
ln thi respect, the proposed rights are more analogous to exclusive copy­
right in granting broadcasters absolute control over al l  current and paten­
tied uses o f  their signals. Furthermore, given that the signal is physically 
indistinguishable from ( and indeed, dependent on) the underlying content, 
control over the signal after its ephemeral existence amounts to control 
over the underlying content. 
290. fd. 
29 1 .  See Wu, supra note 157. at 339-4 1 (noting the existence of "reasons to suspect 
that development· like the Internet . . .  are unlikely to eliminate the central role of dis­
seminators.' ) .  
292. The fir ·r phase of online distribution involved the webcasting of music by online 
companies, which raised a plethora of issues related to the compulsory licensing scheme 
under 1 7  U . . C. �  1 1 -J. (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). It eventually resulted in the Small Web­
caster Settlement Act. Pub. L. I 07-32 I ,  1 1 6 Stat. 2780 (2002). For an overview or the 
debates in this area. which are largely related to our present debate, see Lydia Pallas 
Loren, Unwnglin� the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CAS!:. W. RES. L. REV. 673 (2003). 
See also Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govem 
Information?, 85 TF.X. L. REV. 783. 827-29 (2007) (providing for a theoretical analysis of 
the regime introduc�.:d). 
293. See WI ?0 Broadcast Treaty, supra note 52, at arts. 12- 15 .  
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Recall the hypothetical involving Walter and Quakes. 294 Granting 
XBC the exclusive right to control the post-transmission fixation of its 
broadca t of Quakes and distribute copies of the fixation effectively gives 
XBC control over the work itself. Even i f  Walter were to make his work 
available free of charge on the internet. a user is unlikely to be able to de­
termine whether a given version originated from Walter (legally) or from 
XBC's broadcast (il legally), which will  most likely deter actual viewing of 
Quakes altogether. 
l f  the skeptics are right, and Walter continues to remain dependent on 
XBC to distribute his work, the addition of this new set of right to XBC's 
existing arsenal is  clearly a step in  the wrong direction-away from 
greater authorial control. In  describing the emergence of a new paradigm 
of copyright Jaw, which he calls "copyright's communications policy," 
Tim Wu notes that giving an existent incumbent exclusionary control 
places the development of technologies of dissemination in the incum­
bent's hands. 
Assuming that the pioneer controls the creation of content (either 
by controlling copy1ight. vcnical integration, or through imple 
economic dependence). it can dictate what happens and what 
doe not . . . .  Everything then depend on whether policymakcr · 
believe that an incumbent can be tru ted to promote, rather rhan 
destroy, its technological rivals.295 
He proceeds to argue that this often militates against the recognition of 
broad initial entitlements in the incumbent?96 
Broadcasters and cablecaster cannot be expected to act except with 
their own private interests in mind. Throughout the history of U . S .  televi­
sion broadcasting, they have sought to curtail the development of new 
technologies of dissemination, for fear that the technologies would cut into 
their source of revenue. The mo t obvious instance of thi wa , of course. 
the emergence of cable televi ion. Con equently, author ' di tributive in­
tcre ts can hardly be left exclu ively to their noble intentions. The new set 
of rights thu aptly i l lu trates wu·  point regarding the nature of the enti­
tkment and individuals again t whom it is to operate. 
294. ee .\upm text accompanying notes 1 8-2 1 .  
295. \Vu. supru note 1 57. ar 338. He also notes that in "the example or broadcasL if 
copyright in programming had clearly included future technologic� like t.:able and satel­
lne Iran�mts ion. the deciston to allo" rhe ·e di seminal ton tcchnologtes to de' clop would 
ha' e re�ted wnh the broadcast industry ... Ironically. it is pr�ctscly copyright m broadcasLs 
that the new regime . cek to introduce. See also Trotter Hardy. Cop1·rip,lu aJI(/ "New­
l ·'� .. Technologie\, 23 'OVA L. RF\ . 657 ( 1 999). 
296. W11. supra note 1 57. at 338. 
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Thu , quite apart from the effecL the new regime is likely to have on 
the user, ir also detracts more fundamentally from the ba ·is of traditional 
copyright-and the central role of the author therein. In the past, when 
broadcasters sought exclu ionary control against a new entrant (e.g.,  ca­
ble), authors were never directly implicated because of their almost com­
plete dependence on intermediary distribution. At present, the internet w i l l  
probably decentralize distribution and minimize this dependency. Thus. 
moving to a regime that nc::gatcs the benefits of this decentral ization wi l l  
only sti fle further creativity. 
C. The Paradox of the "Public Interest" 
This Section examines what rhe phrase "public interest" means in the 
broadcasting industry and how that understanding might impact or be im­
pacted by the new regime of broadcasters' rights. Few term have gar­
nered a much ignominy a the phrase "public interest" in the context o f  
televi · ion broadcasting.2Q7 It i s  therefore not surprising to see a significant 
amount of cynici m characterize discussions of public interest over the 
years. While it may indeed be difficult to construct a single coherent defi­
nition of public interest applicable across time and technology, one tincts 
the semblance of a pattern in regulatory decisions premised on the ideal. 
The FCC is mandated by law to use some standard of public intere t in  
connection with innumerable regulatory and policy-making function · as­
signed to i t  under the Communications Act of 1 934.298 Attempts to attrib­
ute meaning to the phrase by scholars over the past several years exhibit a 
significant amount of ideological variety and seemingly conflicting no­
tions. 
One of the earliest conceptions of public interest adopted by regulators 
reflected what came to be known as the "trusteeship model. "
29 9 This 
297. For general studies on rhe topic. see PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE. COMMUNICA riONS 
POLICY J\ND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THI:. TI::LECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 ( 1999); 
MIKE FEINTUCK, "THE PUBLIC INTEREST" IN REGULATION (2004); LAURA R. L i  1DER, 
PUBLIC ACCESS TELEVISION: Aivii:.RICA ' S  ELECTRONIC SOAPBOX ( 1999); Dt:.N IS 
MCQUAIL, MEDIA PERFORMA CE: MASS COMMUNICATION AND THE PUBLIC INTI:.REST 
( 1992). 
298. See. e.g., 47 U.S.C. §� 1 54. 1 57-6 1 .  20 1 , 2 1 4, 229, 25 1 , 257, 259. 271-72. 303, 
307, 309, 3 1 0-1 I, 3 1 5, 3 19,  325, 332. 335-36. 362, 396, 533-34, 543, 548. 572-73. 605-
06, 6 1 0  (2000). Of course, the standard applies to almost al l  of the FCC's functions. For 
an excellent overview of the standard"s origins and its evolution, see Erwin G. Krasnow 
& Jack N. Goodman, The "'Public Interest ·· Standard: The Search .for the Ho�,. Gruil. 50 
FED. COMM. L.J. 605 ( 1998). 
299. For apt examples of this model. see, for example, the FCC's inli:unous 1 9...J.6 
Bluebook, FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N. PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF BROADCAST 
LiCJ-:NSI::ES ( 1946), and for the policies that followed its adoption, see Mark . . fovvler & 
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model wa premised on the need for governmental guidance over all as­
pects of broadcast decision-making, including content-related decisions. 
Thi '"a indeed the approach adopted by the FCC early on.300 
Over time, an expansive reading of broadcasters' First Amendment 
right and various statutory amendments diluted the rigidity of the trustee-
hip model. In the 1 970s the FCC began to move away from this model, 
preferring instead to adopt a distinctively market-driven approach to defin­
ing the public interest.301 FCC Chainnan Mark Fowler made this position 
explicit in his well-known law review article expounding on the virtues of 
the new approach, where he noted that "the public's interest . . .  defines 
the public interest."302 This model adopted a decentralized marketplace 
approach to broadcast regulation, in the belief that broadcasters. driven by 
advertising revenues, would structure their activities and programming 
depending on public demand.303 At  least part of the rationale for this ap­
proach derived from the belief that any monopoly over content distribution 
wa likely to be diluted by new technologies of content delivery.304 The 
1 980 witne sed a spate of FCC action deregulating indu try players ( most 
notably cable television) under this rnode1 .305 
I n  the 1 990 . with the enactment of the Cable Act of 1 992. the FCC 
began to realize that the pure marketplace approach was suboptimal. The 
FCC Chairman at the time, Reed Hundt, reiterated that the television in­
dustry was subject to obligations distinct from other media and advocated 
the introduction of specific content-related regulation, all purportedly in 
the public interest.306 The general consensus that emerged by this time was 
that equating public interest with private control ( in the laissez-faire sense) 
resulted in significant welfare los es, which in turn necessitated remedial 
Daniel L. Brenner, A J'vfarketplace Approach 10 Brvadcust Regulation. 60 TEX. L. REV. 
207. 2 1 3- 1 7  ( 1982). 
300. See Robert K. A' ery & Alan G. wvitsky. Tht� FCC and the J>ub!Jc Interest: A 
Se/ectil·e Cri/Jqul:' of C.S. Te!l:'commllnications Po/l(:r-.\1akmg. 111 PUBLIC 13ROADl A Tll':G 
\ D HI I.:. PUBLIC INTEREST 52 ( Michael P. McCauley ct al. cd ., 2003 ). 
30 I .  The fCCs subsequem deregulation of cable tele' 1 ·1on cxemplifie this ap-
proach. 
302. Fowler & Brenner. supra note 299. at 2 1 0. 
303. !d. at 230. 
304. /d. at 225-26. 
305. See :mpra notes 243-244 and accompanying te:--t. 
106. Reed E. Hundt. The Publil· ·s .4innm>s: What Does the Public lntl!rest Rt.?q11ire 
of Tele1·ision Brow/custer.,·?. 4- DUKE L.J. I tHN. I 090 ( I  996) ('"Clearly. broadcasters are 
sub.iect to dtstmCI public interest obligations 1101 nnposcd on other media."). 
1368 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOU RNAL [VoL 22: 130J 
measures, and that these market fai l ures could be avoided by a form o f  
''progressive paternalism" towards the industry.3u7 
Regulators have thus gone back and forth in their conceptualization of 
the public interest as an ideal. Many have started to question whether the 
concept is worthy of any application at al l ,  given both the readiness with 
which regulatory decisions have in the past been justified by appeal to the 
concept and the remarkable rapidity with which the philosophical basis of 
the idea has varied over the years. 
Thomas Streeter, in his vitriolic critique of domestic telecommunica­
tions policy, argues that the FCC's regulatory approach is driven by an 
ideology of what he terms "corporate l iberalism," which is premised on 
the ideas of property, markets, rights, and bureaucracies . . lof< Using the 
largely left-leaning philosophy of the Critical Legal Studies movement, he 
argues that over the years the phrase has come to mean little except when 
used in a functional sense as an ex post justification for regulators to reach 
decisions modeled on the premi es of classical liberal thought.30C) 
Streeter's cynical position reflects the general understanding that the 
public interest ideal remains an elusive palliative-one often used by regu­
lators to justify whatever decision they reach. Indeed, attempts to generate 
a policymakers' definition through interviews with individual FCC offi-
, 10 cials aptly reflect the same.-> 
However the idea o f  public interest extends beyond content regulation 
into areas such as cable television regulation. Starting in the 1 9 70s, the 
FCC i ntroduced several mles and regulations for cable television, many o f  
which were aimed a t  balancing competition between cable companies and 
local television broadcast stations. I nterestingly, the FCC rationalized al­
most all of these regulations as instantiations of the Commission's public 
interest ideal.3 1 1  In relation to cable television, the FCC often invoked the 
public interest to argue that its regulatory measures were directed at ex­
ploring the benefits of emergent and developing technologies for the pub-
307. See James T. Hamilton, Private Interests in "Public Interest ·· fJmgramming: An 
Economic Assessrnent o.f Broadcaster Incentives, 45 DUKE L.J. 1 1 77. 1 1 78 ( 1996) (re­
viewing Chairman Hundt's proposal ) .  
308. See STREETER, supra note 233, at 22. 
309. See Thomas Streeter, Beyond Freedom o.f Speech and the PuNic Interest: The 
Relevance of Critical Legal Studies to Communications Polic.�v. 40 J .  COMM. 43 ( 1990). 
See also ERWIN G. KRASNOW & LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY, THI:: POLITIC'S Of BROADCAST 
REGULATION 192 ( 1978). 
3 I 0. See Dean M. Krugman & Leonard . Reid. The "Public /mere.' I · ·  as Defined by 
FCC Policy Makers, 24 J .  BROAD. 3 1 1  ( 1980). 
3 l l .  ld. at 3 1 2. 
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lic.31 2 Such policies represent a move away from a content-based approach 
to a process-driven one. Studies of the FCC's public interest goal in rela­
tion to cable regulation seem to indicate that i t  merely referenced a loose 
set of procedural ideals: ( i )  balance between different intere ts; ( i i )  diver­
sity of content and ownership; ( i i i)  dynamism of approach across different 
issues; and (iv) localism of content.31 3 At the center of  the FCC's concep­
tion of public interest in relation to cable television thus seemed to be the 
idea of balance-that its decisions needed to reflect the interests of the dif­
ferent p layers i n  the field, even i f  to different degrees.3 1 4  
One o f  the major flaws with the discussions o f  public interest and bal­
ancing in the context of cable television was that one party directly a f­
fected by policy changes was often without effective access to the policy­
making process. This was the consumer.3 15 While every incumbent in the 
process argued that it was acting in the best interests of consumers, con­
sumers' direct inputs were rarely ever considered. Representational issues 
and collective action problems were largely responsible for this absence. 
Nevertheless, consumers' interests remained at least notionally at the fore­
front of pol icymakers' agenda, and their interests were afeguarded in a 
majority of instances through indirect representation. :; 16 What rendered 
this possible was of course the fact that ( i )  con�umer protection was 
viewed as an aspirational ideal, for it aptly captured the idea o f  public in­
terest, and more impot1antly that (i i)  consumers were never likely com­
petitors or the possible targets of a regulatory regime. 
Enter the debate on broadcasters' rights. As noted earlier in Part l l  and 
Section IV.A, these rights are structured as in rem rights and remain tar­
geted at the user. Much like consumers, users are unlikely to be effectively 
represented in the balancing process, but it is diffieulr  for them to organ­
ize.3 1 7 In addition, given that users remain the targets for the new rights, it 
is unlikely that any of the other pat1ies will  give their interests due consid­
eration. Their only hope, then, is for regulators to take their concerns into 
3 1 2. See. e.g. , FED. COMMC'1 S COMM'N, CABLE TELFVISION R E PORT -\ND ORDER 
AND RECONSIDERATION 4-5 ( I  972). 
3 1 3 . Krugman & Reid. supra note 3 1 0, at 3 1 9-20. 
3 1 4. See generally Patricta Aufderheide. Cable Tl?le,·ision and the Puhlic lllleresl. 42 
J. COMM. 52 ( 1992). 
31 5. Krugman & Reid . supra note 3 1 0. at 323 (noting that the ··most likely place for 
general publtc input is to the complaint service of the Cable Bureau··). 
3 1 6. For example, note that the Cable Act of 1 992 was actually termed the ··C.1blc 
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act'·. Set? supra note 2 1 5. 
3 1 7. For an overview of the collective action problem. see Mr\. CUR OLSO"'. Til l: 
LOGIC or COLL ECTIVE At 'TIU : PUBLIC GOOIJS \ I) THE T I I F:ORY OF GROUP"> (2d png. 
1 97 1  ). 
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consideration. However, the recent Broadcast Flag regulations issued by 
the FCC, which failed to adequately addres users' interests, reflect the 
sad reality that this i yet to happen.3 1 8  
The broadcasters' rights debate i s  thus 1 ikely to create an entirely new 
dynamic for the public interest.3 19 Far from creating measures premised on 
a trusteeship ideal of broadcast regulation, incumbents advocate for mea -
ures which directly restrict user 's rights to use broadcast signals, by argu­
ing that those restrictions are in the public's best interest. The rhetoric 
seems to have thus come full circle- starting from a position where the 
public interest supposedly restricted private actions (trusteeship), to one 
where the public interest was considered to be in al ignment with private 
interests ( marketplace approach), to finally one where the public interest 
purpo11edly dictates rules directly limiting the public's use privileges. Se­
mantic and philosophical skepticism apart, this shift is at once easy to 
identify, yet hard to ignore, given the extent to which the notion of public 
interest remains entrenched in the industry's regulatory framework.320 
One might argue that any property-based exclusion is actually in the 
pub! ic interest, in the long term. Arguments along these l ines-that shoi1-
term restrictions involve long-term efficiency gains-certainly are not new 
to intel lectual property, which is premised on the idea that temporally lim­
ited use-restrictions can produce long-term LLSe-gains. The notion of public 
interest, however, has never sought to place short-term detrimental limits 
or restrictions on the public in order to ensure long-term gains. Thus, for 
instance, the FCC has never in the past entertained regulatory measures 
that would allow cable television prices to rise exponentially i n  the short­
tem1 to ensure an eventual long-tetm price equili.brium. A distinction be­
tween short- and long-term public interest goals is both meaningless and 
3 1 8. One or the major problems with the broadcast tlag regulations that public inter­
est groups highlighted was its failure to provide for use-exceptions along the lines of 
copyright's fair use doctrine. See, e.g., Comments of the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
ro the FCC, In the Matter of Digital Broadcast Copy Protection, M.B. Docket o. 02-
230, Dec. 6. 2002, at 1 3 .  See supra note 273 and accompanying text. The idea has since 
taken the fonn of a Bill (H.R. 5252) currently before Congress. See Communications 
Opportunity. Promotion, and Enhancement Act of 1996, H.R.  5252, 1 09th Cong. (2006). 
3 1 9. See generally Krasnow & Goodman, supra note 298, at 630 (noting that the 
emergence of the digital world does not require a radical change i n  the meaning of the 
standard, given that its "genius . . .  is its breadth and flexibility"). 
320. Indeed. some argue that the "public interest" ideal is unconstitutional to begin 
with, given that it is indeterminate and amounts to an abdication of Congressional re­
sponsibility. Randolph J. May, The Public Interest S1andard-ls it Too Broad to be Con­
stitutional?. in COMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION A 'D FCC REFORM: FINISHING THE }013 
1 85 (Jeffrey .'\. Eisenach & Randolph J .  May eels .. 2001 ) .  
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self-defeating within the context of the television industry, particularly 
given ( i )  the rapidity of technological innovation in the telecommunica­
tions industry and ( i i )  the changing socio-cultural preferences of audi­
ences. 
For example, consider the case of devices such as TiVo, which enable 
users to time-shift and space-shift broadcast programming, and to fast­
forward through advertisements. 321 Under a broadcasters' rights regime, 
its manufacture, sale, and use would presumably al l  be i l legal, unless one 
was to wait fifty years before watching recorded programming. This kind 
of time-shifting and space-shifting is  meaningful only because the shifting 
is within relatively short intervals.322 Thus, Ronald, a busy banker, prefers 
to record Monday's episode of Heroes to be viewed later in  the same week 
(or at most a week later), since he's always tied up i n  meetings on Monday 
nights. Sometimes, he views the episode on his computer at work, instead 
of his television set, the following day over lunch. The broadcasters' rights 
regime would now allow him to do al l  of this only for programming that 
aired at least fifty years ago-all in the name of an attempted trade-off. 
The converse is that, in relation to the Heroes episode, the recording and 
transmission would be permitted fifty years from the Monday on which it 
aired-meaning that if someone missed it live, they would have to wait a 
l i fetime to see it again on their television sets in the comfort of  their 
homes. 
It is precisely the in rem and user-targeted nature of broadcasters' 
open-ended rights that results i n  this outcome. And it is probably for this 
reason that debates are typically couched in  intellectual property or copy­
right tetms, given that the copyright law framework readily accepts the 
temporal l imitation trade-off. The public interest at stake in the copyright 
debates at the international level ( i .e.,  at the WIPO) has l ittle relevance to 
the current regulatory framework ( i .e., retransmission consent, compulsory 
licensing, etc . ) .  Policymakers might require more forceful judicial inter­
vention in order to realize that the regime is actually about broadcasting 
32 1 .  for an overview of rhe TiVo and its technological capabilities. see TiVo.com. 
Service features, http://W\vw.tivo.com/1 .6.4.asp (last visited Dec. I 0. 2006). for a de­
tailed overview of the copyright-related issues that the TiVo technology (OVR) raises. 
see Ned Snow, The TiVo Question: Does Skipping Commercials Vio!at£' Copyright Law!. 
56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 27, 35-38 (2005) (noting that unlike with the VCR. over 90% of 
DVR users actually do skip commercials): Matthew W. Bower, lore. Replaying the Be­
tamax Case for the New Digrtal VCRs: lnTroducing Ti l'o ro Fair Use. 20 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L.J. 4 1 7  (2002). 
322. Time-shifting and space-shifting as legitimate forms of content ··fair use·· are 
normally traced back to the Supreme Court's holding in the Beramax case. See Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios. Inc .. 464 U.S. 4 1 7  ( 1 984 ). 
1372 B ERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOU Rl'JAL [Vol. 22: 1303 
and cahlecasting. arenas where the public interest ideal ( i n  whatever form) 
remains inescapable. The central question then is to what degree the public 
interest wi l l  be spli t into its short- and long-tenn variants. 
V. A BALANCED llVIPLElVlENTATTON PROPOSAL: 
STAGG E R E D  EXCLUSION 
The new regime of broadcasters' rights is without a coherent justifica­
tion, ignores much of what exists as regulatory mechanisms in the televi­
sion industry, and is likely to have serious detrimental consequences for 
both emergent technologies and the dynamic to which they seem to be giv­
ing rise. Broadcasters' and cablecasters' primary motivation for the new 
regime derives from the emergence o f  the internet as a decentralized dis­
tribution mechanism, and with it  digital technologies of copying and 
transmission.323 Claims of signal piracy are in reality claims that broad­
casters' de facto exclusivity over distribution is now being eroded. 
But m ight there be a rationale for introducing a regulatory framework 
thar at once both alleviates some o f  the concerns of broadcasters and at the 
same time is fully cognizant of the pitfalls of straying too far i n  the direc­
tion o f  propetty protection? This Part argues that there might indeed be, 
drawing from the discussion of attenuated rights in the cur ent regime, and 
outlines the structure such a solution might take. 
A. U n fair Competition as a Regulatory Basis 
A regime premised on the ideal of unfair competition- aimed at re­
creat ing a level playing field between competitors-might represent a 
suitable alternative. Historically, the principle of  W1fair competition has 
been associated with the doctrine o f  misappropriation and notions o f  "free­
riding."324 However, the basis o f  the unfair competition regime proposed 
here derives not from these notions, which are proprietary, or at best 
quasi-proprietary, but rather from the ideal o f  unjust enrichment- that an 
individual benefiting from a system in which others bear costs for analo­
gous benefits ought to also bear some of the costs. 
323. See supra Section I I .D. 
324. See Rudolf Callmann, He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown: Unjust Enrich­
ment in the Law of U1�{air Competition, 55 HARV. L. REv. 595, 6 1 2  ( 1942) (''[O]ne who 
has used his intellectual, physical, or financial powers to create a commercial product 
should be afforded judicial relief from a competitor who seeks to ' reap what he has not 
sown . ... ): Miguel Deutch, Unjctir Competition and the ''Misappropriation Docmne "-A 
l?em:m!d Analysis, 48 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 503. 545 (2004) (arguing that misappropriation 
doctrine must balance the "free-rider" problem with economic efficiency). 
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The tmfair competition in the context of broadcasters does not derive 
from any value broadcasters add to the broadcast. Even i f  broadcasters add 
some value, determining the amount added by distribution, which would 
be necessary in order to limit the extent to which they can internalize the 
benefits that others pay for, is near impossible. A claim based on value 
added would track the unfair competition ideal in its misappropriation 
sense. The ideal of unfair  competition that works best here is instead one 
that i s  uncoupled from misappropriation and tied to a notion o f  unjust en­
richment. Specifically, one party must compensate another onZv because 
others are required by law to do so, and permitting the first party to avoid 
this result would enable it to compete on unfair terms with those others.325 
Under the current system, broadcasters remunerate content producers 
for use o f  their creative works in broadcast programs.326 Analogously, ca­
ble companies also compensate content producers when they use broad­
casters' programming. Indeed, the very basis of the current retransmission 
consent regime, which requires cable companies to compensate broadcast­
ers for use of their signals. is premised on a restitution.ary ideal.327 The 
basic idea is that since the regulatory framework requires current distribu­
tors to compensate the creator, a new distributor who seeks to use the 
same creative work ought to be subject to the same regulatory framework. 
Broadcasters, cable companies, and reh·ansmitters all compensate authors 
for their work because to do otherwise would be unjust not in a property 
rights sense ( i .e.,  because incumbents own their broadcasts), but in an eq­
uitable sense ( i .e.,  in the interests of fairness and to create a level playing 
field between competitors). 328 
325. Unjust enrichment, as a general principle, is based on the idea that where one 
person derives a benefit from the act tons of another, he is mandated by the principles of 
equity and natural justice to pan with his benefit or at least a patt thereof. See Peter Birks, 
Unjust Enrichment and Wrong/it! Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1 769 (2001 ). Scholars 
often wlk about the idea of '·restirution for unjust enrichment," which is of direct applica­
tion here. In the ca. e of restitution for a wrong. restitution derives from a primary wrong. 
independently actionable under tori. contract. or property law. Restitution for unjust en­
richmem. however. is a principle of equity, for an action that is otherwise perfectly le­
gitimate (or damnum sine iniuria) at bw. l n  other words, the restitution concept used here 
derives from the unfaimess or tnequity 1nherent in the parry·s gain. 
326. As an element of traditional copyright law, given that broadcasting has always 
been considered a ··public perfom1ance. ·· 
"'27. See general�\ Allard. supru note 2 1 5. 
32B. Indeed. the unjust enrichment argument formed the basis of some of the broad­
casters· early claims for property nghts during the emergence of cable tclcv1sion. How­
ever. i1 is surprising that during discussions for the new regime at W L PO·s SCCR, unjust 
enrichmem arguments were never raised. For an out of contcxr application of the unjust 
enrichment arg.ument 10 pri vale copying.. see Bumcrt. supra note I 07, at 40. 
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Webcast of over-the-air or over-the-wire programming eek to make 
use of the same creative works for which broadcasters and cable compa­
nies must pay. l f, like broadcaster , webcasters do so for a commercial 
motive, the principles of equity seem to require that they be subjected to 
similar regulato1y restrictions. However, this argument is valid only i f  the 
online webcaster, or other party making use of current incumbents' pro­
gramming, does so for commercial purposes. 319 This concept alone re­
mains absolutely central to the notion of unfair competition. The entitle­
ment is not in rem in an absolute sense of the term but in rem only against 
a specified class ( i .e.,  competitors in the distribution market, however de­
fined). 
Regulatory proposals restricted Lo competitors certainly are not novel, 
nor restricted to the judicial context. In 1 999, Congress considered intro­
ducing legislation aimed at protecting electronic databases from copying 
by competitors .330 The legislation was aimed at disallowing compilers of 
databases from avoiding the burdensome process of compiling their data­
bases independently, by relying on the efforts of others.33 1 lt thus sought to 
subject new compilers to a similar detriment or a monetary equivalent. 
However, it differed from the proposal here, because it remained premised 
on copying or misappropriation by vesting the entitlement in the original 
compiler. An unjust enrichment rationale, on the other hand, would have 
vested the entitlement in some other party, such as the owner of the under­
lying content. Nevet1heless, the legislation is aptly i l lustrative of a system 
limited to competitors. 
Limiting the regime in similar manner, to new commercial distribution 
intermediaries-entities seeking to derive their profits through the distri­
bution of content online-serves several purposes. It leaves intact the user 
dynamic of the internet and in a majority of instances would not interfere 
with the activities of individuals engaged in non-commercial activities, 
even if they involved the copying of current broadcast programming. 
329. Copyright law already employs the commercial/non-commercial distinction as 
part of its standard fair use analysis. See 1 7  U.S.C. § I 07 (2000 & Supp. l V 2004) (re­
qutring cour1s to consider "the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nanrre or is for nonprofit educational purposes"). The distinction 
has been applied fairly straightforwardly here and there seems little reason to believe this 
might present problems elsewhere. 
330. Consumer and Investor Access to lnfonnation Act of 1999, H.R. 1 858, I 06th 
Con g. § I 02 ( 1 999); see also H. R. REP. lo. I 06-350, pt. 1 ( 1999) ("Congress must en­
sure that database publishers have sufficient protection against unfair competition."). 
3 3 1 .  For a comprehensive analysis of the Bill, see Yochai Benkler. Consritulional 
Bounds of Database Protection: The Role o(Judicial Review in the Creation and De.fmi­
tion o_(Pril'ate Rights in ll1forma1ion. 1 5  BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535 (2000). 
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Thus. individual accessing and copying programming for their own non­
commercial purposes, public or private. would not be subject to this regu­
latory framework. Furthermore. mere u e • .  commercial or not, that are not 
accompanied by acts of commercial distribution would remain outside the 
reach of this regime, since the framework extends only to competing 
commercial distributors. (Copyright law might, of course, provide content 
producers with an independent remedy against such uses.) Lastly, if the 
regime employed a statutory licensing mechanism, it would also exclude 
from it scope developers of new technologies directed at non-commercial 
end users, l ike TiVo, since such developer , even if commercial, would 
not be competing in the distribution segment of the market. 
Unfair competition thus offers regulators a rich body of work from 
which to tructure a regime that merely ecks to ensure the creation of a 
level playing field between entities u ing the same content for their prof­
it . H:! uch a regime will  o f  course entail ignificant administrative and 
other related transaction costs. 333 However, minimizing these costs by 
adopting an open-ended, decentralized enforcement regime of property 
right would give rise to a plethora of other costs, as noted previou ly.
334 
Thi framework enables regulator to avoid most of tho e pitfalls. 
B. Optimizing the Regulatory StructUJ·e: Taking the Past 
eriously 
How might a regulatory regime for the reuse of broadcasts (and cable­
ca ts)  be ·tructured? In specific. who should compensation, if any. go to 
and how might this work? The regulatory battle between broadca t and 
cable television that eventually ended about a decade ago and re ulted in 
the current regime is instructive.33:; The very same arguments for property 
rights were made by broadcaster in that context. Yet both the FCC and 
Congrc rejected the e argument . and instead adopted a taggered regu­
latory regime of exclusion. The result \.vas the emergence of a burgeoning 
.132.  L.nfmr competition and unJUSI ennchmenl ha' c been 1 ied toge1hcr m 1he past. 
hu1 m different contexts and. more imponaml). as common law ( 1.e .. judicial) solution�. 
s·ee A'\\H.\1 K'\\IPER�IAN A'\DER<;. Ur-...r-\IR CO\tPCTITIO'\ LA\\ : T111 PRCHI-r l iO'\t or 
1'\ rL I Lrt n ·\I '\l'\1) l'IDL•STRIAL CRE·\ 1 1\"1 n 1 34 ( 1997) (argutng for the creation of a 
ne'' doctrine of ·'mnltgn competition··). Bill we Cald\\ ell. supra note I I . at I I  I I  ( noting 
that h�· has "no fallh 111 the lHlJUSt enrichment theory"). 
33.1. Many of which might. of course. be rnimmizcd through a ystcm or collectin� 
l tccrhtng a-.. J!-t currently tn play. S£>e ranley M. Bescn ct al.. 'Ill l::conollli< lnolnis t?f 
Cof>\ ng./11 Colleclil'<''. 78 V \. L . .  RF\ . 3 1< 3  ( l <,)92 ). 
J."-1. See wpra Pan IV.  
) 1."  .\"('<' f.!.\'llaalh Lt Dt 'C s11pra note I 42. 
1376 BERKELEY TECHN OLOGY LAW JOL! RNAL r ol. 22:1303 
cable industry that has a l l  but replaced broadcast television as v 1ewer 
primary source o f  programming. 
The history outlined in. Part u r  reveals a gradual pattern in the devel­
opment of broadcasters' current exclusionary rights. When cable televi­
sion first emerged, broadcasters paid little heed to it. l t  was viewed as a 
mechanism to enhance broadcast viewership, and the retransmi sion o f  
broadcast signals was a l lowed without any re trictions. I t  was only a few 
years later, when broadcasters began to realize that cable companies were 
competing with them and actually affecting their revenue model, that they 
began lobbying regulators for controls on cable. Their principal argument 
remained that while they were forced to contract with content producers 
for work, cable companies were able to short-circuit this requirement alto­
gether. Both the courts and the FCC stayed away at first until Congress 
intervened with its copyright law revisions in 1 976.336 Congres made ca­
ble transmissions a form of public perfotmance and introduced compul­
sory statutory licensing for econdary transmissions of broadca t signals 
carrying copyrighted content. '37 Additionally, it  granted broadcasters 
standing to sue competing cable companies within their local jurisdiction. 
The new statute and the FCC's interstitial regulations allowed cable to 
flourish and compete with broadcasting on a level playing field. It was not 
until 1 992, by which time cable revenues were substantial enough to com­
pete with broadcasters' advertising revenues, that Congress introduced the 
system of retransmission consent, which granted broadcasters exclusion­
ary rights over their content-carrying signals, but only against cable com-
. k. . I 138 parues see mg to retransmit t 1em: 
Of course, it was not owing to any lack of analytical foresight that 
policymakers consciously chose not to introduce property protection early 
on. The idea of "retransmission consent" was proposed in 1 968 for the 
fi rst time and rejected because of the nature of the industry.339 Regulators 
336. See supra Section 1 1 1 .8.2. 
337.  !d. 
338. For a historical overview of this, see LE Due, supm note 142, at 86. See also 
ROBERT W .  CRANDALL & HAROLD W. FURCHTGOTT ROTH, CABLE TV: REGU LATION OF 
COMPETITIO ( 1996); LELAND l. JOH SON, TOWARD COMPETITION IN CABLE TELEVI­
SION ( 1 994). Jn addition, Congress also introduced a set of sh011-term liability rules to 
supplement these rights in 1 992. The rules were to be reviewed periodically and extended 
1 f necessary. and were meant to operate in lieu of full-blown property regimes. See Lem­
ley & Weiser, supra note 292. at 821 (analyzing these "program access rules·· as modifi­
cations of traditional liability rules). 
339. fn re Amendment of Pan 7-t Subpart K. of the Comm'n's Rules & Regulations 
Relative to Cmty. Antenna Television Sys.; Notice of Proposed Rulcmaking & otice o f  
Inquiry. 1 5  F.C.C.2d 4 1 7  � 38 ( 1 968}.  See Veraldi, supra note 225. at 480 ( ''Such consent 
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recognized that property rights could re ult in holdout , which would tn 
tum impede access to programming and the media. 
Figure 2: Exclusionary Protection in the Broadca t-Cable Tussle 
Pha c 1 No regulation of cable television: FCC and couns decline jurisdiction 
Pha c 2 Congressional intervention: 
able transmissions rendered perfonnancel-J 
Broadcasters gTanted limited beneficial ovmcr hip 
Compulsory licensing introduced for retransmissions 
FCC issues exclusivity regulations to supplement these 
Phase 3 FCC regulations relaxed considerably to promote cable 
Phase 4 Retransmission consent introduced 
One Je �on to be learned from this phased approach to exclusionary 
protection is that although full-blown, exclu ionary protection early on 
would have minimized administrative costs as ociated with the regime and 
decentralized enforcement to individual broadca ter . doing o would have 
killed the development of cable television a a \·iable alternative. ]t i 
likely that e\·en the limited retransmission consent \'ariant of exclusionary 
protection would have unduly stifled cable had it been introduced too 
early, which i one reason why its introduction wa put off.3-l0 Jt was not 
until cable grew to a level where i t  wa recognized a capable of comper­
ing with broadcast independently that full blown retransmis ion consent 
( i .e., exclu ionary protection) was introduced. 
A similar staggered approach has much to offer in the context of 
broadcasters' current concern that online transmissions of their signals is 
in some sense unfair. The past several decade. of it functioning do pro­
vide a workable ba i on which to structure a new regime aimed at regu­
lating an altogether new medium of distribution. 
C. A t aggc•·ed Approach to Regulating Online Retransmissions 
Thi section outlines a taggered approach to regulating \Vebca ting 
ba ed on three central principle . First. that the ba i of the regime be nei­
ther proprietary nor wrong-ba ed. but rather ba ed purel) on unfair com­
petition and the belief that equity require a level playing field. econd. 
given the centrality of unfair competition. that it be re tricted exclusive!) 
to commercial \\ebcasting. and thu thar indiYidual u cr would remain 
requ m.'ment� rrobabl) \VOuld h<n e prevented any competition at all from cable -;ys­
tems.'·). 
340 . . ')<"<' VL'ra ldi . '"fWu note 22:\ at 4XO. 
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exempt from the regime altogether. Third, that it forecloses courts from 
inventing causes of action to supplement the regime since such interven­
tion would likely upset the balance of interests. 
The webcasting industry is today at a nascent stage in its development 
and only recently has begun to emerge as a viable alternative to traditional 
over-the-a ir and over-the-wire transmissions.341 However, its success as a 
business model is I ikely to depend on several factors. The most i mportant 
factor is, o f  course, determining the exact revenue model that these struc­
tures are likely to adopt: advertising-based, subscription-based, or a hybrid 
of the two. 
342 A l l  the same, the internet as a distribution and communica­
tion medium has been around for close to two decades now, and digital 
copyright liabil ity for copying and distribution are fairly well settled. 
Thus, the webcasting regulatory regime must take as a given that it is an 




1. Phase l: Statutory Content Licensing/or Retransmissions 
Because broadcasters, cable companies, re-broadcasters, and cable re­
transmitters a l l  have to pay to use authors' creative content, commercial 
webcasters ought to do so as well.  This requirement can be achieved in 
one of two ways. The first mechanism is through voluntary licensing, 
which would require webcasters to negotiate with copyright owners for 
licenses to usc their works in online transmissions. The problem with this 
solution is  that content producers today depend on incumbent intermediary 
distributors for royalties, and most of the works they create are produced 
either under a work-for-hire clause or have had their copyright transferred 
to the intermediary as a precondition to distribution.344 Under these condi-
34 1 .  See generally JESSICA KEYES, WEBCASTING: How TO BROADCAST TO YOUR 
CUSTOMERS OVER THE ET ( 1997); PEGGY MILES, l TERNET WORLD GUIDE TO WEB­
CASTING (Robert M. Elliott ed., J 998). See also Matthew J. Astle, Will Congress Kill clze 
Podcascing Swr?, 1 9  HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 6 1  (2005); Susan A. Russel, The Struggle 
Over Webcasting- Where is the Stream Can)1ing Us?, I OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 1 3  (2004). 
342. For an analysis of a few potential business models, see Sylvia M. Chan-Olmsted 
& Louisa S. Ha, Internet Business Models for Broadcasters: How Television Stations 
Perceive and Integrate 1he Internet, 47 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 597 (2003); and Ashok 
Ranchhod & Oilin Gurau, lmemet-Enabled Distribution Strategies, 14  J. INFO. TECH. 
333 ( 1 999) (studying different models in existence). See also INTERNET TELEVISION (Eli 
Noam et al. eds., 2004) (analyzing the different regulatory and business models that are 
likely to evolve in the context of internet television). 
343. For an overview of some of the issues in relatjon to this area, see JESSICA LIT­
:v!AN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (200 I ). See also Pamela Samuelson, Toward a "New Dear 
for Copyright in rhe li![hrmation Age, 100 MICH . L. REV. 1488 (2002). 
344. Wu, Sllflra note 157, at 339-40. 
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tions, a voluntary licensing mle would require webcasters to negotiate ei­
ther with powerless content producers or with powerful content distribu­
tors with whom they seek to compete directly. ln the latter situation, hold­
outs are very likely. 
A compulsory licensing mechanism, on the other hand, would largely 
avoid the holdout problem and have the added advantage of al lowing the 
benefits to accme back to content producers-the sole contributors of  
creativity t o  the entire process-who today Jack independent negotiating 
power. In addition, it would also allow the system to take advantage of 
collective licensing schemes that currently exist for content, thereby 
minimizing the transaction costs associated with individualized l i cens­
ing.345 Of course, licensing here is not for works directly from the content 
producer, but rather for works originating from the producers but obtained 
from the capture of  broadcasters' or cablecasters' signals. In other words, 
it is restricted to retransmissions and does not include primary transmis­
sions, for which a regime already exists under traditional copyright law. 
The compulsory licensing scheme would thus require commercial 
webcasters to pay a statutorily determined royalty fee for content con­
tained in the broadcast signals they seek to use in their webcasts. 1 f web­
casters fai l  to make royalty payments, they would open themselves up to 
full copyright liability from content producers and their transferees. Sec­
tions 1 1 1  and 1 1 4 of Title 1 7  might provide policymakers with additional 
lessons, since they already contain similarly structured provision. -- one 
for cable retransmissions and the other for webcasts of musical works.-'-1<> 
l n  this structure, commercial webcasters would be able to get access to 
creative content via the primary inte1mediaries-broadcasters and cable 
companies-but would have to remunerate the producers rather than the 
distributors of the content. This structure is analogous to the regime in 
Section 1 1 1  because its emphasis is on creating a level playing field. The 
effect of the statutory license here is thus that it enables webcasters to ac­
cess content contained in traditional broadcasting without having to nego­
tiate with either the producer or the distributor. A license under this re­
gime would exempt a webcaster from a l l  l iability to both the broadcaster 
(should any exist) and the content producer (under traditional copyright ) .  
However, since only commercial webcasters can use this regime, non­
commercial uses might still be subject to liability under traditional copy-
345. Such as those organized by the ASCAP and BMI.  For an overview of copyright 
collectives and their functioning. see ABRAHAM 1-!0LLA.NDER, MARKET STRUCTURE AND 
PF.RFORMA "CF. IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE CASE or COPYRIGHT COLLF.CTI\ l:S 
( 1 983). 
346. See 1 7  U.SC. � I l l  (d) (2 )  (2000 & Supp. I V  2004). 
1380 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOUR AL [Vol. 22:1303 
right. This Article leaves unanswered the broader question of whether the 
rules of online infringement need to be re-appraised.347 
In 1 997, the Copyright O ffice considered compulsory licensing for 
online retransmissions and concluded that compulsory licensing was best 
introduced C{/ier market experimentation.348 Although the cable industry's 
compulsory licensing scheme did come into play c�fter the industry had 
developed tor over a decade, the industry in that case was not subject to 
copyright l iability to producers or broadcasters. I n  the present scenario, 
this immunity does not exist, and consequently the market is not free to 
begin with.349 Fwihermore, were the compulsory license mechanism in­
troduced with a legislatively determined time l imitation in mind, the reali­
zation of a truly free and equitable market might be significantly more vi­
able.350 The objective should be to bring commercial webcasting on par 
with broadcast and cable television for it to compete, not to d i lute the 
rights of content producers. 
Enabling webcasters to retransmit creative works carried by broadcast­
ers and cable companies should allow webcasting to develop as an inde-
347. A recent development in this regard that pits the cable industry against webcast­
ing is the case brought by Viacom against YouTube for direcr and indirect copyright in­
fringement. Much of the balance betw�en commercial webcasting and the cutTent incum­
bents ( i .e., broadcasters and cable networks) is likely to be detennined by the outcome of 
this case. See Vlacom lnt'l lnc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 1 :07CV02 103 (S.D . .  Y.  filed Mar. 
13, 2007). For commentary on the case and its potential impact, see Lawrence Lessig, 
A'lake Wayfor Copyrighl Chaos, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 18, 2007, sec. 4, at 12.  
348. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, A REVIEW OF THE COPYRIGHT LICENSING REGIMES 
COVERING Rt:::TRA SMISSION OF BROADCAST SIG ALS 97-99 ( 1 997) (concluding that a 
license along these lines was likely to interfere with content owners' access to the inter­
net"s capabilities). For past suggestions in this vein .. see Baoding Hsieh Fan, When Chan­
nel .)'wfers Flip 10 the Web: Copyrighl Liability for Interne/ Broadcasting, 52 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 6 1 9  (2000) (recommending a compulsory licensing regime for online web­
casting); Michael Wirth & Larry Collene, Should Congress Establish a Compulso1:v Li­
cense .for Internet Video Providers to Retransmit Over-/he-Air TV Station Programming 
1·ia the fnrernet?, in COMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN TRANSITION: THE I TERNET AND BE­
YOND 397 ( Benjamin M.  Compaine & Shane Greenstein eds., 200 I ) ;  Barbara S. Cohen, 
'ote, A Proposed Regime for Copyrighr Protection on the Internet, 22 BROOKLYN J .  
l. T'L L. 40 I ( I  996). But see fred H.  Cate, Cable Television and the Compuls01:1' Copy­
nght License, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 19 1  ( l990). 
349. Many of these arguments were made during a congressional committee hearing 
on rhe subject in 2000. See Copyrighred Wehcast Programming on the Internet: Hearing 
Bejore !he Subcomm. on Courts and fncellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judici­
w:l·. I 06th Con g. (2000) [hereinafter Webcast Hearings]. 
350. See Picker, supra note 26 1 ,  at 462-63 ("The modem stmcture of racil itating dis­
tributional entry by validating or conferring rights in copyright holders yet coupling those 
rights with statutory licenses has the virtue of mitigating the exercise of monopoly power 
and minimizing the transaction costs of negotiations."). 
2008J THE SOCIAL COSTS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 1381 
pendent distribution service. At the ame time, it po es no threat to content 
producers who either seek to enter the wcbcasting world (e.g., YouTube) 
themselve or create content specifically for digital transmission. By creat­
ing a market for webcasting. the proposed Phase J regulations would in­
duce producers to develop content specifically for internet audiences.35 1  
Phase I is  meant to track the  boom that cable television experienced in  
its first two to three decades of existence. With the issue of copyright l i ­
ability re. olved by the 1 976 Act, content producers began to  develop con­
tent exclusively for cable television. Both cable networks and an entirely 
new segment of the television market soon emerged, all because of the 
realization that cable television was a viable alternative to broadcast tele­
vision, and one for which independent content could be produced with an 
expectation of returns. 352 
2. Phase 11: StatutOJy Retransmission Consent 
Once commercial webca ting reaches a stage where it is capable of 
competing with traditional broadcast and cable media, Ph a e I I should be 
put into place. Phase II involves a licen ing mechanism analogous to re­
tran mis. ion con ent. but with liability rule protection in tead of proper1 ... 
rule protection. Phase I 1  is structurally similar to Phase I, as a statutory 
mechani m that enforces broadcasters' and cableca ter · consent for re­
transmission through a "compulsory authorization" rule that would operate 
as a tatutory licensing scheme to fix the payment webcasters need to 
make to obtain rctransmi ion authorization from broadca ter . 
A mechanism such as this serves more than one purpose. First_ by re­
quiring wcbcasters to pay broadcasters and cable companies for retran -
missions and copyright owners for their works, it forces webcasting as an 
jndu try (which ought to have developed substantially by the time the 
Phase l J  regime i introduced) to move toward creating an independent 
market for webca ring content. By penali:::ing webcaster who seek to re-
35 1 .  , ome argue thm th1 IS already occUlTing. See Jeff I lowe. \'lllsi-Siream TI ·. 
WIRI L>. Feb. 2007. at 54 (noung ho\\' intemct tl'Je, ision . hO\\S arc ancmpung to break 
into the world of tcle' 1s1on ). 
352. Once tim. happens for the internet. and content producers begm to contract l llde­
pendentl) " tth commercial ''ebca ·ten;, the reg1me in Pha5e I m1gh1 be pha�ed out. 1-lu\\ ­
ever. the dismantling ought ro reflect rhe extent to wh1ch '' cbcast ing has de' eloped ,·is-a­
VIS brouJca:-t111g and cablecasting in the market li.)r independent onginal programming. 
Thus. 1f all or a substantial pan of webcasters· contenl is onginal programming. it would 
be an llldlcalwn that the ume IS npe for the dismantl111g. Another �11tcrnative is to phase 
Olll the Cl)lll\:llt 11Ci.!I1SC O\'er a period of time. lronicall), in Spite of cabk 1ekvis1011 ha\ ing. 
become a dom1nant force in the television mdustry. the <;talutory ltcen:'ing reg1mc re­
mams 1n place lor no apparent reason. 
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main dependent on traditional broadcasters and cablecastcrs, it creates in­
centives for them to contribute in the development of an independent con­
tent market. Al l  the same. since new entrants into webcasting are unlikely 
to have content made specifically for them, i t  a l lows them to develop 
through a statutory I icensing regime in the absence of potential holdouts, 
which a property model would ordinarily entail.  
l t  is likely that the period between Phase 1 and Phase ll wi l l  be quite 
significant, given that in the context of cable television it took nearly ix­
teen years.353 However, cable regulations moved directly from statutory 
content licensing (the same as in Phase l )  to a full property rights regime 
o f  retransmission consent. The proposal here is not quite the same. A re­
transmission consent regime would allow broadcasters to determine the 
prices they charge for retransmission and additionally enable them tO re­
strict access to their content-carrying signals in the event that negotiations 
with cable operators faii .35..J In the decade and a half since its adoption, 
conflicting reports exist on the effects of the retransmission consent provi­
sions, with broadcasters continuing to assert that all is welL wh ile cable 
operators argue that they arc being forced to pay extottionate retransmis­
sion fees. 355 The rule proposed here operates midway between full  re­
transmission consent and no liability and alleviates both holdout and pric­
ing problems on the one hand, and inequality concerns on the other. 
The retransmission authorization regime of Phase I I  comes c losest to 
ful l -blown propetty protection, but would sti l l  operate again t a limited set 
of actors and never in rem. One might argue that recognizing broadcasters' 
entitlements in term o f  a property right, even in this limited sense, moves 
353. Statutory coment licensing was introduced in the cable industry in 1 976, whik 
ful l  retransmission consent was introduced only in 1992. 
354. ln 2005, the FCC reviewed the functioning of the retransmission consent regime 
and concluded that it had worked without any problems, therefore requiring little to no 
alteration to the basic mechanism. See FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, RETRANSMISSION CON­
SENT AND EXCLUSIVITY RULES: REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUA1 .T TO SECTION 208 OF 
THE SATELLITE HOME VIEWER EXTENSION A D REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2004, at 4 1  
(2005 ) ,  available at http://hraunfoss. fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachrnatch/DOC-260936A \ .  
pdf. 
355. Compare National Association of Broadcasters, Retransmission Consent, http:// 
www.nab.org/AM!Template.cfm?Section=Resources&TEM PLATE=/CM/ContentDispla 
y.cfm&CONTENTID=7147 (last visited Nov. 27, 2006) ("Retransmission negotiations 
are fai r  and market driven when exercised.") with Am. Cable Ass'n, Report fdent({les 
Economic Harm Caused by Media Consolidation and Retransmission Consent Ahuse 
Reinforces ACA ·s Col/for RegulatOI)' Re.foriJI (2006) (on file with author): see also Rich­
ard A. Gershon & Bradley M. Egen, Re1ransmission Consenl. Cable Franchising. and 
Markel Failure: A Case Sllld_r Anulysis of Wood-TV 8 Versus Cahle1•ision of J'vlichigan. 
1 2  J. MEDIA ECO . 20 I ( 1999). 
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the justification away from unfair competition/unju t enrichment towards 
a property-based one. The use of a liability rule ( tatutorily mandated au­
thorization) in tead of a property rule (voluntary authorization) ensures 
that this is not the case.356 The justification for compensating broadcasters 
and cablecaster under this rule is not because their property has in  any 
sense been used or their faci l i t ies have been transgre sed upon, but rather 
for instrumental purposes closely related to the development of commer­
cial webcasting a an independent channel of distribution. 
Additionally, the unfair competition argument derives from the current 
regulatory framework, which already requires an incumbent with an inde­
pendent source of content ( i .e., cable companies) to negotiate with a 
broadcaster for the use of the latter's content. To fai l  to require the same 
of commercial webcasting would in a sense be unfair to cable companies 
that today require broadcasters' consent for retransmi sion as a matter of 
law.357 The u1�jus1 element of the rationale therefore operates both vis-a­
vis broadcasters and cablecasters, both of whom are regulated and con-
trained by the cun·ent regime. The use of a liability rule instead of a prop­
erty rule, however, ensures an optimal and equitable elution that does not 
impede the overall Dow of in formation and contenL 
D. Summation 
The proposal described above is a conceptual overview of the direction 
a new regime aimed at developing webcasting as a viable distribution me­
dium might take i f  it seeks to preserve the other beneficial characteristics 
of the internet . Phase 1 1  will certainly require fine-tuning and possibly 
regulatory intervention by the FCC, as it did for cable television,35
8 
assum­
ing of course that the FCC decides to assume jurisdiction over web-based 
retransmission.359 In addition, the statutory licensing and consent models 
356. For debates on whether protecting a right through a property rule in the 
Calabrcsi-Melamed fonnulation renders the framework .. propcny"· or not. see 1 Jenry E. 
mJlh, Proper{} und Propen.1· Rules. 79 N.Y.U. L. RJ:.\ . 1 7 1  Y (2004 ): Richard A. Epstein. 
A Clear View of llw C01hedrul: The Dominance of Properly Rule.�. I 06 YAL[ L.J. 2091 
( 1 997). 
357. The corollary �� that if Congress were to relax the retransmiSSion consent rules 
the ··Jc,·el playmg field .. rmionale for webca ter would as a consequence di appear. 
35 . ec Webco.\t Hearmg.\. supra note 349. at gs-89. I n  panicular, the Chatrman of 
the International \\"ebca ting Assoctation ( IWA) offered to work wtth regulators to intro­
duce stmilar e:<clusi' tty-based restnctions (along the lines of the :,yndicated exclusivity 
rules). should the compulsory licensing scheme come to be adopted. 
359. The FCC� jurisdictton over 1ntemct-related activity is an issue that itself has 
generated a livcl;. debate. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 seemingly lorbids the 
FCC from entcnng the domain of internet regulation. See 47 U . .'.C. � 230(11)(2) (2000 & 
Supp. I V  2004) (statmg that 11 i:-. the policy of the United State!-. to .. tO preserve the vibrant 
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that currently exist wi l l  of course have to be altered to accommodate the 
specifics o f  the internet world.360 The exact time frame for the implemen­
tation of each phase will largely depend on the future direction of technol­
ogy and the way in which the market develops. 
More importantly, though, if the United States signs the W I PO Broad­
cast Treaty in its current format, it is unlikely that the above proposal will 
satisfy the mandate of the new treaty, which requires ful l -blown exclu­
sionary protection intended to operate in rem. much like traditional copy­
right.361  
and competitive free market that presently exists for the l.nternet and other intcracti ve 
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation''): Jason Oxman, The FCC 
and the Unregulation of the lmernet (FCC Office of Plans & Pol'y Working Paper Sct·ies 
No. 3 1 ,  1 999), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/ 
oppwp3 1 .pdf; Kevin Werbach, Digital Tornado: The !nternet and Telecommunications 
Policy (FCC Office of Plans & Pol'y Working Paper Series No. 29, 1997), available at 
http://www. fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/ working_papers/oppwp29.pdf. More recent commen­
tators argue for the FCC to step in on a case-by-case or limited basis. See James B .  Speta, 
FCC Authoriry to Regulate the !nternet: Creating it and Limiung it, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
15 (2003) (arguing for the introduction of Congressionally delegated authority to the FCC 
to regulate the intemet); Philip J .  Weiser, Toward a Next Generation RegulatOJ)' Strat­
egy, 35 LOY. U .  CHI. L.J. 4 1  (2003) (arguing that the FCC can regulate the intemet using 
its ancil lary jurisdiction). Some also argue that even if the FCC was found to be without 
jurisdiction in relation to the broadcast flag debate, it nevertheless remains the most com­
petent body to regulate the area, given its expertise in the television industry. See Van 
Houweling, supra note 274. at 1 14. 
360. One sees the creation of a similar regime in the context of satellite television. 
With the emergence of satellite television in the mid-1 980s, Congress stepped in to regu­
late its use of broadcasters' signals, when the satellite television industry moved from 
being one that merely provided service to areas not covered by broadcast and cable to one 
that began to compete with them. Congress' first move was the introduction of a compul­
sory licensing mechanism. The Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 
tit. 2, 102 Stat. 3935, 3949 (codified at 1 7  U.S.C. § 1 19 (2000 & Supp. LV 2004)). In 
1 999 Congress amended i ts  regulation of satellite television again, with the realization 
that the segment had grown commercially, to now subject it to the retransmission consent 
rule, but with numerous exceptions. The Satellite Home Viewer [mprovement Act of 
1999, Pub. L. o 106-1 13.  app. !, tit. 1 ,  1 1 3 Stat. 1 50 1 ,  I SO I A-523 (codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 325(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)). An interesting question is of course whether web­
casting qualifies as a ''multichannel video programming distributor." as defined under the 
section. If this were indeed the case, much of the present debate would be rendered moot. 
For a recent interpretation or some of these provisions and their purpose, see CBS Broad., 
Inc. v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 265 F.3d 1 1 93 ( l ith Cir. 200 1 )  (concluding that the 
SHVA does not violate a carrier's First Amendment rights). 
3 6 1 .  In an elaborate study examining the compatibility of the § I I  I statutory licens­
ing standard with the United States' obligations under intemational copyright law, David 
Brennan concludes that the compulsory licensing regime would indeed be in violation of 
both the Berne Convention and the TRIPs Agreement. both of which recognize content 
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The current U.S. regime with its exclusionary rights for broadcasters 
emerged in spite of the U.S. not being a party to the Rome Convention. 
That the United States participated in the Convention' drafting and yet 
chose not to sign it  hints that the U.S. might trategical ly  favor implement­
ing exclu ionary privileges without being mandated to do so by an interna­
tional treaty, especially given that the current regulatory regime arose 
from the unique characteristics of television broadcasting in the United 
States.362 
V l .  CONCLUSION 
ln his  now classic study of the reasons why individuals seek to create 
or modify property rights regimes over resources, Gary Libecap argued 
that the primary motivations were often ( i )  shifts in relative prices: ( i i )  
changes i n  technology; o r  ( i i i )  shift in parties' political influence.363 In 
some form. all three reason seem to have motivated incumbents' most 
recent claim lor open-ended property right over their transmi sion sig­
nals. The emergence of the internet a a low-cost medium o f  di tribution, 
the ea e with which broadcasters and cablecaster can now reach audi­
ences aero the globe with few regulatory problems, and the ri ing eco­
nomic power of the cable and broadcast industries are all responsible for 
the recent pu h towards a new regime. 
Thi At1iclc has attempted to show that much can be learned by exam­
ining the history of exclusionary rights regimes in the television industry, 
the political process through which they evolved. the compromises that 
producers· exclusive right to broadcast the work in question. The United States is a party 
to both trcaue -but continues to retain the compulsory l icensmg fi·amework and its ex­
tensions to additional di tribmion channels ( i .e  .. satellite broadcasting). Interestingly. the 
study doe· not analyze the issue of broadcasters· rights in any detai l .  DA\"IO J.  BRENNA ·­
RETRANSI\ItSSIOf\ AND US COMPLIANCI:: \\ ITH TRIP 305 (2003). 
362. In th1s context. note rhat the United States i one of the main countries at the 
\ IPO that 1s pushing for the extension or the current \V I PO Broadcast Treaty's provi­
Sions to webca!)tmg -ironically enough. in order to grant webcastt.:rs propeny rights o,·er 
their 1nternet-ha ed transmts ions. This would allo" commercial webca ters to exercise 
full C'>dusionary protection against indi,·iduals makmg use of their ''ebcas�:- online and 
mterferc more directly v. ith the user dynam1c dtscussed before. A-. the treaty heads to rhe 
Gen�ral As. embly. the United States remains the only country sui I adamant about the 
webcasting proposal and there remams a strong likelihood that the non-Inclusion of thts 
aspect alone could result 111 1t::. not signing on to the final vers1011. Set! WI PO. Submission 
of tht! Unired States £?( 1/merim to rht! W!PO Swndmg Commirtee on Cop_1-righr ond Re­
fcllt!d Ntp,hrs. \\'I PO Doc. �o. CCR 1 5/1 'F 2 (Aug. 22. 2006). o\·ailohle at http:1 www. 
wipo. lntlcdot·:-. mdocslcopynghtlentsccr_ l 5'sccr_ 1 5  inf_2.pdf. 
36). (j •\ tn D. I I Bl < -\P. Co TR.A.C rt'-1< i FOR PROP I· Rl Y Rt< .trl'> 1 6- 1 9  { 1 9X9). 
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they represent, and the doctrinal structures through which they carrte to be 
implemented. Even though the United States never implemented a system 
o f  broadcasters' rights, its domestic television industry did not develop 
without the idea of property rights a I together, despite the fact that the 
United States was never a signatory to the Rome Convention. For nearly 
four decades, however, policymakers and regulators have continued to de­
ploy property institutions to regulate competition between different play­
ers in the industry-broadca ters, cable operators, and content producers. 
Not surprisingly, the beneficiaries at each stage sought more expansive 
rights than they were eventually given. Attenuated exclusionary protection 
thus formed the backbone of the system, which over the years came to de­
velop an equilibrium-one characterized by sporadic regulatory interven­
tion-al l  in the name of the ideal of "public interest" that at least notion­
ally guided lawmakers. 
The new regime that current incumbents are seeking is a continuation 
of this process, except that, perhaps for the first time, the right being 
sought is in rem in nature and aimed at the activities of the principal bene­
ficiary of the internet revolution, the individual user. Unl ike in the past, 
the primary target of the exclusionary regime is the public, and the public 
is without direct representation in the negotiation process. 
This Article has argued that there is very little justification for the 
broad and open-ended exclusionary regime that broadcasters and cable 
companies now seek. To the extent that a justification exists, it i I imited 
to the inequity of the current regulatory framework, which subjects the 
curTent incumbents to liability inter se but exempts new commercial ven­
tures I ike webcasters. This result i especially inequitable since these ven­
tures employ similar revenue models and additionally capitalize on the 
virtues of the internet. A staggered implementation proposal that employs 
the same concept of attenuated excl usionary privileges to at once enable 
new incumbents to develop and subject them to the same staggered ap­
proach that each of the current incumbents went through in the past wi l l  
remedy this seeming inequity and re-create a level playing field. This re­
gime derives from the ideals o f  unfair competition and unjust enrichment 
rather than from a property right, thereby foreclosing the possibility of any 
in rem claims while ensuring that competing distribution channels are not 
treated dis para tel y.  
ln the end, al l  o f  this may come to mean very little, if the United States 
should choose to refrain from signing the ftnal instrument of the WBT, in 
spite of its active participation in the drafting and treaty-making processes. 
Indeed, its past record in this area, with the Rome Convention, as well as 
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other more recent instances, such as with the Kyoto Protoco1364 and the 
Rome Charter of the International Cr1mjnal Court,3h� make this a distinct 
po sibil ity. Neve11heless, should the idea of property rights in broadcast 
signals ever raise its head in  domestic policy discussion , regulators and 
policymakers will  hopefully study the long and relatively complex history 
of the idea, for ··a page of history is [often] worth a \'Oiume of logic."366 
364. See ge11eral�1 Jon Hovi et al.. The Persistence o.f 1he 1\yom Prowcul: Why Other 
A1mer I Countrie,· \lol"l� On Wit/rout the United Sw1es. 3 Gl  OfML EP\\ . POL. I (2003) 
(trymg to under tand reasons for the United States' reluctance to s1gn the Kyoto Proto­
col). 
365. Set! ge111'ra/h· SARAH B. SEWALl & C �RL KA 't .  c'. TilL U'\ITl D , T ,\ TE'> -\ '\0 
THF I'\ 1 1- R  "ATIO .<\L CRIMI 1AL COURT (2000) (ancmpung to under tand \\ hy the United 
State. ha!:> not 1gned the ICC Chancr in spite of the fact that the ICC represents the '·rri­
umph of American \ <llucs in the international arena"). 
366. Eldred v. Ao;hcroft, 537 U.S. 1 86. 1 88 (2003) (quoting .lu$l1Ce Holmes· dictum 
in N. r. Trust C(J. , .. f:J, ner. 2.56 U.S. 345. 3-t9 ( I  92 1 )):  �Bay. I nc. v. Mere Exchange. 
L.L.C.. 1 26 ..... Ct. 1 X37. I 42 (2006) (same). lntcreSIJilgly. hnth the Eldred and eBay 
case!'> mvolved intcllectu;1] property i. sue . .  the former copyng.ht term and the latter parent 
1 11J U11Cli011S. 
